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CAUSES, ORIGINS, AND LESSONS OF THE
VIETNAM WAR
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
CAUSES, ORIGINS, AND LESSONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR
MAY 9, 10, AND 11, 1972
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
CAUSES, ORIGINS, AND LESSONS OF THE
VIETNAM WAR
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION ON
CAUSES, ORIGINS, AND LESSONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR
MAY 9, 10, AND 11, 1972
NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL of LAW LIBRARY
^y,f7^/^7/z/
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 83-605 WASHINGTON : 1973
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $2.35 domestic postpaid or S2.00 GPO Bookstore
Stock Number 5270-01713
r
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois WILLIAM B. SPONG, Jr., Virginia
Carl Mabct, Chief of Staff Arthur M. Kuhl, Chief Clerk
(ID
a~> p—
_J
l —1
CONTENTS
Page
Preface v
Statements by :
Gelb, Leslie H., Brookings Institution 2
Thomson, James C, Jr., Harvard University
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., City University of New York 59
Chomsky, Noam, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 80
White, Frank M., former major, Office of Strategic Services ; former
reporter, Time magazine 145
Moffat, Abbot Low, former chief, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs,
Department of State 161
Insertions for the record :
Prepared statement of Leslie H. Gelb 8
Prepared statement of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr 71
Prepared statement of Noam Chomsky S9
Charles de Gaulle on Vietnam 130
TV interview with President Nixon of July 1, 1970 134
Frank White's dispatch to Life magazine describing experiences in
Vietnam, 1945-46 154
Prepared statement of Abbot Low Moffat 172
Appendix :
"The Essential Domino : American Politics and Vietnam," article by
Leslie H. Gelb, Foreign Affairs, April 1972 207
"Vietnam: The System Worked," article by Leslie H. Gelb, Foreign
Policy, summer 1971 225
Documents relating to OSS activity in French Indochina :
Introduction 241
I. The "Deer" Mission to Viet Minh Headquarters, July-Sep- tember, 1945 :
Letter of instruction to Major Thomas, May 16, 1945 243
"Deer" Report No. 1, July 17, 1945 244
"Deer" Report. July 20. 1945 248
Report on "Deer" Mission — Maj. A. K. Thomas, Septem- ber, 17, 1945 251
The Viet Minh Party or League — Maj. A. K. Thomas 205
Pictures from the "Deer" Mission 273
II. "Detachment 404" : Mission to Saigon :
Operation "Embankment" (memorandum from Maj. Peter
Dewey), August 25, 1945 281
Chronological list of dates for Mission "Embankment" (memorandum from Maj. Herbert Bluechel), Septem- ber 17, 1945 282
Political aims and philosophy of the Viet Minh Govern- ment of French Indo-China, and their attitude toward Americans (memorandum from Capt. Herbert Blue- chel), September 30, 1945 283
Comments on reports published by the Allied Control Commission, Saigon, concerning the events of Septem- ber 26, 1945 (memorandum by Capt. Herbert Bluechel),
September 30, 1945 285
Affidavit bv Capt. Herbert Bluechel relating to the death
of Maj. Peter Dewey, October 13, 1945 286
Affidavit bv Capt. Frank White relating to the death
of Maj. Peter Dewey, October 13. 1945 292
(in)
IV
Appendix — Continued
Documents relating to OSS activity in French Indochina— Continued II. "Detachment 404" : Mission to Saigon— Continued
Investigation of death of Maj. Peter Dewey (memo- randum by Maj. F. N. Small with map), October 25, Paw
1945 296
III. Secret Intelligence Branch (S.I.) reports and documents relating to the Viet Minh :
Calling card of Vo Nguyen Giap with note 301
Appeal bv Ho Chi Minh to "Fellow Countrymen," Sep- tember 5, 1945 302
Interview with Bao Dai, former emperor of Annam,
September 19, 1945 303
Interview with Prince Souphanouvong of Laos, Septem- ber 19, 1945 304
Interview with Ho Chi Minh, September 19, 1945 305
Report on the Provisional Government, F.I.C., Septem- ber 20, 1945 307
Political information (from Swift), October 17, 1945 311
IV. iStrategic Service Unit "intelligence dissemination" reports
from French Indochina 327
Military and political information, February 28, 1946 328
Political information, March 4, 1946 330
Military information, March 6, 1946 331
French and Chinese clashes, March 6, 1946 332
Political information, March 17, 1946 333
Political information, March 17, 18, 1946 334
French troops enter Hanoi, March 18, 1946 335
Political and military information, March 19, 1946 336
Political and economic information, March 20, 1946 337
Political information— North Indo-China, March 20, 1946- 338
1946 : 338
Military and political information, March 22, 1946 339
Political information, March 24, 1946 340
PREFACE
February 1973.
During three clays of hearings in May 1972, the Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony describing the origin and evolution of American involvement in Vietnam. Appearing as witnesses before the Committee were Messrs. Leslie Gelb, James C. Thomson, Noam Chom- sky, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Abbot Low Moffat, and Frank White. In testimony covering the years 1945-72, each man shared with the committee his particular experiences and extensive knowledge in an effort to portray a full picture of the Vietnam conflict.
Of particular interest was the description by former Office of Stra- tegic Service (OSS) Officer Frank White of the conversations he held with Ho Chi Minh immediately after World War II, and the extent of contact Ho and the Viet Minh had with other OSS officers. As a result of Mr. White's testimony, I requested the intelligence reports detailing these early contacts. With the assistance of the National Archives, the Foreign Relations Committee has recently secured the declassification and release of a selection of these documents. They are being made public for the first time in the appendix of this print. Nec- essary deletions have been made for security reasons and are noted in the text wherever appropriate.
The Committee decided at its meeting in executive session on February 6 that these hearings with the previously classified material should be published.
J. W. Fulbright, Chairman.
(V)
CAUSES, ORIGINS, AND LESSONS OF THE VIETNAM
WAR
TUESDAY, MAY 9, 1972
United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman), presiding. Present : Senators Fulbright, Muskie, Aiken and Percy. The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
opening statement
The United States today has 68,000 troops stationed in South Viet- nam, with an additional 52,000 men on ships offshore, 37,000 Air Force personnel in neighboring Thailand and 10,000 on Guam. The arrival of the sixth aircraft carrier stationed off Vietnam brings the number of combat aircraft to 1,000. On some days in past weeks these aircraft have flown as many as 1,000 sorties. As of April 29 of this year, over 55,861 Americans have lost their lives in Indochina.
This week's hearings on the causes, origins and lessons of the Viet- nam war, while historical in emphasis, cannot overlook the fact that the United States continues to be deeply involved in this tragic war in Vietnam.
The questions we will address in these hearings are : Why are we fighting in Vietnam? How did we get there? What were the reasons for the initial U.S. commitment? Have these reasons changed, and if so, why do we persist ?
The United States has been actively involved in Vietnam for well over a decade although the roots of that involvement stretch back as far as the Second World War. By reviewing the history of the deepen- ing U.S. involvement in Indochina, we hope this inquiry will yield lessons from which present and future policy might benefit.
Within the government and the scholarly community, a number of explanations of U.S. policy in Vietnam have developed during the past years. In the next few days of hearings we will consider a variety of views and perspectives on the war.
By applying these alternative critical perspectives to the history of U.S. policy in Vietnam, we may arrive at a better understanding of the causes, origins and escalation of the war.
A recent, very important contribution to that understanding was the declassification and publication of "United States-Vietnam Rela-
(l)
tions. 1945-1967," popularly known as the "Pentagon Papers." This compilation of documents and analyses sheds light on much of the official thinking behind critical decisions taken in the war.
To contribute to a better understanding of these decisions, the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations has undertaken its own staff studies of important turning points in the war. The first study, "Vietnam Com- mitments, 1961," dealt with the critical decisions made during the first year of the Kennedy Administration.
The second study, "The United States and Vietnam; 1944-1947," examined in detail American attitudes toward Ho Chi Minh during and after the Second World War.
A third study on negotiations remains classified at the insistence of the Department of State.
Two more studies, one on the events leading up to the Diem coup and the other on U.S. bombing policies, are in the process of being com- pleted. In preparing these studies, the committee staff has relied heavily on the Pentagon history. Despite our requests to several execu- tive agencies for additional documentation, these have been denied us.
INVITATIONS TO TESTIFY
This week's hearings on the origins of the war are a continuation of the effort to advance the dialogue over and further understanding of the U.S. role in the Vietnam war. To bring a broad spectrum of per- spectives to bear on the causes, origins and lessons of the war, the com- mittee has invited distinguished scholars and former governmental officials to testify, The committee was particularly anxious to obtain the benefit of the experience of officials who had been actually involved in early decisionmaking on the war. Unfortunately, the high-ranking officials who were invited to appear either refused to testify or backed out at the last moment. Only former Secretary of State Dean Rusk has indicated that he might be able to appear, but at a later date.
TODAY'S WITNESSES
As our first witness we are fortunate to have Dr. Leslie Gelb from Brookings Institution who served as the Chairman of the Vietnam Task Force in the Department of Defense which prepared the Penta- gon history of the war. He will be followed by Professor James C. Thomson, Jr., from Harvard University, who served in the State De- partment and on the White House staff during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
Dr. Gelb, we are very pleased to have you. Since the hearings were set, of course, there have been some significant changes in the situation. Whether or not you wish to comment on those, of course, is up to you, but we would be very pleased now if you would present your testimony.
STATEMENT OF LESLIE H. GELB, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Mr. Gelb. Mr. Chairman, I am honored by your committee's invita- tion to present testimony on the subject of Vietnam.
What is really on my mind is the President's speech last night and the actions that will flow from it.
I believe my testimony is relevant to that speech and those actions, but I would be glad to comment further on the President's speech later in my testimony.
The purpose of your hearings is history, but with respect to Viet- nam the past and the present are irrevocably interlocked.
The mind-numbing sameness of the war and the overwhelming fact that this war is not }7et history compel us to be contemporary historians with all the attendant risks.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to severely sum- marize my statement and ask that it be entered in the record in its entirety.
The Chairman. Yes, indeed; it will all be entered and you may proceed.
Mr. Gelb. My testimony will deal with (1) the past, specifically, the causes of United States involvement in the war, and (2) the present, specifically the lessons of the past that bear on today.
Wars are supposed to tell us about ourselves. Are we a wise and just Nation ? Or are we foolish and aggressive, merciless or humane, well- led or misled, vital or decadent, hopeful or hopeless? Nations in war and after war, win or lose, try to scratch away at the paste or glue or traditions or values that held their societies together and see of what they are made. It is arguable whether a society should indulge in such self-scrutiny. Societies are, as Edmund Burke wrote, "delicate, intri- cate wholes" that are more easily damaged than improved when sub- jected to the glare of Grand Inquisitors.
But in the case of our own society and the war in Vietnam, too many people are seeking answers and are entitled to them, and many are only too eager to fill in the blanks. The families and friends of those who were killed and wounded will want to know whether it was worth it after all. Intellectuals will want to know "Why Vietnam?" Men seeking and holding political office will demand to know who was responsible.
The answers to these questions will themselves become political facts and forces shaping the United States' role in the world and our lives at home for years to come.
OFFERED EXPLANATIONS OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
Central to this inquiry is the issue of causes of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. I have found eight discernible explanations advanced in the Vietnam literature. Different authors combine these explanations in various ways, but I will keep them separate for the purpose of analysis. I will then sketch my own position.
Let me just list, Mr. Chairman, the eight different explanations that have been offered: (1) the arrogance of power; (2) bureaucratic poli- tics; (3) our domestic political situation and forces ; (4) imperialism; (5) the explanation of men making hard choices pragmatically; (6) balance of power politics, talk of honor and keeping commitments, credibility of our commitments; (7) the slippery slope thesis, that we got into the war in Vietnam through excessive optimism and inad- vertence; and (8) I think, most importantly, the explanation that we got into Vietnam principally to stop communism.
HOW AND WITH WHAT EXPECTATIONS UNITED STATES BECAME INVOLVED
As of this point in my own research. I advance three propositions to explain how and with what expectations the United States became involved in this war :
First, the U.S.'s involvement in Vietnam is not mainly or mostly a story of step by step, inadvertent descent into unforeseen quick- sand. It is primarily a story of why U.S. leaders considered that it was vital not to lose Vietnam by force to communism. Our leaders believed Vietnam to be vital not for itself but for what they thought its loss would mean internationally and domestically. Previous involve- ment made further involvement more unavoidable and, to this extent, commitments were inherited. But judgments of Vietnam's vitalness, beginning: with the Korean war, were sufficient in themselves to set the course for escalation.
Second, our Presidents were never actually seeking a military vic- tory in Vietnam. In my opinion, they were doing only what they thought was minimally necessary at each stage to keep Indochina, and later South Vietnam, out of Communist hands. In a way, this made our policy a functional equivalent of escalation and a functional equivalent of seeking victory.
This forced our Presidents to be brakemen, to do less than those who were urging military victory and to reject proposals for disengage- ment. It also meant that our Presidents wanted a negotiated settle- ment without fully realizing — though realizing more than their critics — that a civil war cannot be ended by political compromise.
Third, our Presidents and most of their lieutenants were not deluded by optimistic reports of progress and did not proceed on the basis of wishful thinking about winning a military victory in South Vietnam. They recognized that the steps they were taking were not adequate to win the war and that unless Hanoi relented, they would have to do more and more.
Their strategy was to persevere in the hope that their will to con- tinue, if not the practical effects of their actions, would cause the Com- munists to relent.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record of my testimony the article in which I developed these proposi- tions and expand on these propositions.
The Chairman. Yes, without objection, it will be so done. (See appendix.)
PRESIDENT NIXON'S JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUATION OF WAR
Mr. Gelb. President Nixon may no longer be devoted to simple anti- communism as the main reason for pursuing the Vietnam war. His administration has done much to rid the public debate of the old cold war cliches. The President's last two speeches, however, in which he frequently invoked the "Communist" threat, does raise suspicions about changes in his thinking. Nevertheless, President Nixon has for the most part justified continuation of the war along two lines : first, he says that it is crucial to our foreign policy and, second, he says that losing would lead to a nightmare of recrimination at home undermin- ing political support for U.S. interest abroad.
CENTRAL TASK BEFORE COMMITTEE
From my vantage point the central task before this committee is to evaluate the President's rationales on their merits, of course, but also against the lessons we should have learned from 25 years of war in Vietnam.
LESSONS WE SHOULD HAVE LEARNED
Lesson one concerns the Saigon government and military forces. They always get better, but they never get good enough. The current North Vietnamese offensive, whatever the immediate results, shows once again that the Saigon forces cannot defend themselves without massive American assistance. Regardless of what can be said about the improvement and bravery of the Saigon forces, one simple fact ob- scures all the rest — a North Vietnamese force of some 100,000-plus men are fighting and beating a 1 million-plus South Vietnamese armed force backed up by about 800 tactical air sorties per day. Something is wrong somewhere. Something always has been wrong.
The lesson is that military power without political cohesiveness and support is an empty shell. Without the legitimacy, without political legitimacy in a government and the quest for it in South Vietnam seems never ending, the Saigon regime perpetually will require Amer- ican support.
Lesson two concerns the Hanoi government. "While annual hints and predictions have it that the North Vietnamese are about to expire, their will to fight seems undiminished and they keep coming back. It is not necessary to glorify Hanoi to face this fact. The brutality of Hanoi's methods of warfare have matched, if not exceeded, Saigon's, but something for them always has gone right somewhere.
The lesson, I believe, is that time and determination are on the side of the elemental tide of nationalism and that the leadership in Hanoi, for historical reasons, always has symbolized this basic political force.
Lesson three comes back to the nature of the war itself. The war in Vietnam was and is a civil war and a war for national independence, in my opinion. The central question of who shall rule Vietnam would have been settled on just these terms long ago had it not been for the intervention of outside powers. The reason, I think, is that the war will never end as long as outside powers keep it going. This goes for Russia and China as well as for the United States. But the United States has a particular responsibility for prolonging this war. We must face the tragic and brutal fact and probability that more Vietna- mese will die by the continuation of the present war than will die, in my opinion, from the bloodletting following its conclusion. _
We can attribute great principles to our involvement in Vietnam but these principles can mean only continuing death to the Vietnamese and in the end the struggle will be resolved as it began, by the Vietna- mese themselves.
A fourth lesson related to the others concerns bombing and, I be- lieve, mining of ports. The lesson is that more bombing and mining will bring neither victory nor peace.
More bombing and mining in North Vietnam will, in time, some- what curtail Hanoi's present offensive in the south but at the risk of once again setting back U.S. relations with Russia and China and at the price of countless civilian lives.
6
More bombing in South Vietnam -will impede Hanoi's offensive at the expense of killing and making refugees out of hundreds of thou- sands of people.
What, then, is the purpose of such senseless slaughter ?
A fifth lesson concerns domestic dissent. Many people who partici- pated in the efforts of the last 7 years to change our policy say that they think they were wasting their time. I do not agree. Their opposition and the potential threat of greater public opposition was a constant factor in the deliberations of American policymakers over the years.
The lesson is that dissenters may not have been powerful but they were not powerless. Responsible criticism often centered in these cham- bers, played an important and honorable role in preventing worse out- rages from taking place.
A sixth and final lesson stemming from the others concerns dealing with dilemmas and ending the war.
DILEMMAS PRESENTED TO UNITED STATES BY VIETNAM
Given the constant goal of a non-Communist south Vietnam since the Korean war, Vietnam has presented the United States with dilemmas.
At first our leaders realized there was no chance of defeating the Vietminh unless France granted independence to Vietnam, but that if France granted independence to Vietnam she would not remain and fight the war. So we could not win with France and we could not win without her. Then our leaders recognized that Diem was hopelessly losing the support of the people but, at the same time, that he repre- sented the only hope of future political stability. So we could not win with Diem and we could not win without him. Later, our leaders came to the view that the Saigon regime could not survive without massive American involvement and that the North Vietnamese effort seemed able to survive despite our efforts. So, again, the war cannot be won with the United States nor without the United States.
REASONS GIVEN FOR PERSISTING QUESTIONED
In full knowledge of these dilemmas, our leaders persisted never- theless. Each successor group of leaders thought that they might just succeed where their predecessors had failed, or at least that they would prevent defeat. Our leaders plowed on for the range of reasons dis- cussed earlier in this paper.
For many years, until the American people saw the policy was not working and began doubting the word of their elected officials, these reasons found a generous reception. It is not difficult to understand why proposals for U.S. disengagement fell on deaf ears. People be- lieved in this war for a very long time, but this is a different time and we have, I think, a new and more sensible lens through which to view the war.
The old rationales about nations falling like dominoes to communism and our own Nation falling into the pit of McCarthyism no longer, in my judgment, can stand close scrutiny. Extremists looking for scape- goats will try to cause trouble but every indication is that the American
people want out of this war. Nor should U.S. withdrawal from Viet- nam presage a return to popular isolationism. If continuing commit- ments elsewhere in the world are honestly explained and seem reason- able to the American people, they have a proven record of being will- ing to bear international burdens.
As for the fate of Vietnam being central to the credibility and suc- cesses of all U.S. foreign policy, as President Xixon has often sug- gested, this is a highly questionable proposition. What wisdom is there that causes President Nixon to link what he calls the "dignity of the office of the Presidency" to the fate of the Saigon forces? Who still believes that any of our allies expect us to fight indefinitely ? How many of our allies were worried enough about the fate of Vietnam to make a meaningful contribution to its defense ? If anything, the domino theory may now be true in reverse, that is, if we continue the war, this act alone might jeopardize the growing pursuit of common inter- ests between Washington and Peking and Moscow and might under- mine American political support for a continuing U.S. security role in the world.
It would be better to find some magic diplomatic formula that could reconcile all parties in Vietnam in a free and democratic process. No civil war has been settled by political compromise. Every president — even President Nixon's generous terms when measured b}^ the standard of nation-to-nation negotiations cannot resolve the hatreds and stakes of a civil war. Civil warring parties will not risk their lives and their lifelong aspirations in the throw of some electoral dice. Elections require trust and a common loyalty. These are precisely the ingredients which are missing in a civil war.
At this point in history, the issue of morality as between the Hanoi and Saigon regimes is not a clearcut matter. The refugees are fleeing south, not north. But when they get south they develop no loyalty to Saigon. It is not easy now to declaim whether Hanoi or Saigon is right about who should rule South Vietnam. But I do believe that the United States is not the keeper of Vietnamese morality and that it is wrong for our Nation to perpetuate this war.
WHAT PENTAGON PAPERS DO AND DO NOT TELL US
The Pentagon papers, the matter specifically before this committee, tell the story of how the executive branch of our government perpetu- ated the Vietnam war. They do not tell us about the role of the Con- gress, the news media, the political climate in our country and our values, or the reactions of other nations. Nor do the Pentagon papers answer the question of what kind of nation are we, the question which I posed at the beginning of this presentation. We may well have this answer in the coming weeks.
ONLY WAT TO RESOLVE VIETNAM DILEMMA
The only way, in my judgment, to resolve the Vietnam dilemma is for the United States to set a date certain for the complete withdrawal of our land, sea and air forces from the Indochina theater in return for our prisoners of war. We must also stand ready to provide refuge for those desiring to leave South Vietnam. This is not a good alternative —
8
the one I am proposing. There are costs that we cannot run away from, but it is better than persisting in an endless, hopeless and tragic war.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(Mr. Gelb's prepared statement follows :)
Statement of Leslie H. Gelb on Vietnam : Causes of the Wab and Lessons
Leaened
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored by your committee's invitation to present testimony on the subject of Vietnam. The pur- pose of your hearings is history, but with respect to Vietnam, the past and the present are irrevocably interlocked. The mind-numbing sameness of the war and the overwhelming fact that this war is not yet history, compel us to be contempo- rary historians with all the attendant risks.
My testimony will deal with (1) the past, specifically the causes of U.S. in- volvement in the war, and (2) the present, specifically the lessons of the past that bear on today.
Wars are supposed to tell us about ourselves. Are we a wise and just nation? Or are we foolish and aggressive? Merciless or humane? Well led or mislead? Vital or decadent? Hopeful or hopeless? Nations in war and after war, win or lose, try to scratch away at the paste or glue or traditions or values that held their societies together and see of what they are made. It is arguable whether a society should indulge in such self-scrutiny. Societies are, as Edmund Burke wrote, "delicate, intricate wholes" that are more easily damaged than improved when subjected to the glare of Grand Inquisitors.
But in the case of our own society and the war in Vietnam, too many people are seeking answers and are entitled to them, and many are only too eager to fill in the blanks. The families and friends of those who were killed and wounded will want to know whether it was worth it after all? Intellectuals will want to kno>v "why Vietnam"? Men seeking and holding political ofiice will demand to Know who was responsible? The answers to these questions will themselves become political facts and forces, shaping the United States role in the world and our lives at home for years to come.
i. causes of the war : the range of explanations
Central to this inquiry is the issue of causes of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. I have found eight discernible explanations advanced in the Vietnam literature. Different authors combine these explanations in various ways, but I will keep them separate for the purpose of analysis. I will, then, sketch by own position.
1. The arrogrance of power
This view holds that a driving force in American envelopment in Vietnam was the fact that we were a nation of enormous power and like comparable nations in history, we would seek to use this power at every opportunity. To have power is to want to employ it, is to be corrupted by it. The arrogance derives from the belief that to have power is to be able to do anything. Power invokes right and justifies itself. Vietnam was there, a challenge to this power and an opportunity for its exercise, and no task was beyond accomplishment.
There can be no doubt about this strain in the behavior of other great powers and in the American character. But this is not a universal law. Great powers, and especially the United States have demonstrated self-restraint. The arrogance of power, I think, had more to do with our persisting in the war than with our initial involvement. It always was difficult for our leaders back in Wash- ington and for operatives in the field to believe that American resources and ingenuity could not devise some way to overcome the adversary.
2. Bureaucratic politics
There are two, not mutually exclusive, approaches within this view. One has it that national security bureaucrats (the professionals who make up the military services, civilian Defense, AID, State, and the CIA) are afflicted with the curse of machismo, the need to assert and prove manhood and toughness. Career advancement and acceptability within the bureaucracy depended on showing that you were not afraid to propose the use of force. The other ap-
9
proach has it that bureaucrats purposefully misled their superiors about the situation in Vietnam and carefully constructed policy alternatives so as to cir- cumscribe their superiors, those forcing further involvement in Vietnam.
The machismo phenomenon is not unknown in the bureaucracy. It was difficult, if not damaging, to careers to appear conciliatory or "soft". Similarly, the con- striction of options is a well-known bureaucratic device. But, I think, these ap- proaches unduly emphasize the degree to which the President and his immediate advisers were trapped by the bureaucrats. The President was always in a posi- tion to ask for new options or to exclude certain others. The role of the bureaucracy was much more central to shaping the programs or the means used to fight the war than the key decisions to make the commitments in the first place.
S. Domestic politics
This view is quite complicated, and authors argue their case on several dif- ferent levels. The variants are if you were responsible for losing Vietnam to communism, you would: (a) lose the next election and lose the White House in particular; (b) jeopardize your domestic legislative program, your influence in general, by having to defend yourself constantly against political attack; (c) invite the return of a McCarthyite right-wing reaction; and (d) risk under- mining domestic support for a continuing U.S. role abroad, in turn, risking dan- gerous probes by Russia and China.
There can be no doubt, despite the lack of supporting evidence in the Penta- gon Papers, about the importance of domestic political considerations in both the initial commitment to and the subsequent increase in our Vietnam involvement. Officials are reluctant, for obvious reasons, to put these considerations down in writing, and scholars therefore learn too little about them. It should also be noted that domestic political factors played a key part in shaping the manner in which the war was fought — no reserve call-ups, certain limitations on bombing target- ting, paying for the war, and the like.
If. Imperialism
This explanation is a varient of the domestic politics explanation. Proponents of this view argue that special interest groups maneuvered the United States into the war. Their goal was to capture export markets and natural resources at public expense for private economic gain.
The evidence put forward to support this "devil theory" has not been persuasive. Certain groups do gain economically from wars, but their power to drive our political system into war tends to be exaggerated and over-dramatized.
5. Men making hard choices pragmatically
This is the view that our leaders over the years were not men who were in- spired by any particular ideology, but were pragmatists weighing the evidence and looking at each problem on its merits. According to this perspective, our leaders knew they were facing tough choices, and their decisions always were close ones. But having decided 51 to 49 to go ahead, they tried to sell and imple- ment their policies one hundred percent.
This view cannot be dismissed out-of-hand. Most of our leaders, and especially our Presidents, occupied centrist political positions. But Vietnam is a case, I be- lieve, where practical politicians allowed an anti-communist world view to get the best of them.
6. Balance of power politics
Intimately related to the pragmatic explanations is the conception which often accompanies pragmatism — the desire to maintain some perceived balance-of- power among nations. The principal considerations in pursuing this goal were : seeing that "the illegal use of force" is not allowed to succeed, honoring commit- ments, and keeping credibility with allies and potential adversaries. The under- lying judgment was that failure to stop aggression in one place would tempt others to aggress in ever more dangerous places.
These represent the words and arguments most commonly and persuasively used in the executive branch, the Congress, and elsewhere. They seemed common- sensical and prudential. Most Americans were prepared to stretch their meaning to Vietnam. No doubt many believed these arguments on their own merits, but in most cases, I think, the broader tenet of anti-communism made them convincing.
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7. The slippery slope
Tied to the pragmatic approach, the conception of balance of power and the arrogance of power, is the explanation which holds that United States involve- ment in Vietnam is the story of the slippery slope. According to this view, Viet- nam was not always critical to U.S. national security; it became so oyer the years as each succeeding administration piled commitment on commitment. I^ach administration sort of slid further into the Vietnam quagmire, not really under- standing the depth of the problems in Vietnam and convinced that it could win. The catchwords of this view are optimism and inadvertence.
While this explanation undoubtedly fits certain individuals and certain periods of time, it is, by itself, a fundamental distortion of the Vietnam experi- ence From the Korean War, stated American objectives for Vietnam were con- tinuously high and absolute. U.S. involvement, not U.S. objectives, increased over time. Moreover, to scrutinize the range of official public statements and the private memos as revealed in the Pentagon Papers makes it difficult to argue that our leaders were deceived by the enormity of the Vietnam task before them. It was not necessary for our leaders to believe they were going to win. It was sufficient for them to believe that they could not afford to lose Vietnam to communism.
8. Anti-Communism
The analysts who offer this explanation hold that anti-communism was the central and all-pervasive fact of U.S. foreign policy from at least 1947 until the end of the sixties. After World War II, an ideology whose very existence seemed to threaten basic American values had combined with the national force of first Russia and then China. This combination of ideology and power brought our leaders to see the world in "we-they" terms and to insist that peace was in- divisible. Going well beyond balance of power considerations, every piece of territory became critical, and every beseiged nation, a potential domino. Com- munism came to be seen as an infection to be quarantined rather than a force to be judiciously and appropriately balanced. Vietnam, in particular, became the cockpit of confrontation between the "Free World" and Totalitarianism ; it was where the action was for 20 years.
In my opinion, simple anti-communism was the principal reason for United States involvement in Vietnam. It is not the whole story, but it is the biggest part.
As of this point in my own research, I advance three propositions to explain why, how, and with what expectations the United States became involved in the Vietnam war.
First, U.S. involvement in Vietnam is not mainly or mostly a story of step by step, inadvertent descent into unforeseen quicksand. It is primarily a story of why U.S. leaders considered that it was vital not to lose Vietnam by force to Communism. Our leaders believed Vietnam to be vital not for itself, but for what they thought its "loss" would mean internationally and domestically. Previous involvement made further involvement more unavoidable, and, to this extent, commitments were inherited. But judgments of Vietnam's "vitalness" — begin- ning with the Korean War — were sufficient in themselves to set the course for escalation.
Second, our Presidents were never actually seeking a military victory in Viet- nam. They were doing only what they thought was minimally necessary at each stage to keep Indochina, and later South Vietnam, out of Communist hands. This forced our Presidents to be brakemen, to do less than those who were urg- ing military victory and to reject proposals for disengagement. It also meant that our Presidents wanted a negotiated settlement without fully realizing (though realizing more than their critics) that a civil war cannot be ended by political compromise.
Third, our Presidents and most of their lieutenants were not deluded by opti- mistic reports of progress and did not proceed on the basis of wishful thinking about winning a military victory in South Vietnam. They recognized that the steps they were taking were not adequate to win the war and that unless Hanoi relented, they would have to do more and more. Their strategy was to persevere in hope that their will to continue — if not the practical effects of their actions- would cause the Communists to relent.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record of my testimony the article in which I develop these propositions.
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II. LESSONS LEABNED
President Nixon may no longer be devoted to simple anti-communism as the main reason for pursuing the Vietnam war. His administration has done much to rid the public debate of the old cold war cliches. The President's speech of April 30, however, in which he frequently invoked the •'communist'' threat does raise suspicions about his change of thinking. Nevertheless, President Nixon has, for the most part, justified continuation of the war along two lines : first, that "the right way out of Vietnam is crucial to our changing role in the world, and the peace in the world" ; and second that losing would produce a "nightmare of recrimination" at home, undermining political support for U.S. interests abroad. From my vantage point, the central task before this Committee is to evaluate the President's rationales on their merits, of course, but also against the lessons we should have learned from twenty-five years of war in Vietnam.
Lesson one concerns the Saigon Government and military forces. They always get better, but they never get good enough. The current North Vietnamese offensive, whatever the immediate results, shows once again that the Saigon forces cannot defend themselves without massive American assistance. Ke- gardless of what can be said about the improvement and bravery of the Saigon forces, one simple fact obscures all the rest — a North Vietnamese force of some 100,000 men is fighting and beating a 1 million plus South Vietnamese army backed up by about 800 tactical air sorties per day. Something is wrong somewhere. Something always has been wrong.
The lesson is that military power without political cohesiveness and support is an empty shell. Americans can have great sympathy for the many non-com- munist South Vietnamese who do not want to be ruled by the communists. Yet, these groups never have been able to submerge their own difference into a single, unified purpose and gather support from the peasant masses. Most recently, the Thieu regime has gained in stability but not in legitimacy. Without this legit- imacy, and the quest for it seems never-ending, the Saigon regime perpetually will require American support.
Lesson two concerns the Hanoi Government. While annual hints and predictions have it that the North Vietnamese are about to expire, their will to fight seems undiminished and they keep coming back. It is not necessary to glorify Hanoi to face this fact. The brutality of Hanoi's methods of warfare have matched, if not exceeded, Saigon's. And certainly, Hanoi has received massive doses of aid from the Soviet Union and China — although only a fraction of the aid the United States has given to Saigon. But something has gone right for them somewhere.
The lesson is, I believe, that time and determination are on the side of the ele- mental tide of nationalism, and that the leadership in Hanoi