THE MAILING LIST
The Infantry School
MAILING LIST
A compilation of instructional matter prepared at Ghe Infantry School
and issued from time to time
Containing the Latest Thought on Infantry
VOLUME XXI
Prepared by the Academic Department of the Infantry School under the supervision of the Assistant Commandant
DISTRIBUTED BY THE BOOK SHOP THE INFANTRY SCHOOL, FORT BENNING, GEORGIA
ann? MA?
prcgeety of U.S.
PREFACE
This volume of The Infantry School Mailing List con- tains material contributed by the following officers sta- tioned at Fort Benning, Georgia:
Lt. Colonel Sterling A. Wood, Infantry
Lt. Colonel Donald A. Stroh, Infantry
Lt. Colonel Elbridge G. Chapman, Jr., Infantry Lt. Colonel Thomas W. Herren, Cavalry
Major Charles L. Keerans, Infantry
Major James A. Lewis, Infantry
Major Thomas V. Webb, Infantry
Captain Crawford F. Sams, Medical Corps.
Lt. Colonel Sterling A. Wood, Infantry, assisted by Lt. Colonel Harry S. Wilbur, Infantry, and Major Leander D. Syme, Infantry, edited this volume under the supervision of Lt. Colonel Henry P. Perrine, Infantry.
The drawings, map reproductions, printing, and binding are the work of the enlisted personnel of The Infantry School Reproduction Plant, supervised by Lt. Colonel James H. McDonough, Infantry.
Charles W. Thomas, Jr., Colonel, Infantry,
Acting Assistant Commandant, The Infantry School.
(v)
Always do a little more
than can reasonably
be expected of you.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
February, 1940
Chapter Page 1. Tactics of the Auto-Rifle Squad 1 2. Medical Service in the Defense 15 3. The Heavy Weapons Company in the Attack . 49
4. An Infantry Battalion in the Attack (German Battalion Attacks in Poland) .... 89
5. Tactical Employment of a Motorized Detachment 107 6. Signal Communication—Regiment in Attack 133
An Infantry Regiment (Reinforced) Prepares to Receive an Armored Attack _................. 165
8. The Infantry Regimental Commander in Offensive Combat . - ; _ 197
9. An Infantry Rifle Regiment Launches an Attack.... 215 10. Motorized Patrolling i << aaa
11. The Modern Ration of the German Armed Forces 297
(vii)
CHAPTER 1
Tactics of the Auto-Rifle Squad
(AN INFANTRY SCHOOL TEACHING)
CHARACTERISTICS, ORGANIZATION, AND EQUIPMENT
The auto-rifle squad of the rifle platoon is armed with the Browning Automatic Rifle, M1918 A2.
The auto-rifle is capable of the rapid production of a large volume of accurate, concentrated or distributed fire and offers a small target when in action. Auto-riflemen have the marching mobility of riflemen but not their capa- bility for short bursts of speed. The auto-rifle is not suited for sustained fire for long periods, nor for indirect fire, but, for short periods of time, can produce a volume of fire equivalent to that of several M1 rifles. The auto-rifle is a most effective shoulder weapon against hostile aircraft.
Certain modifications in the BAR M1918 have recently been adopted and incorporated in the M1918 A2 rifle. These are:
1. A metal bipod has been attached to the rear section of the flash-hider. This is so attached that the rifle can be rotated on the bipod head without canting regardless of uneven ground on which the bipod legs may stand. The bipod legs are rigidly locked in a vertical plane for firing. The shoes on the legs of the bipod are rounded to resemble skids and-have been set at angles of ninety degrees to the legs.
2. A hinged butt-plate has been attached to the top of the butt-plate. It is short enough to prevent cramping of the large muscle at the junction of the neck and shoulder.
‘SV SIGIW OY MMBWOynY SulUMOAgG—y | aunDIg
TACTICS OF THE AUTO-RIFLE SQUAD 3
3. The cyclic rate can now be changed at will from the normal rate of about 600 rounds per minute to a decreased rate of about 350 rounds per minute. This decreased cyclic rate has greatly increased the accuracy of automatic fire. It also enables the gun to be fired automatically from the shoulder in the standing position.
4. A cut away forearm gives better cooling properties.
5. A pistol grip affords better control in firing.
6. A stock rest has been provided to permit laying the gun on a final protective line during daytime. An elevating screw and clamp on the stock rest allow the gun to be laid and clamped for any desired range. Aiming stakes, or improvised stakes driven along the side of the barrel, can be used to control the direction of fire. Thus the gun can deliver automatic fire along a predetermined line under any condition of visibility—regardless of fog, smoke, and darkness.
ORGANIZATION The organization of the auto-rifle squad is as follows:
1 Sergeant, squad leader. 1 Corporal, assistant squad leader. Privates or privates first class: 2 Auto-riflemen. 2 Assistant auto-riflemen. 2 Ammunition carriers.
The auto-riflemen are armed with auto-rifles. The two assistant auto-riflemen are armed with pistols. All other members of the squad are armed with rifles. The squad is divided into two auto-rifle teams of three men each, one of whom is designated as team leader.
Tables of Organization effective October 1, 1940 show two automatic rifles per platoon. New Tables of Basic Allowances will provide an extra automatic rifle in each weapon carrier of the rifle company and one reserve, which will enable the company commander to employ habitually three auto-rifles per platoon in defensive situations.
LIST
THE
MAILING
AMMUNITION SUPPLY
According to the Tables of Basic Allowances dated Jan- uary 1, 1939 the following allowances of ammunition were prescribed :
On the On the Battalion On Train Individual Ammunition Higher Total Vehicle Unit Rifle, Browning, Auto, M1918 Al * In the Rifle Squad 200 (a) 820 (b) 520 1540
* Without the stock rest and cyclic rate reducer.
(NOTE.—No Tables of Basic Allowances have been published since the adoption of the Auto Rifle Squad. However, the figures give an
indication as to the amount of ammunition that will be authorized.)
(a) 80 rounds carried by the Auto Rifleman and 120 rounds car- ried by the Assistant Auto Rifleman, all in magazines.
(b) 300 rounds to be issued prior to combat: 100 to the Auto Rifleman and 80 to the Assistant Auto Rifleman in magazines; 120 to the Assistant Auto Rifleman in bandoleers. 520 retained in the
battalion ammunition vehicle as a reserve.
All of the ammunition provided for the automatic rifle is divided into 12% armor piercing, 81% ball, and 7% tracer.
IN THE ATTACK
In the attack, auto-rifles are usually employed to sup- port the advance of the rifle squads of the platoon or to assist the advance of adjacent units. They are usually employed under platoon control. However, if attachment to rifle squads results in their more effective employment, they may be so attached.
The auto-rifle squad usually functions under the general direction of the platoon leader. The guns are usually em- ployed together under the direct control of the squad leader so as to simplify control, facilitate supply, and ensure the
TACTICS OF THE AUTO-RIFLE SQUAD 5
continuity and increase the density of fire. Frequently, however, the terrain and mission will necessitate the two auto-rifles being employed separately.
The dispositions and movement of the squad in extended order are generally as prescribed for the rifle squad in Infantry Drill Regulations (FM 22-5).
In the advance in route column the auto-rifle squad marches as part of the rifle platoon. Orders for its forma- tion and location normally will be issued by the platoon commander. The usual formation for the squad is squad column or squad wedge. A line of skirmishers or infiltra- tion should be used when advancing across ground swept by hostile fire.
MISSION The mission assigned the auto-rifle squad in the attack generally will be one or more of the following:
1. Support, by fire, the rifle squads of their own pla- toon.
th
. Protect the flanks of the platoon. 3. Cover the reorganization of the platoon.
4. Assist the advance of adjacent platoons by flanking fire.
5. Attachment in rare cases to rifle squads.
6. AA defense.
In the approach march the auto-rifle squad also marches with the platoon. During this phase it is the principal platoon weapon for AA defense, and orders for its initial formation and location are issued by the platoon com- mander.
The squad usually moves under the direction of the squad leader. It normally moves in rear of the center of the lead- ing echelon of the platoon, taking advantage of cover to reach a position where the teams can readily be put into
6 THE MAILING LIST
action. When advancing in close proximity to rifle squads, the auto-rifle squad should adopt the formation taken by the rifle squads. Regardless of the formation, the squad leader leads his squad. The squad leader may change the initial formation upon his own initiative to take advantage of cover and to reduce losses.
FIGURE 2.—Advancing the BAR through heavy grass.
The auto-rifles constitute a flexible, easily controlled volume of fire in the hands of the rifle-platoon leader. They are put into action when conditions especially favor their employment. The difficulty of ammunition supply restricts the use of these weapons to situations where their support is vital to the success of the platoon and adjacent units.
Situations especially favoring the use of the auto-rifle are offered where an open flank permits flanking fire in support of the movement of the rifle squads. The squad is preferably put into action on a flank of the platoon. Such situations may result from the deployment of the rifle com- pany over a wide front or from the separation of the pla- toon from adjacent units in the course of battle. When one platoon advances more rapidly than adjacent platoons,
TACTICS OF THE AUTO-RIFLE SQUAD 7
gaps in depth occur, making available flanking fields of fire which facilitate the full development of the fire power of the auto-rifles.
The auto-rifle squad intensifies its fires as necessary during periods when any part of it or any squad of the platoon or adjacent units are in movement. During periods when no movement is in progress or impending, it reserves its fires to conserve its ammunition and its fighting power.
At ranges beyond 400 yards, auto-rifles open fire only when other available fire support is inadequate.
Auto-rifles act by fire and movement. They must seek positions that enable them to perform their fire missions. Generally these positions will be:
FIRE POSITIONS
On a flank of the platoon. In a gap between rifle squads.
Behind an advanced rifle unit, in a position to permit flanking fire across the front of an adjacent unit.
The auto-rifles may occupy primary positions or alter- nate positions. A primary position is one normally occu- pied by the auto-rifle and its crew and is the one from which it can best accomplish its assigned mission. An alternate position is one used when enemy fire, or the threat of fire, makes it necessary to move the rifle and its crew from the primary position to protect them and keep them in action. Fire from an alternate position must be able to cover the same target or sector of fire as fire from the primary position. An alternate position should be at least 50 yards from the primary position.
8 THE MAILING LIST
The mission assigned the auto-rifle squad is the primary factor governing the selection of auto-rifle positions. Other factors are:
1. Fields of fire.
2. Safety for the auto-rifles and their personnel (cover and concealment).
3. Time available.
1. Routes of approach for the occupation of the posi- tions and for supply.
5. Contact with the rifle unit being supported. 6. Routes for displacement forward.
FiGURE 3.—BAR in jiring position.
Whenever practicable, cover should be available in rear of the fire positions for the shelter of the auto-rifle teams and the weapons when not firing.
Fire direction and control.—The platoon leader assigns a general position area and targets or a target area to the squad leader. The squad leader assigns approximate posi- tions and targets or sectors of fire to the auto-rifle teams. Sectors of fire are assigned where targets cannot be defi- nitely located and the teams are too widely separated for
TACTICS OF THE AUTO-RIFLE SQUAD 9
target designation by the squad leader. Where a line tar- get is designated, fire may be distributed between the teams by the allocation of a part of the target to each team.
Displacement.—After the squad engages in the fire fight, it carries out its movement in close coordination with its own fire and the fires of the rifle squads and the support- ing weapons. Movement is usually effected by team eche- lons and by bounds from successive fire positions. Teams execute rushes as a unit or by individuals. The auto-rifle- man usually leads the rush.
When a position no longer affurds an effective field of fire, and other factors of the situation permit, the squad leader orders a displacement. He designates the order of movement of the teams and, when practicable, moves for- ward to reconnoiter the new position area. He locates the approximate fire position for each auto-rifle and, when practicable, a cover position in proximity thereto. He then signals or otherwise directs the teams to move to the new cover position.
In an isolated attack, where the platoon attacks with unsupported flanks, the auto-rifle squad is usually placed well to the flank where it can cover by flanking fire the advance of the platoon towards the hostile resistance. It again moves forward to an advance position as soon as its fire is masked.
Against an entrenched enemy, the auto-riflemen join the rifle squads of the attacking echelon just prior to the assault and deliver automatic fire at point-blank range. The assault is usually preceded by a volley of hand gre- nades thrown by the rifle squads.
When the attack halts for any reason the auto-rifle teams should be moved at once to positions from which they can protect the front and flanks of the platoon against counterattacks.
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IN THE DEFENSE
The auto-rifles form the principal fire elements of the rifle platoon in the defense. Where an additional auto-rifie is made available the squad forms three teams. The teams generally occupy separate emplacements so located as to cover the entire sector of fire of the platoon. Where the platoon covers an exceptionally wide front the auto-rifles may be assigned flanking missions leaving the frontal field of fire to the riflemen. Wherever practicable, alternate emplacements are selected for each auto-rifle.
Figure 4.—BAR M1918 A2 in a foxhole.
Auto-rifle teams should be located within and attached to the unit comprising the combat group. Each auto-rifle should be assigned a principal fire mission and a sector of fire. The sector of fire should not exceed 90 degrees. Auto- rifles open fire when enemy units arrive within close range and present a remunerative target.
When an auto-rifle team is attached to a rifle squad it
TACTICS OF THE AUTO-RIFLE SQUAD 11
covers the entire fire sector of the squad. It should be located to fire across the front of adjacent squads.
When auto-rifles are not attached to rifle squads, their exact locations and their principal fire missions are determined by the combat group commander assisted by the auto-rifle squad leader. The combat group commander coordinates the auto-rifle fire with that of the light and heavy machine guns. The auto-rifles are sited to execute their principal fire mission.
PRINCIPAL DEFENSIVE FIRE MISSIONS
Cover by fire avenues of approach not covered by light and heavy machine-gun fire.
Cover by fire gaps in final protective lines of light and heavy machine guns.
Fire in support of adjacent combat groups by placing fire either across their front or along their flanks.
Cover intervals between combat groups.
Protect exposed flanks of the platoon.
The assignment of the same fire mission to both auto- rifles of the squad will result in greater density of fire and more sustained fire. However, the number of fire missions to be performed usually will require that the auto-rifles be employed singly.
In the defense, auto-rifles may occupy primary or alter- nate positions. The mission assigned the squad is the governing factor governing the selection of primary posi- tions. Other factors are:
1. The sectors of fire.
2. Safety for the auto-rifles and their personnel (cover and concealment).
3. The time available.
4. The routes of approach for occupation and supply.
12 THE MAILING LIST
As soon as the location of a position is determined its preparation is begun. This work is usually accomplished in the following priority:
1. Clearing fields of fire.
2. Assembling camouflage and laying it out ready for use.
3. Digging and camouflaging the emplacement for the primary position.
1. Preparing firing data to critical terrain features and supplying the position with ammunition and other neces- sary supplies.
All of the above operations may proceed simultaneously, different members of the team being assigned different duties. After the initial work has progressed to include an adequate emplacement for the primary position, an alter- nate position should be prepared. Covered routes between the positions should be selected, existing rifle or communi- cation trenches and natural cover being utilized for the purpose as far as practicable. Where no covered route is available a shallow communicating trench should be dug and camouflaged. Frequently riflemen will be called upon to assist in this work.
During the time that the primary position is being pre- pared the weapon should be prepared to fire against the enemy in case of attack.
DEFENSE AGAINST TANK ATTACK
Riflemen and auto-riflemen generally take cover against a tank attack. Using armor-piercing bullets, the auto- rifles open fire on lightly armored vehicles.
AA FIRE
Whenever practicable, auto-rifle squads assigned to AA missions are employed as a unit. Under cover, the auto- rifle squads of the company may be united under the direct control of the company commander in order to obtain concentrated fire effect. Where several auto-rifles are employed under common fire control, fire distribution is
TACTICS OF THE AUTO-RIFLE SQUAD 13
prearranged; the leading or right airplane, the next suc-
ceeding to the rear or left, and the other airplanes in the
normal attack formation are assigned to designated teams. IN SECURITY
The auto-rifle squad (or team of the squad) either as a part of the platoon, attached to rifle units, or acting alone may be employed with an advance guard, a flank guard, a rear guard, or as part of an outpost.
When operating as part of an advance, a flank or a rear guard the squad is employed in accordance with the tactics governing the employment of the auto-rifle squad in attack or defense.
An auto-rifle team frequently reinforces a rifle squad on outpost duty. It opens fire at long range on the advancing enemy. On close approach of the attacking troops it with- draws from its position over routes previously selected to avoid masking the fire of the rifle echelon.
CHAPTER 2
Medical Service in the Defense
(AN INFANTRY SCHOOL TEACHING)
The infantry regimental commander is responsible for the efficient operation of the medical service within his regiment. In order that he may accomplish the duties incident to this service, there is provided, as an organic part of the regiment, a medical detachment. This detach- ment is commanded by the regimental surgeon. He is assigned additional duty as an officer on the regimental staff. The regimental commander is assisted in carrying out his responsibilities for the medical service of the regi- ment, by timely recommendations of the regimental sur- geon in his capacity as a staff officer.
In planning the medical service of the infantry rifle regiment in any combat situation, the regimental surgeon must have a complete knowledge of the tactical dispositions of the regiment on which to base his plans. He must esti- mate the number of casualties and the areas in which most of these casualties will probably occur. He knows the organization, equipment, and capabilities of the medical service with the regiment. His problem consists in making the best use of these capabilities based on his knowledge of the tactical situation and his estimate of the expected medical situation.
-
MISSION
The mission of the medical detachment with the infantry regiment is to conserve the fighting strength of the unit in camp or bivouac, on the march and in combat.
15
THE MAILING LIST
16
This mission is accomplished by—
1. Recommending and supervising the execution of the principles of military preventive medicine within the regi- ment.
2. The methodical disposition of the sick and wounded so as to insure the retention of effectives and to relieve the fighting forces of noneffectives.
3. Providing such medical, surgical, and dental service as the limited equipment and facilities of the detachment permit.
GENERAL FUNCTIONS
The regimental medical detachment is the base on which is built the entire medical evacuation system of the field force. If this base fails, then the entire structure fails. The personnel of the detachment constitute the medical department representatives most intimately associated with the fighting troops.
The morale of the infantry soldier is enhanced by know- ing that if he becomes sick or is wounded he will receive prompt medical attention by the officers and men of the medical department in whom he has learned to have confi- dence. This confidence is gained by the close association found in the common sharing of danger and hardships. In order to sustain this confidence, the personne! assigned to sub-units of the detachment should habitually accompany the same infantry unit in all operations. For instance, Privates Jones and Brown, if designated as company aid men, should habitually function with Company A rather than rotate with other companies of the battalion.
In combat the regimental medical detachment has a most difficult task to perform in the tactical withdrawal of approximately ten per cent of the regimental strength for each average day of combat. These casualties are not only disorganized and widely separated within the regimental area, but are often entirely helpless. The withdrawal is made more difficult by the necessity of executing it under the fire of hostile small arms and artillery. Casualties
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE 17 among medical department personnel are high. It requires men with exceptional courage to carry out their duties in treating and evacuating wounded when they themselves are receiving the effects of hostile fire without the oppor- tunity of returning it.
Realizing the importance of the regimental medical detachment in the scheme of evacuation, the medical depart- ment selects officers of more than average physical endur- ance for this duty. They should be well trained in pro- fessional work in the field which differs markedly from professional civilian hospital practice. They should have an excellent knowledge of the administration and organi- zation of their own commands. They need a good working knowledge of the organization and tactics of the infantry troops they serve.
Enlisted men receive the usual basic training common to all arms and services. Their technical training includes elementary anatomy, first aid, splints and splinting, gas defense, litter drill, hygiene and sanitation, map reading, and communications. Tactical training includes the normal dispositions and employment of the infantry regiment and corresponding dispositions of the medical detachment on the march and in all forms of combat.
ORGANIZATION
Personnel.—The regimental medical detachment of the infantry regiment, rifle, consists of 10 officers and 96 enlisted men. Two of the ten officers are dentists. All other officers are doctors. Veterinary officers are no longer assigned to the infantry regiment, since motors have replaced all animals. Meat and food inspection formerly performed within the regiment as an additional duty of the veterinary service is now accomplished in higher eche- lons. In the event that food is received within the regi- ment, which, due to conditions in transit, arouses a sus- picion as to its suitability for human consumption; the surgeon is called on to inspect it and make a decision as to its condition.
_
18
THE
T O 7-11 October 1, 1940.
4 Hq Regtl 15 Med Det 1 Det Hq 3
Major MC-Regtl Surg Tech Sgt-lIst Set Pvt-chauffeur Pvt-motorcyclist
Truck, %-ton, comd and ren Motorcycle, with sidecar
—
_
—
- me & Oo
_
(a)
tw
(a) With front mounted
MAILING
LIST
10 Med Det 96 2 Ist Bn 27 Section 3 Regt] Aid 12
Sta Sqd
Capt MC-Commands Regtl Sec- tion and is also Asst Regt] Surg Capt DC-Regtl Dental Surg Capt DC-Asst Dental Surg
Sgt-Property, asst dresser in slightly wounded dept Pvt-surg techn, in charge of hypodermics and sterilization, asst dresser in seriously wounded dept
Pvts-dental techn
Pvt-record clerk
Pvt-med techn, asst dresser Pvts-surg techn, asst dressers Pvt-san techn
Pvts-chauffeurs
Truck, %-ton, comd and ren Trucks, 114-ton, cargo
power operated winch.
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE 19
2| 2d Bn 27 2, 3d Bn 27 Section Section Co Aid 8 Litter 12 2 Bn Aid Sta 7 Sqd bearer Sqd Sqd 1 Capt MC-Bn Surg 4 Pvts-med techn 10 Pvts-litter 1 1st Lt MC-Asst Bn Surg 3 Pvts-surg techn bearers tf Set-S “a 1 Pvt-basic 2 Pvts-basic 1 Sti Sgt-Sec property, asst
dresser in slightly wounded
9 ’ ; (2 Co Aid men dept
per Inf Co)
_
Corp-asst dresser in seriously wounded dept 1 Pvt-med techn, clerk 4 Pvts-chauffeurs 4
Trucks, '2-ton, pick-up
(b) One with front mounted power operated winch.
Figure 5.—Medical Detachment, Infantry Regiment, Rifle.
20 THE MAILING LIST
The detachment seldom serves as a unit after completing its initial organization and training. Battalion sections normally are attached to and remain with their respective battalions. The detachment has the following interior organization:
(1) Headquarters Regimental Medical Detachment:
1 officers, 15 enlisted men.
(2) Battalion Medical Sections, 1st, 2d, and 3d Battal- ions, each:
2 officers, 27 enlisted men.
When battalion sections join their battalions, they are commanded by the battalion surgeons, who in turn are responsible to the infantry battalion commanders. The regimental surgeon then, as a member of the regimental staff, exercises only technical supervision over battalion sections, retaining under his immediate control the head- quarters section.
Equipment.—The equipment of the regimental medical detachment consists of individual medical equipment of officers and men, and of three battalion sets and one regi- mental set of medical department field equipment. Each set is made up of litters, blankets, splint sets, and technical equipment, drugs and dressings. This equipment, except the litters and blankets is packed in standard chests. This equipment is adequate to provide essential medical, surgi- cal, and dental treatment for the command for one day in combat. A tent fly furnishes protection for each aid station during inclement weather. Such tentage is used only when it does not disclose the location of the aid stations to ground or air observation.
Supply.—The regimental surgeon is charged with the medical supply of the detachment. For routine medical supply replacement, he prepares a_ requisition on the division medical supply officer. This requisition is turned over to the regimental S-4 who sends it through normal channels of communication to the division medical dis- tributing point. There the medical supply officer fills the requistion. The supplies are sent by truck to the infantry regiment’s class-I distributing point. From that point, the
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE 21
supplies are taken to the battalion sections by personnel of the regimental medical section. In a combat emergency supplies may be obtained by battalion medical sections; first, by calling on the regimental section which furnishes such supplies as it can spare temporarily, and second, if those are inadequate, by calling informally on the division collecting company evacuating them. These procedures are used for all supplies and equipment other than litters, blankets, and splints. When a divisional medical unit evacuates casualties from an aid station of the regimental medical detachment, the litters, blankets, and splints used on the patients accompany them to the rear. The litter bearers or ambulances of the divisional unit bring forward a corresponding number of litters, blankets, and splints as replacements. This procedure avoids the rapid depletion of the limited number of these items available in the detachment.
Transportation.—The transportation of the regimental medical detachment consists of two trucks, 14-ton, 4 x 4, command and reconnaissance, twelve trucks, 14-ton, 4 x 4, pickup; two trucks 115-ton (LC) 4x4 (2dt), cargo, and a motorcycle with sidecar. The two command and recon- naissance trucks, the two 11!4-ton trucks, and the motor- cycle are assigned to headquarters regimental medical detachment. Within the headquarters regimental medical detachment, one command and reconnaissance truck and the motorcycle are assigned to headquarters detachment and the remainder of the transportation is assigned to the regimental aid station. Of the twelve 14-ton pick-up trucks, 4 are assigned to each of the battalion medical sections.
The distribution of loads of personnel and equipment on the transportation is as shown on Figure 6. The transpor- tation of the detachment is identical in type with that of the infantry regiment served. Supply and maintenance of vehicles, speeds, and cross-country mobility commensurate with that of the combat vehicles of the infantry is thus assured. This is essential since medical sections with their truck transported equipment must accompany their units
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TRANSPORTATION LOADING of
REGIMENTAL MEDICAL DETACHMENT
Infantry Regiment
HEADQUARTERS REGIMENTAL MEDICAL DETACHMENT
Truck 16-ton comd & ren
Truck 14-ton comd & ren
Truck 144-ton cargo
Truck 144-ton cargo
Detachment Headquarters
1 Major MC-Regtl Surg Motor- 1 Tech Sgt-lst Sgt cycle 1 Pvt- with Motorcyclist
dwt chs ur i 1 Pvt-chauffeur Sidecar
Regimental Aid Station Squad
1 Capt MC-Commands Regt! Sec and is Asst Regtl Surg
1 Capt DC-Regtl Dental Surg
1 Capt DC-Asst Dental Surg
1 Pvt-chauffeur
1 Sgt-property, asst dresser
1 Pvt-surg techn, hypodermics, sterilization 1 Pvt-dental techn
1 Pvt-chauffeur 1 Pvt-surg techn, asst dresser
1 Pvt-san techn
Regimental Aid Station Equipment
1 Pvt-record clerk
1 Pvt-dental tech
1 Pvt-surg techn, asst dresser
1 Pvt-med techn, asst dresser
1 Pvt-chauffeur
Tentage, bedding rolls, reserve of medical supplies.
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE px
Ue
Ist BATTALION MEDICAL SECTION
1 ist Lt MC-Asst Bn Surg oo 1 Pvt-med techn, asst dresser pickup 1 Pvt-chauffeur Battalion Set, Aid Station Equipment (less tentage)
Track 1 Stf Sgt-property, asst dresser gr na 1 Pvt-med techn, clerk pickup 4 Pvts-litter bearers 1 Pvyt-chauffeur Truck 1 Cpl-hypodermics, etc fod 1 Pvts-litter bearers P 1 Pvt-chauffeur Truck 2 Pvts-litter bearers bs = ond 2 Pvts-basic
1 Pvt-chauffeur
NOTE: 1 Capt MC-Bn Surg rides with Bn Commander. 8 Pvts-Co Aid men are with companies to which attached.
2D BATTALION MEDICAL SECTION
Same as Ist Battalion.
3D BATTALION MEDICAL SECTION Same as lst Battalion.
FIGURE 6.—Transportation Loading of Medical Detachment.
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24
at all times. It will be noted that due to shortage of person- nel some of the vehicle drivers have additional assignments within sections. This is necessary in order to have suffi- cient personnel at aid stations to serve as a team in per- forming functions essential to aid station medical service in combat.
3efore calling on the regimental medical detachment for trucks to be used for other than medical purposes, serious consideration should be given to the effect which the loss of some drivers will have on the medical service due to their assignment to additional duties as part of the section teams. Remember, twenty-four hour medical service must be provided. Consideration must also be given to the fact that temporary absence of the trucks may immobilize the medical service at a time when it is urgently needed. The employment of air and mechanized forces has enabled enemy units to produce casualties at almost any depth in a theater of operations. Hence it is unwise to assume that it is safe to immobilize the medical service by utilizing its transportation for other than medical purposes.
Communication.—Regimental medical detachments have no organic means of communication other than by foot or motorcycle messenger. Contact between the command post and the unit surgeon must be maintained at all times.
A regimental surgeon, who normally is at the regimental command post, sends instructions to the regimental aid station by foot or motorcycle messenger. Messages to bat- talion surgeons, except those pertaining to technical mat- ters, are sent in the name of the regimental commander and are transmitted through command channels.
A battalion surgeon, as a member of the battalion staff, maintains communication with the battalion command post at all times. Communication is maintained by leaving at the command post a messenger from his section when the battalion surgeon goes to the aid station. Under such circumstances, he requests the staff to send him any infor- mation of interest to the medical service. There is located at each battalion aid station a contact agent from the divisional collecting company evacuating that station. He
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE 25
serves as a means of communication with medical units in the rear.
Medical department enlisted men assigned as company aid men with each company communicate with their res- pective battalion medical sections. Messages from com- pany aid men are carried by walking wounded or by litter bearers of the section.
Mess.—Headquarters regimental medical detachment normally messes with the regimental headquarters com- pany. Battalion sections, less company aid men, normally mess with a unit of the battalion designated by the battal- ion commander. This unit may often be the battalion reserve in combat, due to its relatively convenient location. Company aid men mess with the companies to which they are attached.
HEADQUARTERS REGIMENTAL MEDICAL DETACHMENT
The headquarters of the regimental medical detachment is divided into a detachment headquarters and a regi- mental section.
1. The detachment headquarters consists of one medi- cal officer and three enlisted men. A Major Medical Corps is the regimental surgeon. He commands the detach- ment and is the regimental staff officer for the medical service. As commanding officer of the detachment, he is responsible for the organization, administration, and train- ing of the unit. He makes timely requisitions for all neces- sary supplies and equipment and insures their proper dis- tribution to the various sections. As a staff officer he advises the regimental commander in all matters pertain- ing to the health of the command. He provides the neces- sary instruction to the entire regiment in first aid, hygiene, and sanitation. He makes necessary sanitary inspections of units of the regiment. A technical sergeant is first ser- geant of the detachment. A private, chauffeur, drives the command and reconnaissance car. A private acts as a motorcycle messenger.
M.L..—2
26 THE MAILING LIST
2. Regimental Aid Station Section.—The regimental aid station section consists of three officers, two of whom are dental officers and twelve enlisted men.
A Captain Medical Corps commands the regimental aid station section, which operates immediately under the control of the regimental surgeon. The Captain is also assistant regimental surgeon. He acts for and in the name of the regimental surgeon during that officers’ absence. He should be the senior Captain in the Medical Detachment. A Captain Dental Corps assigned to the regimental section is the regimental dental surgeon. A second dental officer is assistant dental surgeon. He may be assigned during combat to any of the sections as a reinforcement or as a replacement for a medical officer.
The regimental section serves all elements of the regi- ment which are not a part of or serving in the zone of one of the battalions. It is frequently used to furnish aid sta- tion service to units held in regimental reserve until the reserve is committed. This permits the battalion section of the reserve to retain its mobility. Personnel of the head- quarters section may be assigned as reinforcements or as replacements to battalion sections in emergency.
BATTALION MEDICAL SECTIONS
Battalion medical sections of the infantry regiment are identical in organization and functions. Each section is divided into:
Company Aid Squad: 8 enlisted men Litter Bearer Squad: 12 enlisted men Battalion Aid Station Squad: 2 medical officers and
7 enlisted men.
1. Company aid squad.—Medical department enlisted men serving with companies of the infantry battalion are known as company aid men. They are allotted at the rate of two for each company within the battalion. Normally they are attached to the company, when that unit is on the march, in bivouac, or in combat. Four of these men are
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE 27
medical technicians, three are surgical technicians and one is a basic private. Each of these men carry two pouches in which are first aid equipment such as dressings, iodine, tourniquets, and instruments. They are not provided with litters. Their duties are as follows:
a. To maintain contact with the company to which they are assigned.
b. To send information to their battalion surgeons by litter bearer.and walking wounded. These messages give the location of the company, contemplated changes in the location or disposition, and the approximate number and location of casualties in the company area.
c. To administer first aid and to tag the sick, wounded and dead.
d. To instruct sick and walking wounded as to the exact site of the aid station and the proper route to be used in proceeding to it.
e. In combat, to place all seriously wounded in defiladed locations along the route of advance. This facilitates the work of the litter bearers.
2. Litter bearer squad.—tIn the litter bearer squad there are twelve men, ten of whom are privates litter bearers and two are basic privates. The litter bearers provide for three four-man teams. Four-man teams are habitually used for long hauls. The '-ton 4x 4 pick-up trucks of the battalion section are utilized to asist the litter bearers in those areas which are comparatively free from aimed small-arms fire, due to defilade or as the result of an ad- vance of the battalion beyond a previously contested area. In combat the litter bearers are sent out to contact company aid men and to remove all seriously wounded within the battalion area to the aid station. They tag and apply first aid to casualties missed by company aid men. All fracture cases are splinted before being moved. The litter bearer squad is also used in assisting the aid station squad in hand- carrying the aid station equipment when this becomes necessary. Casualties from enemy fire are numerous in the litter bearer squad. Replacements and reinforcements of the squad, particularly in severe fighting, are essential. It
28 THE MAILING LIST
is one of the duties of the regimental surgeon to provide such replacements and reinforcements to battalion surgeons. The regimental surgeon utilizes such of the limited person- nel of the regimental section as can be spared and requests additional reinforcements from the regimental commander. The regimental commander considers the immediate requirements of personnel for combat, as compared to the desirability of rapid evacuation of the wounded. He then decides as to whether or not riflemen can be spared as reinforcements for the medical detachment to assist in clearing the field of wounded. Prisoners of war, under the international rules of land warfare, may be required to carry back their own wounded to the aid station.
3. Battalion aid station squad.—The aid station squad establishes and operates the battalion aid station. The duties of the personnel of the aid station squad are so assigned as to form a team to provide for the following procedures:
a. Receiving, sorting, and recording casualties entering the station.
b. Property exchange of litters and splints between the litter bearer squad and the aid station squad. Property exchange of litters, blankets, and splints between the aid station and the litter bearers or ambulances from the divisional collecting company evacuating the aid station from the rear.
c. The operation of a_ seriously wounded department within the aid station in which all seriously wounded are treated for their wounds and shock.
d. The operation of a _ slightly wounded department through which ordinarily will pass the bulk of the casual- ties.
e. The operation of a gas section in the event the bat- talion is operating in a gassed area. Usually, however, if gas is used in a battalion area casualties will be so numerous that the entire aid station will have to be used for the treatment of gas casualties. If only a gas section is operated, it is separated from the rest of the aid station in order to avoid gassing of previously unexposed casualties
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE 29
by gas emanating from the clothing and equipment of the gassed casualties.
f. The establishment of a morgue in which are placed all men who die enroute to the aid station or while in it.
g. The administration of antitetanus serum to all casual- ties who have been wounded.
h. This squad has four 14-ton pick-up trucks. They are used to transport the equipment and personnel of the squad and for clearing portions of the battalion area of litter cases when, due to defilade or concealment, motor trans- portation may be used.
SUMMARY
a. Commanding officers of all units are responsible for the efficient operation of the medical service within their organizations.
b. Medical officers are provided on the staffs of battalions and regiments. In addition to their own command func- tions, these officers assist the regimental and battalion commanders by making timely recommendations concern- ing the employment of medical units.
c. The medical detachment is an organic part of the regiment. Medical sections when attached to battalions become integral parts of those battalions.
d. The regimental section is so organized as to provide medical service to all units of the regiment not operating in battalion areas. A limited reserve of supplies and per- sonnel is provided which may be used in reinforcing bat- talion sections.
e. Battalion sections are so organized as to provide first aid to the wounded where they fall, evacuation by litter or truck when necessary to the aid station, and operation of an aid station.
f. Responsibility for evacuation from regimental or battalion aid stations is a function of divisional units in rear.
For additional details as to the functions of the medical detachment see Chapter 9, Volume XVIII, The Mailing List. This chapter is entitled: Caring for our Wounded.
30 THE MAILING LIST
ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEM SITUATION
Early on 10 January, the Blue Ist Division, reinforced, marched southeast from a bivouac area in the vicinity of Fairfield with the mission of covering the advance of a large Blue force through the mountain passes west of the
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line: Zora-Fairfield. Elements of the Blue main force are expected to begin arriving in the Zora-Fairfield area at noon, 12 January. (See Figure 7).
At 6:30 AM, 10 January, a Red force estimated as two divisions was reported, by observation aviation, to be marching northwest in multiple columns and approaching Taneytown.
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE 31
At 7:00 AM, Major General 1st Division decided to defend an area west of the Monocacy River between Toms Creek and Barlow and centered around the hill mass of Hoffman Hill. Extracts from the order for the defense are as follows:
* * ok * ok 38
“The 3d Battalion 2d Infantry reinforced by one anti- tank platoon and by the Ist Platoon Troop A Ist Cavalry will outpost the division position between Toms Creek and Marsh Creek. (See Figure 8.)
“Battalions organizing the position north of Marsh creek will protect their own sectors with combat outposts.
“Evacuation :
Casualties :
Collecting stations: For ist Infantry sector and division outposts: Woods in the vicinity of CR 499-A (45-38).
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NOTE: The Monocacy River is unfordable south of its junction with Toms Creek. From Toms Creek to Bridge- port it is fordable with difficulty. All streams, except as indicated above, are easily fordable by foot elements. Other combat elements can cross only at selected localities. Bridges over the Monocacy between Marsh Creek and a point 20 miles south of the mouth of Toms Creek are being destroyed by engineer motorized elements. This work will be completed by 2:00 PM, 10 January.
THE OUTPOST
Lieutenant Colonel 3d Battalion, 2d Infantry received orders to organize a division outpost as the advance guard of the center column arrived at RJ 438-A (47-35). By noon units of the outpost were located as shown on Figure 8 and were organizing the positions. The outpost was to be withdrawn only on division order.
The outpost between Toms Creek and Marsh Creek con- sists of an infantry battalion reinforced by an antitank
32 THE MAILING LIST
platoon and by the Ist Platoon Troop A Ist Cavalry. The front to be occupied is approximately nine thousand yards wide. The position must be held until 5:00 PM, 10 Jan- uary if the organization of the battle position is to be com- pleted. Time and space factors indicate that the enemy is capable of exerting pressure on the outpost shortly before 3:00 PM. Experience tables of probable casualties for an outpost engagement indicate that at least 30 casualties will occur among the outpost troops during the afternoon of 10 January if the enemy attempts to drive in the cut- post. Of this number 6 will be killed, 12 will be litter cases, and 12 will be walking wounded. The problem confronting the battalion surgeon is to determine where the bulk of these casualties is likely to occur and then to so dispose the battalion medical section as to provide the most efficient medical service for the greatest number of the expected casualties.
Because of the unfordability of the Monocacy River and the destruction of bridges, there is little probability of the enemy making a crossing of the Monocacy south of its junction with Toms Creek. While the enemy may force a crossing of the river in this area, to do so would consume time, would require special equipment, and cculd hardly be done during the remaining daylight hours of 10 Jan- uary. As long as the Red force is kept under surveillance by the Blue observation aviation, information will be ob- tained of any Red action indicating such 2 movement. Except for small reconneissance parties, the right flank of the outpost position will prob2bly nct be subject to hos- tile action. The Monocacy River frcm the mouth of Toms Creek to Bridgeport is fordable with difficulty. This sector of the river will be a serious obstacle to the movement of any enemy force against that part of the outpost position lying south of the Emmitsburg—Taneytown Road. (See Figure 8.) Therefore, nearly one-half of the outpost front is in little danger of being attacked by any sizable force of the enemy during the afternoon of 10 January. Based on the above factors it is obvious that the dangerous part of the sector is that part lying between Bridgeport and the
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE 33
mouth of Marsh Creek. This sector faces the direct ad- vance of the enemy columns and undoubtedly the advance guards of these columns will make an attack in this sector in an effort to drive in the outpost and uncover the Blue battle position.
The surgeon, therefore, estimates that the bulk of the casualties will occur in the sectors of Company I and Com- pany K.
The outpost sector is divided into three approximately equal company sectors. In the sector of Company L on the right, the position is held by one rifle company (less a pla- toon), a section of heavy machine guns, and the Ist Pla- toon Troop A list Cavalry. Each of the other sectors is held by a rifle company, a section of heavy machine guns, a section of caliber .50 machine guns and a section of 37- mm antitank guns. The battalion reserve consists of one platoon from Company L and a section of heavy machine guns. It is centrally located in reference to the company sectors of I and K companies.
In each company sector, the troops are disposed over a front of approximately 3000 yards and have organized three combat areas. There are only two company aid men for each sector except that of Company K where there will be three company aid men. As the type of action expected in the outpost is defensive, relatively little movement with- in the sectors will take place. If one company aid man were assigned to a combat group, one or two such groups in each company sector would be without medical support. Better medical service can be rendered if the efforts of the company aid men are combined by establishing a company aid post for each sector to which walking wounded can move and at which minor casualties can be accumulated. This facilitates the work of the litter bearers from the aid station as they have but a single location in each company sector to contact. These locations are in the vicinity of the command post of the company commander.
The company aid men were attached to companies and hence are under the control of the company commanders.
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The surgeon exercises technical supervision and recom- mends to the company commanders the method for their employment. The company commander makes the decision as he is responsible for the medical service within his unit.
There are several possible plans for the employment of the remainder of the battalion medical section. An aid station in the vicinity of RJ 416 (47-33) (See Figure 8) would be centrally located for the entire outpost sector. However, the maximum litter haul would be about 3000 yards from the flank company aid posts. The bulk of the casualties is expected to occur in the area northeast of this site which would increase the labor for litter bearers. The possibility should be considered of splitting the aid station squad and equipment to establish two aid stations, one in the vicinity of RJ 418-A (46-32) and the other in the vicinity of RJ 428-B (47-34). This would reduce the maxi- mum litter haul for each station to approximately 1800 yards. The principal disadvantage of this plan is the fact that the aid station squad is trained to function as a single team. Neither the organization nor equipment is_ well adapted to operating two aid stations simultaneously for any length of time. Dispersing medical personnel by such a plan results in reduced efficiency in each element. A third plan is to establish a single aid station in the vicinity of RJ 428-B. This site is centrally located behind the area in which the bulk of the casualties is expected to occur. The maximum litter haul to the company aid posts of Com- panies I and K does not exceed 1500 yards. The site is near the assembly area of the battalion reserve and can provide medical service for those units. Contact with the battalion command post is facilitated. Cover, concealment, lines of drift, and evacuation routes are satisfactory. How- ever, the distance of 3200 yards from the company aid post in the sector of Company L is excessive. The few casual- ties which are likely to occur in this sector should be evacuated direct to the collecting station. These casualties would be moved by litter bearers of the collecting platoon, evacuating the outpost, to an ambulance loading post in the vicinity of RJ 418-A and moved by ambulance direct to the
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE 37
collecting station in the vicinity of CR 499-A (45-38) which has been designated in division orders to evacuate the outpost. This plan holds dispersion of the battalion medical section to a minimum with a maximum of efficiency and benefit to the greatest number of casualties. The addi- tional burden on the collecting platoon can be carried easily by that unit as few casualties will be likely to occur in other units of the 1st Infantry until after the outpost has been withdrawn.
Based on these considerations the Surgeon 3d Battalion 2d Infantry prepares the following plan for the medical service of the outpost.
Company aid men to remain attached to their companies.
To recommend to company commanders that company aid men attached to their units be employed as follows:
1. The company aid men with Company L to establish an aid post in the vicinity of the woods southwest of RJ 418-A (46-32) (See Figure 8) to serve all elements in the sector of Company L.
2. The company aid men with Company K to establish an aid post in the vicinity of the end of the unimproved road at (48.0-33.1) (See Figure 8) to serve all elements in the sector of Company K.
3. The company aid men with Company I to establish an aid post in the vicinity of the draw near RJ 439 (49-34) to serve all elements in the sector of Company I. (See Figure 8.)
4. One of the company aid men of Company M to be attached to the platoon in the sector of Company K to work with the company aid men of that company. The other company aid man of Company M to remain with the ma- chine-gun- platoon (less a section) in battalion reserve.
To have litter bearers reconnoiter and mark defiladed routes from company aid posts in the sectors of Companies I and K, to the battalion aid station.
To establish an aid station at once in the vicinity of the house 150 yards southeast of RJ 428-B (47-34).
38 THE MAILING LIST
To send a message by contact agent to the collecting station located near CR 499-A, which has been designated to evacuate the outpost, requesting that the aid station be evacuated on call and that the company aid post for the sector of Company L be evacuated direct to the collecting station by the collecting company. (Note: No messenger service is provided for a battalion medical section.)
To recommend that the commander of the 1st Platoon Troop A list Cavalry be notified of the location of the com- pany aid post for Company L.
SITUATION, CONTINUED A REGIMENTAL SECTOR FULLY OCUUPIED
The ist Infantry has completed the organization and occupation of its sector, as shown on Figure 9. You are the regimental surgeon. In your capacity as a staff officer you inspect all the medical installations, which are located as follows (For all locations see Figure 9.) :
Aid station, lst Battalion 1st Infantry: In the draw 500 yards north of RJ 444 (46.6-36.3).
Aid station, 2d Battalion 1st Infantry: In the draw 200 yards northeast of RJ 506-C.
Aid station, 3d Battalion 1st Infantry: In the woods on the southern slope of Hoffman Hill at (46.4-37.3).
Regimental Aid Station: 200 yards east of CR 499-A (45-38).
YOUR ESTIMATE OF THESE DISPOSITIONS
In the sector of the Ist Infantry, there are located three battalion and one regimental aid stations fully established. Maximum protection for personnel and for expected casualties would be provided by utilizing all available time in preparing dugouts and trenches for protection from observation and small-arms fire.
The 1st Battalion occupies a center of resistance on the main line of resistance on the right of the regimental sec- tor. The center of resistance is narrow but deep. Three
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40 THE MAILING LIST
strongpoints are organized. The strongpoint on the right is on a nose between two branches of a small stream which offers the best hostile avenue of approach into the center of resistance. The strongpoint on the left is on hill 487 (47-35). The rear limit of the strongpoint occupied by the reserve company was placed a thousand yards in rear of the main line of resistance in order to utilize the excellent fields of fire inits front should the enemy penetrate up the draw on the right of the center of resistance. It may be expected that the bulk of the casualties will occur on the right of the center of resistance. Lines of drift are up the draw toward RJ 506-C (46-37) and up the draw parallel to and east of the road RJ 444 (46-35)—RJ 474-B (46-36). An aid station site in the clump of trees 300 yards south- west of RJ 506-C (46-37) is on the line of drift and offers concealment and cover. However, this site is 2500 yards from the main line of resistance and has the additional dis- advantage of lying within the strong point prepared by a company within the regimental reserve area. A site in the draw 500 yards north of RJ 444 was selected as being cen- trally located in the rear of the battalion center of resist- ance and located on the line of drift. No cover is available at this site. It will be necessary to call on the battalion com- mander for assistance in constructing protection from observation and small-arms fire, for medical personnel and casualties which accumulate. This cover can be prepared by digging into the side of the draw at right angles to the expected line of hostile fire.
The 2d Battalion 1st Infantry occupies the left half of the regimental sector. Two strong points occupy a heavily wooded ridge which provides defilade for any aid station site selected in the rear part of the area. The reserve company occupies the open forward slopes of Hoff- man Hill. The most likely hostile avenue of approach into the position is up Marsh Creek on the left of the center of resistance. Casualties may therefore be expected to occur in greater numbers on that flank. Lines of drift are in the direction of RJ 506-C (46-37). An aid station site located in the clump of trees 300 yards east of RJ 506-C is centrally
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE 41
located in the rear part of the center of resistance and fulfills all other requirements for a suitable site.
The 3d Battalion 1st Infantry is garrisoning three strong points in the regimental reserve area on a front of 2500 yards. Lines of drift from the strongpoint on the right and the center strongpoint would be toward the woods on the west slope of Hoffman Hill. Lines of drift from the left strong point would be toward the woods east of CR 499-A. A site in the woods on the southern slope of Hoffman Hill at (46.4-37.3) would adequately care for casualties from the right and center strongpoints. A site in the stream bed six hundred yards further north would be more centrally located for lines of drift from all three strongpoints, but would lie in the area allotted to the field artillery, which should be avoided. In this situation, an aid station estab- lished in the woods on the southern slopes of Hoffman Hill (46.4-37.3) to care for the casualties from the right and center strongpoints is more desirable. Casualties from the left strongpoint should be cared for by the regimental aid station which will be discussed below.
The headquarters section would establish an aid station in the vicinity of the command post of the regiment 200 yards east of CR 499-A (45-38). This station ordinarily cares for casualties occurring in and near regimental head- quarters. In this situation, the casualties of the left strong- point in the regimental reserve area can be evacuated more readily to the regimental aid station than to the battalion aid station. This is an example of a situation in which the headquarters section can assist a battalion section by means other than reinforcements in personnel and equip- ment.
42 THE MAILING LIST
SITUATION, CONTINUED A REGIMENTAL SECTOR, PARTIALLY OCCUPIED
The 3d Infantry has been ordered to occupy its sector initially with only one battalion. The remainder of the regimental sector is to be organized and prepared for occu- pation.
At 5:00 PM the reconnaissance and preparation of the centers of resistance of the 2d and 3d Battalions were com- pleted. These two battalions, less small detachments left on the position, have been assembled in the areas shown on Figure 10. The 1st Battalion remains on the position. Aid station sites for the regiment have been reconnoitered and prepared as follows:
lst Battalion 3d Infantry: In the woods three hundred yards northeast of RJ 419-C (47-38).
2d Battalion 3d Infantry: In the woods at (47.2-40.2).
3d Battalion 3d Infantry: In the woods at (46.5-40.1).
Regimental aid station, 3d Infantry: RJ at (46.3-39.6).
YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE DISPOSITIONS
In the sector of the 3d Infantry, only the Ist Battalion completely occupies its center of resistance. The 2d and od Battalions have reconnoitered and prepared their res- pective centers of resistance and have moved into assembly positions under cover as shown on Figure 10. They are held mobile until the enemy has disclosed the direction and force of his attack. The battalion medical sections accom- panied their respective battalions to the assembly areas after completing the preparation of aid station sites in the centers of resistance. These battalion medical sections must accompany their battalions at all times. Casualties are likely to cecur while the battalions are in their assembly areas as the result of hostile artillery fire which habitually seeks out probable locations of reserves as targets for con- centrations prior to and during an attack. Only so much of the equipment as is necessary to care for such casual- ties would be set up by the battalion medical sections while in the assembly areas. Arrangements must be made for
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44 THE MAILING LIST
early evacuation of these casualties in order to maintain the mobility of the battalion medical sections. In this situation, an example of assistance by a regimental aid station is illustrated. The regimental aid station at the RJ at (46.4-39.6) adjacent to the assembly area of the 3d Battalion would take over casualties which might occur in the battalion and thus assure the retention of mobility by the battalion section.
At this time—5:00 PM—the battalion medical sections (less company aid men) and headquarters section of the regimental medical detachment of the 3d Infantry are located as follows:
lst Battalion Medical Section: At the aid station site in the woods three hundred yards northeast of RJ 419-C (47- 38).
2d Battalion Medical Section: In the assembly area west of hill 642-a (46-40).
3d Battalion Medical Section: In the assembly area north of Marsh Creek and east of hill 491 (45-39).
Headquarters Section 3d Infantry: At the regimental aid station site at RJ at (46.4-39.6).
SITUATION, CONTINUED
THE BATTALION IN DIVISION RESERVE COUNTERATTACKS
The enemy continued the advance. By 5:30 PM 10 Jan- uary the Blue outpost had been withdrawn. Increasing Red pressure on the front of the Ist Division, especially in the sector of the 1st Infantry, has uncovered the Blue battle position. The lst Squadron Ist Cavalry (less Troop A) on the left has been driven to the rear. Reports from Troop A Ist Squadron Ist Cavalry on the right stated that no enemy had been observed along the Monocacy River south of its junction with Piney Creek.
At 6:00 AM, 11 January, the Reds launched a general attack along the entire front. South of Marsh Creek in the sector of the 2d Battalion 1st Infantry, this attack was supported by tanks.
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE 45
At 11:00 AM the enemy has pentrated the Blue position up the valley of Marsh Creek.
The hostile attack on the left flank of the Division has been severe and it is holding with difficulty. The 2d Bat- talion 2d Infantry and the 2d and 3d Battalions 3d Infan- try have occupied previously prepared centers of resistance.
Major General 1st Division decides to counterattack. The counterattack is to be launched at 11:50 AM with the 3d Battalion 2d Infantry supported by the coordinated fires of the artillery and of adjacent areas to restore the battle position.
The battalion commander plans to attack with two com- panies abreast.
Fifteen casualties occurring as the result of hostile artillery fire falling in the assembly area have not been evacuated at 11:00 AM from the battalion aid station of the 3d Battalion 2d Infantry.
YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
The 3d Battalion 2d Infantry after withdrawing from the outpost position was held in division reserve. At 11:00 AM, Major General Ist Division decided to use this reserve in a counterattack under his immediate control to restore the battle position due to the enemy penetration which threatened the vital observation on Hoffman Hill. This battalion was not released to regimental control as it was to be employed in an area involving the sectors of both the lst and 2d Infantry. At the time of this decision, 15 casual- ties were in the battalion aid station established in the assembly area. Since the battalion was retained under division control, the battalion surgeon could not call on the regimental aid station of the 2d Infantry to take over his casualties as illustrated in the previous situation. He must provide for these casualties by leaving a utility man with them and notifying the collecting station, a divisional unit, that the casualties are being left at the old aid station site. The contact agent who carries this message to the collecting platoon is used to guide litter bearers from the
46 THE MAILING LIST
collecting platoon to the new battalion aid station site for the counterattack. The battalion surgeon had reconnoitered and selected sites for tentative aid stations to conform to the various plans for possible employment of the battalion. It will be necessary to carry all equipment from the bat- talion assembly area to the selected site by hand. The 12 litter bearers assist the aid station squad in this movement. As soon as it is completed and the attack is launched, litter bearer teams will be dispatched from the new aid station to follow each attacking company. As the attack progresses the aid station should be displaced forward.
YOUR PLAN
1. To close station at once. Equipment to be packed and hand carried to the site of a new aid station for the counter- attack. The battalion medical section (less company aid men) to follow the reserve company.
2. Company aid men to remain with their companies.
3. The litter bearer squad to assist the aid station squad in movement of equipment across country to the new site.
4. The aid station squad (less one utility man) to move aid station equipment by hand to the site of the new aid station and establish it by 11:50 AM.
5. To leave a utility man with the wounded at the aid station site in the assembly area until they have been evacuated. This man to rejoin the aid station squad at the new site on completion of the evacuation.
6. To send a message by the contact agent to the collect- ing station notifying the platoon commander that fifteen wounded are located at the present battalion aid station and that the new station will be established by 11:50 AM.
7. As soon as the attack is launched to dispatch one four- man litter team to follow each attacking company to con- tact company aid men and evacuate seriously wounded to the aid station.
MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE DEFENSE 47
SUMMARY
In this problem the following principles have been em- phasized :
1. Commanders of units are responsible for the medical service within their units.
2. When a part of a regiment is employed 2s a division outpost, the medical estimate must be based on the tactical organization of the position in order to determine the area in which the most casualties are likely to occur. This is true of any tactical situation and for anv size organiza- tion. Dispersion of the medical section must be held to a minimum, particularly in an outpost which holds a rela- tively wide front, if efficient medical service is to be ren- dered to the greatest number. Medical troops should be concentrated to serve the area in which the greatest num- ber of casualties is estimated to occur.
3. In a regimental sector in which all centers of resist- ance are occupied, aid stations are established immediately. Litter routes to company aid posts are reconnoitered and marked. Battalion aid stations are located in the rear part of the battalion center of resistance on the lines of drift particularly from the strongpoints most likely to suffer heavy casualties. Regimental aid stations assist when possible by caring for a portion of the casualties from strongpoints within the regimental reserve area.
4. In a regimental sector which is initially only partially occupied, aid station sites are reconnoitered and prepared for all battalions. However, in those units withdrawn to assembly areas, the battalion medical sections accompany their battalions in order to care for casualties which fre- quently occur in these areas. The regimental aid station when located adjacent to one or more battalion assembly areas is employed to take over such casualties when the battalion moves out to its prepared position or to be em- ployed elsewhere.
5. The surgeon of a battalion in reserve must prepare his medical plans based on the tactical plans of the battal- ion. These plans should include the reconnaissance and
48 THE MAILING LIST
selection of aid station sites so that they can be occupied without delay when the battalion moves out to counter- attack. The medical section must retain its mobility while in reserve. In this situation in which the battalion is em- ployed under division control, casualties are not turned over to the headquarters section of the regiment from which it was detached, but are left behind in the assembly area. The collecting station, a divisional unit, is notified of their location.
CHAPTER 3
The Heavy Weapons Company in the Attack (ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEM)
(AN INFANTRY SCHOOL TEACHING)
This illustrative problem teaches the tactical employ- ment of the heavy weapons company in the attack.
For complete details as to the organization, armament, means of communication, transportation and functions of the command, administrative and supply groups and the fighting platoons see Chapter 4, Volume XIX, The Mailing List.
The success of an attack, other things being equal, depends upon a proper combination of fire and movement. 3y fire the strong points of the enemy defenses are neu- tralized. By movement, the weak points are broken through and a maneuver is executed to place the strong points at a disadvantage.
As the attack progresses, infantry must depend more and more upon its own resources to produce enough fire power to continue its advance. The heavy weapons com- panies are an important source of this fire power. They cover by fire the forward movement of the rifle companies; protect the front and flanks of those units, furnish antiair- craft and antimechanized protection; and execute long range fires. .
The mission and the location prescribed by the battalion commander for the platoon weapons will usually be in general terms. The company commander must exercise initiative and ingenuity in working out the details in order to carry out the mission in the most effective manner.
49
THE MAILING LIST
SITUATION
A Blue force is holding the line of Middle Creek with small covering detachments. At 1:00 PM, 4 June, this force received orders to attack at 6:30 AM, 5 June, and captured the high ground in the vicinity of McCleary School. Subsequent plans provided for boundaries between units, line of departure and disposition of units for the attack as shown on Figure 11.
At 3:30 PM, 4 June, the known Red force is disposed in hasty entrenchments as shown on Figure 11.
Based on orders from his regimental commander, Lieu- tenant Colonel 1st Battalion 30th Infantry has announced his tentative scheme of maneuver, extracts of which are as follows:
“To attack with two rifle companies in the leading echelon, making the main attack on the left in order to capture hill 722-b.”’
At 3:30 PM, 4 June, Captain Company D 30th Infantry, near the edge of woods at point marked M on Figure 12, has just received from the battalion commander the tentative scheme of maneuver for the battalion attack to be made at 6:30 AM, 5 June. Captain Company D is accompanied by his reconnaissance officer, reconnaissance and signal ser- geant, and one messenger. Nearby are his command and reconnaissance truck and a motorcyclist with one messenger.
Company D (less the caliber .50 machine-gun platoon and elements of the Ist and 2d Platoons which are engaged on security missions) is now in the battalion assembly area in the woods 1000 yards west of hill 725-a.
The battalion attack order will be issued at 5:00 PM today near the edge of woods at point marked M.
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THE MAILING LIST
FIRST REQUIREMENT
1. Actions taken by Captain Company D from 3:30 PM until 4:45 PM, 4 June, at which time he will give his recom- mendations to Lieutenant Colonel ist Battalion.
2. The recommendations of Captain Company D for the tactical employment of the heavy weapons company, based on both ground and map reconnaissance, to support the battalion scheme of maneuver.
DISCUSSION
Reconnaissance by the leaders of the heavy weapons company is most essential in preparing plans to accomplish the mission of close support of the rifle companies. Over broken terrain it will be unusual to find any one position area from which the entire battalion zone of action may be covered. After receipt of the battalion’s tentative scheme of maneuver, Captain Company D is able to plan his recon- naissance. He must use the reconnaissance officer and the reconnaissance sergeant to assist him in covering the bat- talion area. Time will seldom permit one officer to ac- complish all the reconnaissance necessary.
The actions that are to be taken by Captain Company D will be determined by answers to the following questions:
1. How much time is available?
2. Where are the enemy positions and his supporting weapons located, or if not actually disclosed, where should they be?
3. What position areas are available to cover the known or possible hostile positions with machine-gun and mortar fires?
4. Will ammunition supply be feasible to the available position areas?
5. On what hostile position should the initial fires be placed?
6. Where must subsequent fires be placed?
7. When do I want my platoon leaders and how will I get them to me?
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 53
Captain Company D knows that the main attack is to be made by Company B in the left of the battalion zone of attack and realizes that he should place the bulk of his sup- porting fires in the zone of action of that company. However, at this time no hostile positions are known to exist in this zone except the position near the top of hill 722-b. This hostile position can do little against Company B until after it has advanced about 500 yards and captured Woods Q. From the southwest edge of Woods Q the enemy may offer serious resistance to Company B after that unit has passed through Woods P. Therefore, supporting weapons should be prepared to place fires on the southwest edge of Woods Q. Machine guns located in the edge of the woods on the northeast slopes of hill 725-a near the point marked X, or near the eastern edge of Woods P could deliver such fire. From positions near the eastern edge of Woods P heavy machine guns can cover all of the ground between Woods P and Woods Q. This is not true from positions on hill 725-a.
Captain Company D must consider also the zone of action of Company A. The hostile position east of the Woods O and N is the closest known hostile position. It will give early trouble to Company A and should be smothered, initially, with supporting fires. To place fire on this position, machine guns must be located either on the line of departure or so that they can fire through the gaps on both sides of Woods N. Reconnaissance indicates that, from the three position areas located near points X, Y, and Z, this entire target can be covered. (See Figure 12.) Also that much of the ground to the northeast of this hostile position can be covered from the same position areas. However, due to the many patches of woods which mask observation, Company B cannot be supported from these position areas, nor from any other single position area in the battalion zone of action.
Captain Company D therefore considers the possible solu- tions. He knows that to support Company B, at least one platoon will have to be placed in direct support of that company. Initially, however, it is desirable to concentrate
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Figure 12.—Situation Map. 1st Battalion 30th Infantry at 3:30 PM.
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 55
the maximum fire on the hostile position most likely to give the first resistance.
Hill 725-a affords the best observation of the battalion zone of action. However, much of the area is masked by woods. If the mortars are employed from near the line of departure, they can be used only against one hostile posi- tion. They will be unable to shift fires from one target to another without moving the mortars or constantly switching their observation post. Ammunition supply will be limited in the forward area. Although hill 725-a is about 1000 yards from the line of departure, and observation therefrom is not perfect, yet the mortars can better support the battalion from hill 725-a than from any other position area in the battalion zone of action.
In planning the location of the caliber .50 machine-gun platoon a study of the terrain discloses that initially the left flank is more vulnerable to a hostile tank attack, secondly the front from the direction of hill 722-b. After the capture of Woods Q, the battalion will be vulnerable also from the front. It appears doubtful if a hostile tank
attack could be launched through Woods §S against the right flank.
A SOLUTION OF THE FIRST REQUIREMENT
1. Actions taken by Captain Company D from 3:30 PM until 4:45 PM
a. He sends a mortorcycle messenger to the battalion assembly area to direct the platoon leaders to meet him at Liberty Hall School at 5:15 PM.
b. He directs the reconnaissance officer and the recon- naissence sergeant to reconnoiter the edge of woods west and northwest of RJ 511-C for machine-gun positions from which fire can be placed on the hostile position northeast of RJ 511-C; to reconnoiter woods near point X and the knoll at (40.15-43.00) to determine if those positions will permit close support in the zone of action of the left assault company; and to reconnoiter for caliber .50 machine-gun positions in the vicinity of RJ 511-C and RJ 510-D. They
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FIGURE 13.—Disposition of Heavy Weapons Company Ist Battalion 30th Infantry.
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 57
will rejoin him not later than 4:45 PM at the point marked M.
c. He reconnoiters the east and west slopes of hill 725-a and the vicinity of RJ 642-C for mortar positions from which fire can be placed on the hostile position northeast of RJ 511-C and still cover the maximum ground in the zone of action of the left assault company. He also recon- noiters for positions for the caliber .50 machine guns in the same areas, and studies the west slopes of hill 725-a for a defiladed rendezvous for company vehicles.
d. He makes a detailed map study to determine the most likely avenues of approach for hostile tanks.
2. Recommendations of Captain Company D to Lieutenant Colonel 1st Battalion—
a. To employ the heavy machine-gun platoons in general support from positions in edge of woods west and northwest of RJ 511-C to fire on the hostile position 400 yards north- east of RJ 511-C. All guns to be prepared to engage hostile aircraft in an attack against Company A. One platoon to be prepared to go in direct support of Company B on order.
b. To employ the mortar platoon in general support from defiladed positions on the west slopes of hill 725-a to fire on the hostile position 400 yards northeast of RJ 511-C. This platoon to be nrepared to shift fires or displace to positions from which it can engage any target delaying the advance of Company B.
c. To place the caliber .50 machine-gun platoon in position of readiness in the draw west of CR 510-D prepared to protect against tanks from the directions of RJ 595-E and hill 722-b. To displace to Woods Q upon the capture of the same and cover approaches from the north and east. Upon the capture of hill 722-b to displace to the corner of woods
at (41.5-43.6) and cover approaches from the north and east.
M. L.—3.
58 THE MAILING LIST
SITUATION, CONTINUED
It is 3:30 PM, 4 June.
There is no change in the situation. Based on orders from his regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel 2d 3attalion 30th Infantry has announced his tentative scheme of maneuver, extracts of which are as follows:
“To attack with two rifle companies in the leading echelon, making the main attack on the right in order to capture the ridge: CR 618-E—south slope of hill 722-b.”
SECOND REQUIREMENT
The recommendations of Captain Company H 30th In- fantry for the tactical employment of his heavy weapons company, based on ground and map reconnaissance, to sup- port the tentative scheme of maneuver of his battalion.
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FIGURE 14.—Situation Map. 2d Battalion 30th Infantry at 3:30 PM.
THE MAILING LIST
DISCUSSION
Captain Company H 30th Infantry, after studying the map and the terrain, realized that his company would have to be widely scattered during the attack. Within the bat- talion zone of action there is no suitable point from which to observe the terrain to be crossed by the battalion in its advance. Even the high ridge about 900 yards in rear of the line of departure affords observation of only one or two small areas forward of the line of departure. These areas are the open spaces near P. Odle and the hostile position on the south edge of Woods T. This ridge is much too far to the rear to be used for heavy machine-gun position areas. Each of the attacking rifle companies need heavy machine-gun support. Centralized control of machine guns in woods fighting is most difficult. However, on the right the battalion is vulnerable from possible hostile counterattacks from Woods V and W and from hostile fires from near P. Odle. One of the missions for heavy machine guns is to pro- tect the flanks. The terrain near the battalion right boundary offers the opportunity for the heavy machine guns of the battalion to place flanking fire on the hostile positions in the zone of action of the battalion on the right. Captain Company H believes he can accomplish his mission by placing some machine guns in direct support of Company F, the left attack company; and retaining one platoon in general support to accomplish a threefold mission on the right flank. He decides not to recommend attachment of the platoon to the left attack company because the supply of ammunition can better be handled by the heavy weapons company commander.
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 61
Captain Company H considers employing his mortars from positions immediately in rear of the attacking rifle companies, or from locations that will take advantage of the ridge southeast of RJ 642-C. If the mortars are employed close behind the attacking units, they may fiind some targets in the open spaces within the woods. The ridge southeast of RJ 642-C affords observation of the hostile position in edge of Woods T. This position will give early resistance to the advance of Campany F and should, therefore, be neu- tralized by the fire of the mortar platoon. The mortars have practically no observation of the ground in the zone of action of Company E, which is making the main attack of the battalion. In the event that visibility was poor at the time of the attack, because of weather conditions or smoke, the mortar platoon would have to take initial position along Middle Creek and take under fire such targets as may be located. Ammunition supply would be difficult to mortar positions along Middle Creek until after the capture of the ridge: CR 618-E—hill 722-b.
Captain Company H determines from his map study that there is little danger of a hostile tank attack from the front because of woods. Possible tank approaches exist from the directions of P. Odle and hill 722-b. To cover both of these approaches with only four guns is difficult because of the distance separating the approaches and because fields of fire are masked. It is not desirable to separate the squads of the caliber .50 machine-gun platoon to the extent that they cannot be controlled by the platoon leader. Usually the four guns of the platoon should be mutually supporting. Any hostile tank attack against the battalion would have to be made across the fronts of adjacent battalions. This in itself is some protection to the 2d Battalion.
-
FIGURE 15.—Position areas for Heavy Weapons Company 2d Battalion 30th Infantry.
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 63
A SOLUTION OF THE SECOND REQUIREMENT
The recommendations of Captain Company H, 30th In- fantry for the employment of his weapons are as follows:
1. To have one heavy machine-gun platoon follow Com- pany E in general support, prepared to:
(a) Protect the right flank of the battalion.
(b) Fire against hostile resistance southwest of P. Odle.
(c) Go in direct support of Company E on order.
2. To place one heavy machine-gun platoon in direct support of Company F from positions immediately in rear of that company to fire initially on the hostile position in edge of Woods T.
3. To employ the mortar platoon in general support from positions 300 yards southeast of RJ 642-C to fire initially on the hostile position in south edge of Woods T.
4. To hold the caliber .50 machine-gun platoon in position of readiness in the wooded draw 450 yards northeast of RJ 540-B prepared to cover the tank approach from the direction of P. Odle. It will thereafter follow the leading elements at about 500 yards distance to positions near CR 618-E and cover tank approaches from the north.
THE MAILING LIST
SITUATION, CONTINUED
It is 3:30 PM, 4th June.
There is no change in the situation. Based on orders from his regimental commander. Lieutenant Colonel Ist 3attalion 29th Infantry has announced his tentative scheme of maneuver, extracts of which are as follows—
“To attack with two rifle companies in the leading echelon, making the main attack on the left in order to capture the ridge: T. Amos—CR 618-E.”
THIRD REQUIREMENT
The recommendations of Captain Company D 29th In- fantry for the tactical employment of his heavy weapons company, based on ground and map reconnaissance, to sup- port the tentative scheme of maneuver of his battalion.
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FIGURE 16.—Situation Map. 1st Battalion 29th Infantry at 3:30 PM.
THE MAILING LIST
DISCUSSION
Captain Company D 29th Infantry should have analyzed his problem somewhat as follows:
1. This battalion is making the main attack of the regi- ment. The main attack of the battalion will be on its left, therefore the bulk of my fires should support the left attack- ing company. However, observation of this area is masked by trees from the line of departure to within 100 or so yards of the hostile position along the near edge of Woods W. Much of the fighting by Company B will be in woods. Machine-gun support for this company is possible only by having the machine guns very close to or actually abreast of the leading units. Such guns cannot be controlled centrally; therefore, they should be placed in direct sup- port of Company B and given initial positions on or near the line of departure. Attachment to Company B is not warranted, because the ammunition supply should be handled through the heavy weapons company commander. Although machine guns located on the ridge west of RJ 534-H can fire on the hostile position at the edge of Woods W, this is not recommended because Company B will need machine-gun support during its advance through Woods V and the guns would be too far to the rear when Company B reorganizes after its capture of the hostile position.
2. Company A will make the holding attack across open ground. It will need all available supporting fires. Position areas in woods west of RJ 480-B permit excellent observa- tion over considerable of the battalion zone of action from close in rear of the line of departure. A platoon located here can be controlled through the heavy weapons company.
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 67
3. It is desirable to support Company B with the mortar platoon. This is impossible, initially, because of the lack of observation over the ground in the zone of action of Company B. This condition will continue until Company B reaches the northeast edge of Woods V some 500 yards forward of the line of departure. In the meantime the hostile position near C. M. Neff can be engaged by the mortar platoon. By placing the mortar platoons in defilade west of the ridge in rear of the line of departure, sufficient ammunition may be delivered during the night to place heavy initial concentrations on the hostile position near C. M. Neff, and thereby facilitate the advance of Company A. The mortar platoon should remain under the control of the heavy weapons company commander.
4. The right half of the battalion zone of action is most vulnerable to tanks. Woods give some protection to the left half. The caliber .50 machine-gun platoon, from posi- tions west of RJ 480-B, can cover approaches in the right half of the battalion zone.
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FIGURE 17.—Dispositions of the Heavy Weapons Company lst Battalion 29th Inafntry.
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 69
A SOLUTION OF THE THIRD REQUIREMENT
The recommendations of Captain Company D, 29th In- jantry for the employment of his weapons are as follows—
1. To place one heavy machine-gun platoon in direct support of Company B from positions immediately in rear of that unit to fire on targets in the zone of action of Com- pany B.
2. To employ one heavy machine-gun platoon in general support from positions in woods 150 yards west of RJ 480-B to fire initially on the hostile position northwest of C. M. Neff. One section to be sited primarily for defense against aircraft.
3. To employ the mortar platoon in general support from positions on the reverse slope of ridge about 500 yards west of RJ 480-B to fire initially on the hostile position northwest of C. M. Neff. The mortar platoon to be prepared to shift on order to targets in the zone of action of Company B.
4. To hold the caliber .50 machine-gun platoon in posi- tion of readiness in woods west of RJ 480-B, prepared to protect against tanks from the direction of C.M. Neff. Upon the capture of the hostile positions near C. M. Neff, to follow the leading attack elements and cover the approach from the direction of T. Amos. Upon the capture of the ridge; T. Amos—CR 618-E, to take positions thereon and southeast of CR 618-E to cover tank approaches from the northeast.
THE MAILING LIST
SITUATION, CONTINUED
It is 3:30 PM, 4 June.
There is no change in the situation. Based on orders from his regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel 2d Battalion 29th Infantry, announced his tentative scheme of maneuver, extracts of which are as follows—
“To attack the hostile positions northeast of RJ 506-B and north of Herring by fire only with one rifle company, and battalion supporting weapons. To be prepared to advance and capture the above positions on order.”
FOURTH REQUIREMENT
The recommendations of Captain Company H 29th In- fantry for the tactical employment of his heavy weapons company, based on ground and map reconnaissance, to sup- port the tentative scheme of maneuver of his battalion.
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FIGURE 18.—Situation Map. 2d Battalion 29th Infantry at 3:30 PM.
THE MAILING LIST
DISCUSSION
After receipt of the battalion’s tentative scheme of maneuver and while studying the situation, the terrain and available maps, Captain Company H 29th Infantry may have reasoned somewhat as follows—
1. This battalion is attacking in column of companies, initially by fire only, on nearly its maximum possible front- age. There are not sufficient weapons in my company to cover, simultaneously, all the known hostile targets. There- fore, successive concentrations on the most dangerous targets will be required. This is best accomplished by keeping the weapons under centralized control, i.e., in general support. If an advance is ordered, the maximum concentration will be necessary on the nearer hostile posi- tion, because of the very open terrain. This, again, favors employment in general support. The hostile position north of Herring is somewhat too far distant to give serious trouble with its rifle fires. Hostile supporting weapons, in that area, can probably be engaged more quickly by our weapons if they remain in general support.
2. Observation close in rear of the line of departure is excellent over most of the battalion zone of action. Posi- tion areas for machine guns and mortars with suitable observation are available within an area about 400 yards in depth. Centralized control, therefore, is relatively easy.
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 73
3. The woods in the left half of the battalion zone of action, while furnishing forward positions some conceal- ment, would require firing over level ground. In such cases observation is obstructed by the smallest fold in the ground and by any short growth. The woods in the right of the zone of action have the advantage of 20 to 60 feet more elevation.
4. Hill 606-c may afford observation for the mortars. However, even if observation from hill 606-c is masked by the trees to the east, the observer can move to the edge of these trees and be connected with wire to the mortars in defilade just west of hill 606-c.
5. With reference to protection against tanks, Captain Company H realizes that the entire battalion zone of action is vulnerable if attacked by tanks. The line of Middle Creek is the only obstacle in the area. He therefore decides to take positions close in rear of this obstacle. He has a choice of placing the guns practically on the line of departure in the left half of the battalion zone of action with probable limited fields of fire, or to place the guns in the vicinity of RJ 506--B, which has the advantages listed for positions for the heavy machine guns.
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YARDS
FIGURE 19.—Dispositions Heavy Weapons Company 2d Battalion 29th Infantry.
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS
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or
A SOLUTION OF FOURTH REQUIREMENT
Recommendations by Captain Company H 29th Infantry are as follows—
1. To employ the heavy machine guns in general support from locations near RJ 506-B and the mortars in general support from locations west of hill 606-C by firing initially on the hostile position 600 yards northeast of RJ 506-B; all weapons to be prepared to shift on order to the hostile position north of Herring. To give one section of machine guns the primary mission of defense against hostile air- craft.
2. To hold the caliber .50 machine-gun platoon in posi- tion of readiness near RJ 506-B prepared to defend against tanks from the north, northeast, and east. Upon the capture of the hostile position southwest of Herring, it will displace thereto and protect against tanks from the north, northeast, and east. Upon the capture of the ridge southeast of T. Amos, to displace thereto and cover ap- proaches from the east and northeast.
THE MAILING LIST
SITUATION, CONTINUED
It is 3:30 PM, 4 June.
The reserve battalions of the 29th Infantry and of the 30th Infantry are located as shown on Figure 11. Arrange- ment has been made to deliver an additional 400 rounds of ammunition per mortar to each of these reserve battalions during the night 4-5 June.
FIFTH REQUIREMENT
So much of the recommendations of Major S-3 29th In- fantry and of Major S-3 30th Infantry as pertain to the initial employment of the heavy weapons companies of their respective reserve battalions in support of the attack.
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 77 DISCUSSION
In the initial stages of an attack all available firepower should be used against the enemy. For this reason the guns of the heavy weapons companies of reserve battalions should be used. However, their use is restricted by the following—
1. The necessity for protection of reserve battalions against hostile aircraft and hostile tanks.
2. The strength and ammunition of the heavy weapons company should not normally be depleted to a degree that it will be of little aid to its own battalion when that unit is committed to action.
3. When employed the guns seldom displace forward, but revert to control of their own battalion when their fires are masked.
4. Guns must be so located that they are readily available to their own battalion at, or before, the time the battalion is to be employed.
In this situation, requirements 2, 3, and 4, above, are met by placing the guns on or in rear of the ridge: hill 725-a— hill 606-c. In the case of mortars of reserve battalions, the ammunition supply will usually be such as to prohibit their use except with their own battalions. The situation, in this case, shown an additional 400 rounds of ammunition per mortar to be delivered during the night. (Note. The 1940 Tables of Basic Allowances have not been published. The Infantry School teaches that 60 rounds of mortar shell will be carried on the weapon and ammunition carrier of the 8l-mm Mortar Platoon. On the ammunition vehicle of each battalion allotted to the 8l-mm mortars there will be carried 244 rounds of light shells and 54 rounds of heavy shells. )
The caliber .50 machine guns of reserve battalions will usually be sited to protect their own battalions against hostile mechanized attacks. One platoon of heavy machine guns will usually be needed for protection against hostile aircraft.
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HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 79
A SOLUTION OF FIFTH REQUIREMENT
So much of the recommendations of Major S-3 29th In- fantry and of Major S-3 30th Infantry as pertain to the initial employment of the heavy weapons companies of their respective battalions—
1. Major S-3 30th Infantry.—To employ one heavy ma- chine-gun platoon and the mortar platoon of Company M, in general support, from positions southeast and south of RJ 642-C to fire initially on the hostile position northeast of RJ 511-C. Thereafter to engage any observed targets in the regimental zone of action until its fires are masked, when it will revert to control of its battalion. Captain Com- pany M to coordinate his initial fires with Lieutenant Colonel 1st Battalion.
2. Major S-3 29th Infantry.—To employ one heavy ma- chine-gun platoon and the mortar platoon of Company M, in general support, from positions on or near the ridge 400 yards west of RJ 480-B to fire initially on the hostile posi- tion near C. M. Neff and to be prepared to shift on order to hostile positions on the ridge: T. Amos—CR 618-E in the zone of action of the 1st Battalion. When its fires are masked the company will revert to the control of its bat- talion. Captain Company M to coordinate his initial fires with Lieutenant Colonel 1st Battalion.
THE MAILING LIST
SITUATION, CONTINUED
The recommendations of Captain Company D 30th In- fantry, as covered in the solution to the first requirement, were approved and issued in the battalion attack order. (See Figure 13.)
Company D moved into positions during the night. The attack jumped off as planned.
Company A attacked through Woods N and O. Its right platoon advanced, initially assisted by the fire of its left platoon, and captured the southern half of the enemy posi- tion in its zone. The left platoon then advanced, and by 7:15 AM this position had been captured. Preparations are being made to continue the advance. The company is receiving heavy small arms fire from the northeast.
Company B attacked in a zone of 200 yards, with its right initially at CR 510-D. As its attacking elements emerged from Woods P they were met by heavy small-arms fire from the southwestern edge of Woods Q. Attempts to continue the advance through the woods along the east and west limits of the company zone have been unsuccessful. By 6:45 AM the company has been definitely stopped. There is severe fighting in the woods on both sides of the road about 400 vards southwest of RJ 650 in the center of the battalion zone of action. The Reconnaissance Officer Com- pany D has just reported this situation to Captain Company D.
The heavy machine-gun platoons, in general support, fired on the hostile position southeast of CR 510-D. By 6:45 AM the fire of its 1st Platoon was masked by the advance of the right platoon of Company A, and this platoon suspended firing. The 2d Platoon Company PD continued its fire until the left platoon of Company A started its advance, when this platoon, at 7:00 AM, also suspended firing.
The 8l-mm Mortar Platoon in general support ceased firing on the hostile position northeast of CR 510-D at about 7:00 AM.
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 81
The reconnaissance sergeant has reported to Captain Company D that hostile machine guns have been located in the woods near (40.9-43.0) and near (40.8-43.3).
Buglars from Company D are now present with each attacking company.
Captain Company D is acquainted with the situation and, accompanied by two messengers, is now at the battalion OP near point X.
Lieutenant Colonel 1st Battalion is now in Woods P to learn the situation with reference to his main attack.
SIXTH REQUIREMENT
With reference to the employment of the battalion sup- porting weapons, what action, if any, should each of the following officers take at this time?
1. Captain Company A.
2. Captain Company B.
3. Captain Company D.
DISCUSSION
During an attack all commanders must strive to keep the maximum supporting fires on those hostile targets that are delaying the advance of the rifle companies. Much supporting fire will be delivered without request or action on the part of the rifle company commanders. This condition will exist because the rifle company commanders are fre- quently in a position from which requests for fire support sent to higher headquarters will be difficult, if not impossible. However, a rifle company commander knows best where, when, and what supporting fires will assist his advance. He should therefore make every effort to report hostile locations and request supporting fires. For this purpose one man, usually a buglar, from the headquarters of the heavy weapons company, is detailed with each attacking rifle company. In addition, when a heavy machine-gun platoon is in direct support of a rifle company, a corporal agent, from the machine-gun platoon is present with the rifle company commander. These means are provided the
82 THE MAILING LIST rifle company commander to assist him in obtaining sup- porting fires. However, in combat these means and all others with rifle companies may either fail to function or will be unable to function because of hostile activities. Leaders of supporting weapons and battalion commanders must antici- pate the needs of rifle units. They must issue orders ac- cordingly. In this situation the battalion commander is absent. Captain Company D, therefore, takes action to support the attacking rifle companies. The main attack must receive the maximum fire support. It has been stopped by enemy fire from the forward edge of Woods Q. From their present positions the heavy machine-gun platoons cannot fire on Woods Q. The battalion attack order anticipated the need for heavy machine-gun support in the wooded patches throughout the zone of action of Company B and directed that one platoon be prepared to go in direct sup- port of that unit. With this advance preparation, the minimum time should elapse before the platoon reports to Company B in direct support and machine-gun fire is placed on Woods Q.
Mortar targets exist on the front of both Company A and Company B, all of which are visible from the present observation post of the mortar platoon. Captain Company D at once shifted the mortar fire to support the main attack.
A SOLUTION OF SIXTH REQUIREMENT
Action taken by officers listed:
1. Captain Company A.—Directs the Bugler Company D to report to Captain Company D the location of the hostile machine guns and to request mortar fire on them. Also to request machine-gun fire on the edge of woods northeast of present position of Company A. This report should be accompanied with a sketch showing the location of the hostile guns.
2. Captain Company B.—Directs the Bugler Company D to report to Captain Company D the location of hostile resistance in Woods Q and to request both mortar and machine-gun fire on the southwest edge of Woods Q. This
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 83
report should be accompanied with a sketch showing the location of the hostile resistance.
3. Captain Company D.—In the absence of Lieutenant Colonel 1st Battalion, Captain Company D directs:
a. That the 1st Platoon displace to positions near Com- pany B’s front line in Woods P at once, in direct support of Company B.
b. That the fire of the 2d Platoon be shifted at once to the hostile positions northeast of Company A.
c. That the fire of the mortar platoon be shifted to the southwest edge of Woods Q as requested by Captain Com- pany B.
d. That his reconnaissance officer take one messenger, guide the 1st Platoon to positions to support Company B, and, thereafter, keep the company commander informed of the situation affecting Company B.
e. That his reconnaissance sergeant reconnoiter routes of advance from the present positions of the 2d Platoon to advance positions in Woods R from which Company A can be supported.
f. That the buglers return to Captain Company A and Company B, respectively, and inform them of the actions taken.
THE MAILING LIST
SITUATION, CONTINUED
The attack of the 1st Battalion was resumed at 8:00 AM.
Situation at 8:30 AM.—Elements of the 1st Battalion are disposed as indicated on Figure 21.
Company A experienced great difficulty in advancing against the hostile position near RJ 650. All platoons have been committed, but the company is unable to advance from positions along the edges of the woods.
Company B cleared Woods Q of the enemy, but suffered severely in doing so. All platoons have been committed, but the company is unable to advance from the edge of the woods.
Company C, in battalion reserve, is in Woods R. It has not been employed during the attack.
Company D. The 1st Platoon, in direct support of Com- pany B, displaced forward by section as soon as Woods Q was captured, and is now firing on the hostile position south of Miedley from the position area as shown. The 3d Section is firing in general support of the battalion from the posi- tion area shown on Figure 21. The 4th Section, in its initial position, has just gone out of action and is preparing to displace forward.
The Mortar Platoon, from initial positions, assisted the advance of Company B to the edge of Woods Q. It then displaced forward, by squad, to the indicated position and is now firing on hostile machine guns located in edge of woods north of RJ 650.
The caliber .50 machine-gun platoon has displaced for- ward to positions in readiness near the western edge of Woods Q. It is preparing to protect against tanks from the east and north.
The 2d Battalion 30th Infantry on the right is advancing slowly, with its leading elements near the northeast edge of woods.
Units of the 6th Division, on the left, are abreast of the leading elements of the 1st Battalion.
Lieutenant Colonel 1st Battalion, accompanied by Captain Company D and others, is in Woods R. All present are familiar with the situation.
we
of Wy
et} Oy é » 8, S ¥ i
YARDS
1st Battalion 30th Infantry at 8:30 AM.
Situation Map.
FIGURE 21.
86 THE MAILING LIST
PLAN OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL 1ST BATTALION
To move Company C into the zone of action of the 2d 3attalion and attack the hostile position on hill 722-b through Woods S.
Companies A and B to hold the enemy by fire until Com- pany C attacks, then to renew the attack in conjunction with Company C.
To request Lieutenant Colonel 2d Battalion 30th Infantry to place flanking machine-gun fire on the hostile position on hill 722-b.
Company D * * *
SEVENTH REQUIREMENT
1. The recommendations of Captain Company D to Lieu- tenant Colonel Ist Battalion for the employment of the several elements of Company D to support the plan of action.
2. The recommendations of Captain Company D to Lieu- tenant Colonel 1st Battalion with reference to the probable position area and mission for each platoon under control of Company D in the event hill 722-b is captured.
DISCUSSION
In this situation all of Company D except one section of heavy machine guns is committed to action well forward in support of the rifle companies. The rifle companies cannot advance, which indicates that they need all supporting fires now being delivered. Units committed to action and under hostile fire can usually be moved only with excessive losses.
The battalion scheme of maneuver directs an envelope- ment through Woods S by Company C. Heavy machine guns will be of little use to Company C during the actual advance through the woods. An advance to the north and west edges of Woods § will seriously threaten hill 722-b. Counter- attacks can be expected. Machine guns in the northern and western edges of the Woods S will be most useful in holding the position or repulsing counterattacks. The 4th Section has the only guns available to go with Company C. The 2d
HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY ATTACKS 87
Platoon, less the 3d Section, should be attached to Company C in order to have an officer with the machine guns. This officer will be responsible to Captain Company C not only for the tactical employment of the machine guns, but also for their ammunition supply. The unit should be attached to Company C rather than in direct or general support, because of the distance and woods separating this unit from the remainder of the company.
Upon the capture of 722-b, Lieutenant Colonel Ist Bat- talion desires the rapid displacement of all supporting weapons thereto to cover any reorganization required and to stop hostile counterattacks. Advance study of maps and planning by Captain Company D should considerably reduce the time necessary to give maximum protection after cap- ture of hill 722-b.
A SOLUTION OF THE SEVENTH REQUIREMENT
Recommendations of Captain Company D are as follows:
a. For the attack—(1) To attach the 2d Platoon, less 3d Section, to Company C at once.
(2) No change for the mortar platoon.
(3) No change for the caliber .50 machine-gun platoon.
b. In the event hill 722-b is captured.—To reconnoiter and prepare plans to displace all weapons to hill 722-b to posi- tion areas and with missions as follows:
(1) 1st Platoon to woods at (41.5-43.7) to cover hostile approaches from the east and northeast.
(2) 3d Section to the northern edge of Woods S to cover hostile approaches from the north and east.
(3) Mortar platoon to reverse slopes of hill 722-b and about 250 yards northeast of RJ 650 prepared to place con- centrations in orchard and woods to the north and northeast.
(4) Caliber .50 machine-gun platoon to the corner of woods at (41.6-43.6) to protect against tanks from the north and east.
CHAPTER 4
An Infantry Battalion in the Attack
(Historical Illustration—German Invasion of Poland, September 1939)
Few accounts of fighting between small infantry units during the present war are available for reproduction and study. The following description of an infantry battalion in the attack deals with the attack in which the 3d Battal- ion, 63d German Infantry decisively defeated a Polish force of similar strength on September 20, 1939. The Polish forces had organized defensive positions near Tom- aszow, a little town not far from Lemberg.
This account has been translated* from the report of the commanding officer of the German battalion, as pub- lished in the Militarwissenschaftlicho Rundschau, a periodi- cal published by the General Staff of the German Army.
Even though the Polish forces were on the verge of sur- render on September 20, 1939 and did not offer determined resistance to the advance of the Germans, the historical problem is interesting in that it provides a study of the tactical employment of the German infantry battalion. As you study the pages of this Chapter, note the similarity of German and corresponding American units in organiza- tion and in the application of tactical principles.
The German battalion consisted of three rifle companies (9th, 10th,.and 11th Companies), a machine gun company,
* Translated by Technical Sergeant Fred W. Merten, on duty in the Translation Section, The Army War College. The four figures are reproduced through courtesy of the Command and General Staff School Military Review.)
89
M.L t.
90 THE MAILING LIST
and the usual heavy weapons. For the attack the battalion was reinforced by a platoon of 37-mm guns from the regi- ment.
On the evening of September 19th, the 3d Battalion, 63d Infantry arrived at Huta Dzierazynskie, where it went into regimental reserve behind the left of the defensive position.
A large hostile force was known to be at Zamoso, a town 12 miles to the north; and other strong hostile units were reported to have clashed with elements of a light division at Tomaszow. The 63d Infantry was ready to go into action in the direction of Tomaszow, where a fight had been raging for two days. The engagements in that region were a part of the great battle that was taking place in the general areas of Lemberg and Tomaszow. It was believed that the enemy would attempt a break-through toward the east and northeast. The small village of Tarnawatka, located south of Huta Dzierazynskie, was in flames. The sound of heavy fire was coming from the region of Tomas- zow. On Hill 325.8, to the southeast, a company of engi- neers had established a long line of outposts facing south. Though once driven back to the north by a Polish assault, the engineers had recaptured their positions on that hill (See Figure 22.).
Around that time, German artillery in position just southeast of Tarnawatka could be heard firing to the south. Simultaneously, the regiment received a call for help from the engineer company out front. The engineers reported that due to the elongation of their outpost line they would be unable to stave off another hostile attack; and that need of support was urgent.
When the commanding officer of the division artillery likewise expressed concern over the situation of his bat- teries, the regimental commander decided to place a rein- forced company of the 3d Battalion in support of the engi- neers on Hill 325.8.
jo. o\ , p s0%) La 63 ula Dzieraznia 1
SSS Zwiartow
je Attempted _ ~ as te PR -*| attack PM, 19 Sept. Sethe ® oS e o7 as _ “hea es O.«
T><_. Szarawola- ~~ = = AS ee: Zachodnia _ ™ “k ‘e ita OS attack PM, 19 Sept. y
ow Lubelski
Attempted break-through — early morning 20 Sept.
_ ae Se ee as WI 9
FIGURE 22.—Situation on the evening of 19 September.
92 THE MAILING LIST
In compliance with the instructions of the regimental commander, the battalion commander issued the following verbal orders:
“A strong enemy force is putting up a stubborn fight in the region of Tomaszow; he is constantly trying to break through in all directions. He may make another attempt at a penetration to the north and northeast at any moment, especially during the night. A company of engineers, spread over a wide front, is on outpost on Hill 325.8, south- east of Tarnawatka. It has called for support. You can hear our own artillery firing to the south from its posi- tions at Tarnawatka (pointing in that direction). This artillery, too, is exposed to hostile attack.
“The 9th Company, reinforced by a heavy infantry mortar section and accompanied by a pack radio crew of two men, will move immediately through the southeast part of Tarnawatka to Hill 325.8 and prevent a_ hostile penetration astride the highway. The company will take up a defensive position on the right of the road and extend- ing to the lake. Outposts will be established along Wie- przow Creek. Combat intelligence to be pushed south- ward. The engineer company, located on the left of the road, will be subject to your orders. You will cooperate with the friendly artillery. Send messages to battalion by cyclist, through regimental command post. The other com- panies of the 3d Battalion will go into regimental reserve at Huta Dzierazynskie.”
Relative to further combat operations of the battalion on 20 September, the battalion commander reports as fol- lows:
Meanwhile darkness was approaching. The battalion commander reviewed the reinforced 9th Company as it moved out, addressed a few words to the men, and joined the remainder of the battalion in its bivouac.
At midnight, the 9th Company sent word that it had taken up the defensive position as directed and established liaison with the engineer company and the artillery. The
AN INFANTRY BATTALION ATTACKS 93
company reported that lively artillery fire in the region of Tomaszow seemed to indicate that an engagement was taking place in that vicinity.
Around 2:00 AM (Figure 23), the 3d Battalion received orders to proceed immediately to the high ground south of Tarnawatka and to take over the assignment of the 9th Company with the entire battalion. At 3:00 AM, the bat- talion (less reinforced 9th Company)—with the heavy infantry mortar sections divided between the 11th and 10th Companies—marched out from Huta Dzierazynskie on the road to Tarnawatka. Upon reaching the southeast part of the village, which had burned to the ground, the battalion commander ordered the battalion to halt, prepare the light machine guns for action, and draw ammunition, hand grenades, flares, and so on. In the meantime, the bat- talion commander established liaison with the 9th Com- pany and the artillery. At the suggestion of the officer com- manding the 9th Company, the battalion was advanced to the command post of the 9th Company, which was located some 500 yards southeast of Tarnawatka. Likewise at the advice of that company commander, the battalion com- mander decided to place an additional rifle company in the line, and to attach elements of the Machine-Gun Company and the Heavy-Weapons Platoon (Infantry Cannon Pla- toon) to the 9th Company. He placed the 10th Company in a position in readiness to the right rear, with the idea of employing it at daybreak, if necessary, in the right half of the defensive sector previously held by the 9th Company. Next, the battalion commander established liaison with the commanding officer of the artillery battal- ion. According to the statements of the officer command- ing the 9th Company and the artillery commander, the enemy (estimated at a regiment each of Polish cavalry and infantry) seemed to be hiding in the woods west of Pan- kow; and strong hostile forces were believed located in the woods north of Tomaszow. Around 4:30 AM, heavy artil- lery fire and other weapons suddenly flared up again in the approximate region south of Tomaszow—Lubelski.
2 DE ", Ozierazynskie
y fn Bic Hula Ozieraznia v.
Antoniowka I
*
E eeusl handl \Grenades etc.
B88
<2F + ha Huta
Weir eon: os
a o ee RS he oe r oF
lee 5:00AM = _- ale zarawola- R trol 41th Co. \ Re Zachodnia — C
Enemy attempted brea k- “through
0 ’ 2 3 oo 5 6 miles
e..*! ns 00AM.20 Sept. Zwiarfow
\ Omin halt for dismounting MGs.
“oe
FIGURE 23.—Situation up to 6:30 AM.
AN INFANTRY BATTALION ATTACKS 95
The enemy apparently was now trying to break-through toward the south. The battalion commander reported his impressions to the regiment by radio and in writing and requested that his battalion be directed to support the fighting by an attack in the direction of Tomaszow. He placed the battalion in position so that it could attack at once, with the left flank advancing along the highway, and made the necessary preparations in cooperation with the officer commanding the artillery battalion.
At 6:30 AM, the regimental commander called up and issued the following instructions:
“The regiment will attack at 7:00 AM; 3d Battalion west of the road, lst Battalion east of the road. Objective: Hills south of the large woods northwest of Tomaszow.”
The zone of the 3d Battalion was defined further as the region of the ponds located about half a mile south of the forester’s house at Dabrowa.
The battalion commander assembled the company com- manders, the leader of the attached heavy-weapons pla- toon, and the commander of the artillery battalion, which had been designated to support the battalion, on the hill a mile north of Kozia Wolka. Briefly surveying the situa- tion from that dominating terrain feature, he issued verbal attack orders as follows (Figure 24):
BATTALION ORDERS FOR ATTACK IN THE DIRECTION OF TOMASZOW
“The enemy apparently is pushing on to the south, with the view of breaking through our lines at, and in the region south of, Tomaszow. One of our patrols reports Pankow to be free of the enemy. Our patrols have not yet reported whether hostile forces are still in the woods west of Pan- kow or hiding in the woods northeast of Tomaszow. Both may be still in the hands of the enemy.
“The 63d Infantry will attack—3d Battalion on the right, 1st Battalion on the left of the highway to Tomas- zow—and wipe out all resistance. The hills north of Tomas- zow have been designated as the regimental objective;
THE MAILING LIST
96
while the high ground just south of the forester’s house of Dabrowa is the objective of the 3d Battalion.
“The ridge with the several farm buildings, a mile and a half ahead of us, constitutes the initial objective of the battalion.
“Zero hour: 7:00 AM.
“The attack will be carried out as follows:
“The 11th Company on the left, its left flank resting on the highway, will lead the attack; the highway is included in its zone. Width of company front: 500 yards. The 10th Company echeloned to the right, will follow at a distance of 300 yards in deployed formation.
“The 9th Company, in battalion reserve, will trail the forward echelons, at a distance of 500 yards behind the center of the battalion. The company will proceed, for the time being, to the small clump of woods beyond the swamp (half a mile south of Kozia Wolka).
“The heavy mortar sections will remain with the rifle companies.
“One machine-gun section will go into position on this hill; its mission will be to cover the advance of the bat- talion across the swamp and fire on all observed targets. The machine guns must be placed so as to be able to bar any hostile flank action coming from the direction of the woods east of Pankow. They must be displaced forward as early as possible. The remainder of the Machine-Gun Com- pany will advance with the 11th and 10th Companies for their immediate support in case of resistance. It is most important that the assault proceed with a minimum of delay from the initial battalion objective to the edge of the woods over there.
“The Heavy-Weapons Platoon, attached to the 11th Com- pany, will accompany an assault party and advance along the highway. The mission of the heavy weapons is to shat- ter all resistance by direct fire and to break the morale of the enemy.
“Artillery battalion: I request that the artillery cover and support the attack of the battalion across the swamp,
AN INFANTRY BATTALION ATTACKS "7
by firing on any hostile elements that may be observed on the high ground over there or at the edge of the woods.
“The artillery liaison detail will accompany me. Only minor elements may be detached to meet hostile action directed from the region of Pankow against the right flank of the battalion.
“IT shall follow 300 yards in rear of the right flank of the llth Company. Next battalion command post probably will be established at the house over there (Kozia Wolka) or near the high fir trees in the woods west of the highway.
“Communication with the 10th and 11th Companies will be by radio.”
While the company and other commanders issued their orders, a corporal of the 11th Company, accompanied by several cyclists, moved out on the highway to Tomaszow to reconnoiter whether hostile forces were operating along the road and, if so, what strength and arms the enemy possessed.
The battalion jumped off at seven o’clock. It moved down into the creek bottom at Kozia Wolka and across the swamp without receiving any hostile fire. As the battalion commander was crossing Wieprzow Creek behind the right of the 11th Company, the corporal of the 11th returned with the following information: “Strong enemy all along the road. There are some 20 or 30 guns in position in that area. We captured nearly 50 men, taking them by com- plete surprise; one man of my patrol is taking them back toward Tarnawatka. One of the prisoners states that Polish field howitzers are in position along the edge of the woods over there, ready to mow us down with canister as soon as we approach within 50 yards of them.” From this the battalion commander concluded that the battalion was likely to encounter strong resistance in the area near, and to the right of, the highway; and that his attack might be more successful if it were carried forward on as wide a front as possible. He ordered the 10th Company to extend its front so as to join the 11th on the left, and to attack on a 500-yard front. Around 7:45 AM, the 10th Company and, shortly thereafter, the 11th reached the
98 THE MAILING LIST
initial battalion objective, a long ridge covered with under- brush and topped by a few groups of buildings, about a mile and a half south of Kozia Wolka (Figure 24). Battal- ion headquarters reached the group of trees 300 yards north of the right flank of the 11th Company and set up its command post. The 9th Company, whose instructions were to follow close behind battalion headquarters as a battalion reserve, lagged behind almost a thousand yards, having been delayed by the assembly of its widely distrib- uted outposts. Around that hour, a prisoner who spoke some German was brought before the battalion commander. He confirmed the report that strong artillery and also several companies of infantry were located in the woods, and that parts of the hostile artillery were in position along the edge of the woods, waiting to greet the Germans at closer range. The battalion commander believed it quite possible for the enemy to resort to a ruse of that kind; and he concluded further that, judging by the sound of the rifle and machine-gun fire, the edge of the woods also contained infantry. Two hostile machine guns had been identified definitely in a small wooden shack at the edge of the woods. The battalion commander decided to wait for the 9th Com- pany to close up for the ensuing action and to continue the advance only after a thorough artillery preparation on the enemy in, and along the edge of, the woods. Forwarding his request through the artillery liaison detail and by radio to the regiment, the battalion commander called for an artillery preparation to be delivered on the edge of the woods. Further he requested the artillery battalion co- operating with his battalion to advance a battery to a point close behind the battalion command post, where it would be immediately available for fire against individual strong points. The regiment assured the battalion that the sup- porting battalion of light guns and a battalion of heavy artillery would fire a preparation from 8:30 to 8:45 AM. The artillery likewise complied with the request to advance a battery.
Meanwhile the battalion made preparations for the resumption of the attack; and all heavy weapons of the
AN INFANTRY BATTALION ATTACKS 99
battalion were brought up front. Intermittent machine- gun fire and heavy rifle fire, coming from the edge of the woods, met everything that moved.
At 8:40 AM, the regimental commander sent word that the enemy might decide to negotiate for a surrender. The battalion commander reported that he would proceed with the attack upon the conclusion of the artillery preparation and as soon as the battery of artillery which he had requested had moved up. Around nine o’clock, he received the report that the advanced battery would be ready to open fire shortly. The 10th Company sent word that a bat- tery of enemy artillery had left its positions at the edge of the woods and was hurrying westward under the fire of the heavy infantry mortars and heavy machine guns of the 10th. Observers from battalion headquarters and the 11th Company reported to have seen Polish soldiers run- ning around near the edge of the woods; it appeared as if the hostile infantry and gun crews were falling back. The battalion commander decided to take up the pursuit without delay.
Shortly after nine o’clock, the 10th and 11th Companies jumped off for the assault on the edge of the woods. Weak rifle fire and, on the left of the 11th Company, also machine gun fire met the German assault. The hostile machine guns at the edge of the woods were kept down by the well aimed fire of the advanced battery. The 10th Company and the right of the 11th pushed on without stopping. The ad- vanced battery or a battery belonging to the artillery bat- talion in the rear kept hammering the edge of the woods in front of the left of the 10th Company. Despite the repeated discharge by the infantry of green flares, which was the agreed signal for the artillery to lift its fire 2000 yards, the battery failed to cease fire immediately. In order to avoid a delay of the pursuit and not to give the enemy time to renew his resistance, the battalion commander issued orders for the left of the 10th Company to go round the fire of the friendly artillery and continue the pursuit. This kept the pursuit in flow.
“2 \ ss
=< Kozia Wolk, \'s
Szarowola- -Zachodnia
w ibelski
FiGuRE 24.—Situation as of 9:00 AM.
AN INFANTRY BATTALION ATTACKS 101
The battalion was forging ahead through the woods, when battalion headquarters suddenly found itself in a gap that had been created in the woods between the 10th and 11th Companies of the forward echelon. While the firing near the highway was dying down, sporadic rifle fire was still heard at close range in the woods. In order to keep the men from getting lost, the battalion commander had word passed on through the ranks to keep moving in the direction of the sun. At a point about 900 yards north of the south edge of the woods, he directed a sergeant from battalion headquarters to follow a trail through the woods and determine whether it led to the south. The sergeant ran into a bunch of Polish troops, shot down their officer —whereupon the soldiers laid down their arms and sur- rendered—and returned with about 40 prisoners. The bat- talion commander ordered a section of the 9th Company, which was following close behind battalion headquarters, to move ahead and mop up the woods on both sides of the trail. Without encountering further resistance—a number of Polish soldiers surrendered voluntarily—battalion head- quarters reached the south edge of the woods simultaneous- ly with the forward section of the 9th Company. There was no sign of the 11th Company on the left. It was still in the woods. Out front and over to the right, however, elements of the 10th Company had pushed on beyond their objective, the edge of the woods, despite orders to the effect that the attack was not to continue until the necessary supporting fire had been assured. From where battalion headquarters was located, a large number of Polish rifle troops and machine guns could be observed on the high ground, firing down on the 10th Company. Many hostile riflemen and machine gunners close in front of battalion headquarters opened flanking fire on the left flank of that part of the 10th Company which had pushed on beyond its intermediate objective. These Polish troops faced east. In order to relieve the situation of the 10th Company and seize the hill just south of the edge of the woods, which was found to dominate the area toward Tomaszow (most of the ponds shown in the sketch were dry, leaving only deep
Displacement cancelled
ste) due to cessation of Fight see) Kozia alk, Pankow
/ ==
~ Tomaszow~ Subelski £7, 500 O- 500 — 00verds / WY 44 7
Figure 25.—Final situation as of 10:15 AM.
AN INFANTRY BATTALION ATTACKS 103
mud holes and depressions), the battalion commander decided to throw the 9th Company immediately into the gap between the 10th and 11th Companies.
Deploying from the march, the 9th Company emerged from the woods, opened rifle and machine gun fire on the flank of the Poles—which took them completely by surprise —seized the dominating hill within a few minutes, and so brought about also the speedy collapse of the resistance in front of the 10th Company. Some of the 10th Company had taken by assault a heavily occupied hill in front of the woods, captured a Polish battery that had been firing on the 11th Company during the attack (half of the battery was encountered limbered up and the other half still in firing position) and stormed another piece of high ground, whence the attacking forces had a sweeping view of the valley of Tomaszow.
Shortly before ten o’clock, the entire battalion reached the dominating hills north of Tomaszow, the objective assigned to it by the regiment, and was ready to continue the pursuit (Figure 25). Light and heavy machine guns opened a devastating fire on the enemy as he was retreat- ing toward Tomaszow and the east.
While the battalion commander was issuing brief orders to move up the platoon of 37-mm guns and the artillery, orders arrived from the regiment to cease fire and to hold the line occupied, as negotiations were under way for the surrender of the enemy.
A few hours later, during which a number of prisoners were rounded up in the fields and farm buildings, word arrived that the opponent had declared himself ready to surrender. The assault of the Regiment into the hostile artillery and thus into the rear of the opponent at Tomas- zow probably contributed to the final decision of the enemy to lay down his arms. Regimental orders directed the bat- talion to leave strong outposts on the occupied line and to go into bivouac in the field for the coming night.
The interrogation of captured officers revealed that about 20 pieces of hostile artillery had been in the woods north of Tomaszow; that some of them had been employed to
THE LIST
MAILING
104
block the attack from the north; and that several batteries actually had orders, and had intended, to let the attackers approach to within 50 yards before annihilating them. In the zone of attack of the 3d Battalion, the enemy had em- ployed a battalion of infantry, with the mission of covering the artillery against an attack from the north. Whereas a large part of the Polish artillery had been completely demoralized and ready to surrender, the officers of the Polish infantry battalion had been determined to hold out to the end. One officer, so his men stated, had threatened to shoot down with his pistol any man who refused to fight to the last. Some of the captured officers (there were seven all told) gave the impression of fanatics. Many of the Polish officers had refused to give up and were killed in action. When the German battalion commander questioned one of the officers as to why they had persisted in the hope- less fight, this officer replied that they had been fighting for their honor. When he learned that the Polish division on the other side had surrendered and that the Polish general had offered to lay down his arms, the officer was stunned. All companies reported that the Polish officers, especially the lieutenants and captains, had put up a very brave fight. On the other hand, the prisoners stated unani- mously that the artillery concentration on the edge of the woods had thrown the defenders into a veritable panic. A Polish battery, which had been placed at the edge of the woods, with orders to open fire on the Germans at close range, was blasted out of its positions; what guns and horses were not destroyed, escaped capture by flight. Apparently, this was the battery which the 10th Company had seen retreating westward and had taken under fire. The small losses suffered by the German battalion, (four dead and six wounded), were due mainly to the fact that the German artillery fire and the forceful assault caused the opponent to lose his head and apparently deliver only unaimed fire, as evidenced by the comparative number of dead on both sides. Whereas the German battalion counted but four dead, the Polish forces lost around a _ hundred dead in the zone of the 9th and 10th Companies alone.
—a—_ ae
AN INFANTRY BATTALION ATTACKS 105
In three and a half hours of attack, interrupted by a delay of nearly an hour which was taken up with prepara- tions for the continuation of the assault, the German bat- talion overran a battalion of hostile infantry, forged ahead through four miles of largely wooded terrain, wiped out completely its opponent, and finished off strong artillery. The prisoners numbered seven officers and 572 men. The booty consisted of 16 pieces of artillery, including guns of heavy caliber, nine antitank guns, a large number of light and heavy machine guns, rifles, vehicles, horses, and all kinds of equipment.
CHAPTER 5
Tactical Employment of a Motorized Detachment
(AN INFANTRY SCHOOL TEACHING)
1. a. A motorized detachment may be formed when there is a definite need for increased mobility for a portion of the foot elements of a command. Such a detachment has no permanent organization, but is formed for a particular tactical mission or when a tactical mission can be definitely foreseen. Basically, it consists of rifle company elements and heavy weapons company elements transported in trucks, together with a commander who must be supplied with means of communication and control. It may be rein- forced by truck-drawn artillery, engineers, and chemical and medical troops, depending upon the mission for which the detachment is formed. Transportation for a motorized detachment should be furnished by a higher echelon.
b. During the course of this chapter the details involved in the organization and composition of a motorized detach- ment will be discussed and the detachment will then be dispatched on a combat mission. An illustrative problem has been drawn requiring an infantry regimental com- mander to organize such a detachment and to use it to secure the uninterrupted march of the regiment.
2. a. The 1st Division, after an unopposed crossing of the Chattahoochee River into Red territory during the afternoon bivouacked for the night with an outpost along Lumpkin Road. (See Figure 26.)
107
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MOTORIZED DETACHMENT 109
b. At 2:00 AM, Colonel 3d Infantry received the follow- ing message, together with a copy of an operation map, from the Ist Division (For map references see Figure 26.) :
“Strong hostile patrols employing automatic weapons are operating east of Lumpkin Road. Ist Division will march at 6:30 AM in three columns.
“Ist Division Reconnaissance Troop, commencing at 6:00 AM, will operate in advance of the division. It will report the presence of enemy troops on or adjacent to routes of march direct to column commanders.
“3d Infantry with 44th Field Artillery Battalion (truck- drawn); 2d Platoon, Company A, Ist Engineers and one truck load bridge repair material; Detachment 1st Signal Company; Ist Platoon (truck) Company A, Ist Quarter- master Battalion (24 114-ton trucks) and five motorcycles with sidecars, will march at 6:30 AM via Route C and will reach the Columbus-Cusseta Road by 10:00 AM and RJ 445 by 12:30 PM. The 3d Infantry will protect the left (north) flank.”
c. After a brief map study of his route of march and the terrain adjacent thereto, Colonel 3d Infantry formu- lated plans for the march, made brief notes, and gave the following instructions to Major S-3 who was with him at the command post 3d Infantry:
“Read the division order and take a look at this opera- tion map. The regiment will march as follows:
“Advance guard: list Battalion (less detachments)
“Main Body: Foot elements of the 2d Battalion, 3d Bat- talion.
“Motor elements of all units will follow the main body by bounds of not to exceed three miles.
“Form a motorized detachment consisting of a rifle com- pany, a heavy weapons company, and small administra- tive, reconnaissance, and communication detachments. I will probably have to use it well to the front to clear the route of march or to assist in protecting the left flank. Have it march at the head of the motor column, initially, and be ready to move out at 6:15 AM. Put Major-Execu- tive 3d Battalion in command. Use the necessary number
110 THE MAILING LIST of 11,4-ton trucks and the motorcycles from the Ist Quar- termaster Battalion. Give the detachment commander suf- ficient transportation to enable him to provide for the organization of at least two patrols. In addition, have a strong motorized patrol protect the left flank north of the Upatoi Creek. Issue warning orders now and let me see your notes when you are ready to issue the complete order. “Any questions?”
3. You are Major S-3, 3d Infantry. After talking to Major-Executive Officer, 3d Battalion, you are ready to prepare notes from which to issue orders for the organi- zation of the motorized detachment.
FIRST REQUIREMENT
4. Prepare the notes you will show the commanding offi- cer, and from which you will issue the order for the detailed organization of the detachment to include only the desig- nation of the following elements:
a. Rifle Company.
b. Heavy Weapons Company.
c. Artillery.
d. Engineers—equipment and transportation.
e. Command and administrative personnel—transpor- tation.
f. Communciation Personnel—equipment and transpor- tation.
g. Medical Personnel—equipment and transportation.
h. Transportation, Company A, Ist Quartermaster Bat- talion.
DISCUSSION
5. The 3d Infantry must reach the Columbus-Cusseta Road by 10:00 AM. Hence, it is imperative that it march uninterruptedly at a rate of about 214 miles per hour. In order to insure the regiment against delay by hostile detachments, Colonel 3d Infantry should organize a mobile, hard hitting detachment which is capable of independent action for a short period.
MOTORIZED DETACHMENT 111
As a combat mission is foreseen, the detachment should be strong in automatic weapons. These weapons should be taken from the battalion which, in the event of combat, will form the regimental reserve. The rifle elements should preferably come from the advance guard battalion, since combat action of the motorized detachment will probably be to clear the way for the advance guard. Command, administrative, and communication personnel should be accustomed to working with the detachment commander. By the time it is necessary to employ the reserve battalion, the elements of the motorized detachment will probably have reverted to unit control.
Engineer and artillery reconnaissance groups should be included to facilitate the participation of their units. An engineer working party and bridge repair material should be included because of the stream crossings on the route of march.
The two company aid men from the battalion medical sections should remain with the units to which they are habitually attached. In addition, some means should be provided for collecting wounded and transporting them back to the nearest collecting station. A noncommissioned officer, some litter bearers (one of whom is a truck driver), and some litters appear to be adequate for this purpose. These men, their transportation and equipment, all should be taken from the headquarters section of the medical detachment.
Transportation for motorized detachments should be furnished by higher echelons. Organic transportation carries specific loads and should not be unloaded and diverted to other uses, except in cases of extreme emergen- cies. To the number of vehicles actually required for the transportation of the personnel of a motorized detachment there must be added at least one truck and one messenger vehicle for each patrol. If the personnel or equipment transported in an organic vehicle is included in the detach- ment, the vehicle should also be included.
(NOTE.—To obtain the maximum benefit from studying this illustrative problem it is urged that you solve the
112 THE MAILING LIST requirements before you read the solution prepared by The Infantry School. Each requirement is followed by a dis- cussion. When you have read the discussion note the time suggested for the preparation of your solution. Then take a pencil and paper and actually write down your solution to the requirement. Editor.)
(Time allowance—20 minutes)
A SOLUTION OF THE FIRST REQUIREMENT
6. Major S-3 made the following notes pertaining to the designation of the units which were to form the motorized detachment:
a. Rifle Company— 1 Rifle Co 1st Bn
b. Heavy Weapons Company— Co M
ec. Artillery— Ren detail in 1 vehicle (organic) Msgr, Mtcl w se (organic) d. Engineers— Ren detail in 1 vehicle (organic) 1 Trk (organic)—personnel of working party 1 Trk QM loaded with bridge material
e. Command and administrative personnel—
1 Ist Lt S-2 ) 1 Stf Set Int Sec ) 1 Sgt Maj ) 3d Bn 1 Msgr, mtcl w se )
1 Trk, comd and ren and chauffeur, Hq Co
f. Communication Personnel and Equipment—
1 Tech Set In charge )
1 Stf Set Rad & Vis ) Com Plat 2 Pvts Rad Oprs ) 3d Bn Sec 2 Radios SCR 195 (“walkie-talkie”) ) Hq Co
1 Trk, Pick-up )
1 Pvt msgr 3d Bn
1 Mtcl w/se Ist QM Regt
MOTORIZED DETACHMENT 115
g. Medical Personnel and Equipment—
1 Set In charge ) 2 Pvts ‘ Hq Sec
1 Trk, Pick-up, 2/litters ) Med Det
h. Transportation lst Quartermaster Battalion— 20 Trks, 114-ton 4 Mtcls w/se
SITUATION, CONTINUED
7. a. After receiving the above orders from S-3, Major Motorized Detachment made plans for the organization and prompt movement of the detachment, assembled his company and other commanders, oriented them as to the terrain, hostile situation, and plans of the regiment and issued his order, extracts of which follow:
3B 3K * ae *
“The detachment will be prepared to move on my order at 6:15 AM. It will march at the head of the motor column initially. Captain Company B organize patrols Nos. 1 and 2. Patrol No. 1 will consist of a leader, one rifle squad, one- half of an auto-rifle squad, and a messenger transported in two 114-ton trucks and one motorcycle with sidecar. This patrol will be prepared to cover me if I go forward on reconnaissance. Patrol No. 2 will consist of the remainder of the rifle platoon from which Patrol No. 1 was taken. It will be prepared to function as the advance guard of the detachment, when the detachment leaves the motor column. Captain Company M, you will command the detachment during the march. Captain Company B will ride with you. Have Patrol No. 1 and the communication detachment from Headquarters Company, a motorcycle with sidecar, and a 3d Battalion messenger report to me at increased speed on call by code message “Taxi” or upon receipt of instructions delivered by the motorcycle mesesnger. Bring the detach- ment forward upon receipt of radio code message “Two Pair” or on receipt of instructions delivered by the motor- cycle messenger.
114 THE MAILING LIST
“The detachment will march in the order:
Patrol No. 1 Communication Detachment with motorcycle messenger
Patrol No. 2
Caliber .50 Machine-Gun Platoon, Company M Company B (less patrols)
Company M (less detachments)
Engineer Detachment
Medical Detachment
“Lieutenant, Ist Quartermaster Battalion, arrange to spot transportation in bivouac areas as desired by officers concerned, as follows:
Company B— 14 trucks 3 motorcycles w/sc
Company M—6 trucks
Detachment Headquarters— 1 motorcycle w/sc
“Lieutenant S-2, 3d Battalion, get a command and recon- naissance truck from Headquarters Company and a motor- cycle w sc from 1st Quartermaster Battalion, pick up the sergeant major, a radio operator with a “walkie-talkie” (SCR 195) and one of the motorcycle messengers of the 3d Battalion, and report to me at the regimental command post at 6:15 AM. I will ride with my command and ad- ministrative group in this truck and follow the regimental commander.”
* * * * *
b. Captain Company B returned to his command post and, assisted by the Ist Sergeant, made plans for entruck- ing his company. He sent a guide to the bivouac of the truck platoon, Ist Quartermaster Battalion. When he com- pleted his planning he assembled his officers and the pla- toon sergeant, lst Platoon.
MOTORIZED DETACHMENT 115
c. After explaining the situation and stating the mission he issued the following instructions to Lieutenant 1st Pla- toon:
“T have allotted five trucks, 114-ton, and two motorcycles with sidecar for the transportation of your platoon. You will organize two patrols. Patrol No. 1 will consist of one rifle squad, one-half of an auto-rifle squad and one messen- ger, with the platoon sergeant in command. This patrol will be assigned two trucks, 114-ton, and one motorcycle with sidecar. It will march at the head of the detachment, initially, and be prepared to move forward on call and protect the detachment commander during his reconnais- sance. You will command Patrol No. 2 consisting of the remainder of your platoon. March initially in rear of the detachment communication section Headquarters Com- pany. Your patrol will become the advance guard of the detachment when it leaves the motor column.”
d. It is now 6:00 AM. You are Lieutenant Ist Platoon Company B. Your platoon is assembled ready to receive orders. The transportation allotted to you has just reported. A hostile observation plane is circling high above the biv- ouac area.
SECOND REQUIREMENT
8. Orders as actually issued by Lieutenant Ist Platoon Company B. These orders should include the detailed organization of Patrol No. 2 to include the assignment of individuals to vehicles and the duties to be performed by each.
(Time allowance—15 minutes)
DISCUSSION
9. Patrois must be carefully organized. Every member must understand his specific duties. Leaders must be care- fully selected and well instructed. Lieutenant Ist Platoon designated the platoon sergeant as the leader of Patrol No. 1 and required him to organize that patrol. Lieutenant 1st Platoon personally organized the patrol which he was to lead.
116 THE MAILING LIST
A SOLUTION OF THE SECOND REQUIREMENT
10. Lieutenant 1st Platoon issued the following oral orders to his platoon:
“Strong enemy patrols with automatic weapons are operating east of our outpost line. This regiment marches east via Marne Road at 6:30 AM. A motorized detach- ment consisting of Company B, Company M, and some small detachments has been formed to attack any enemy troops which might delay the regiment. This platoon will form two patrols—
Patrol No. 1:— Platoon Sergeant: Patrol leader Ist Squad 1, Auto-Rifle Squad, including Sergeant, squad leader 1 Messenger 2 Trucks, 1!5-ton (pointing them out) 1 motorcycle (pointing it out)
“This patrol will march at the head of the detachment, and be prepared to act as a covering force for the detach- ment commander on order. Platoon Sergeant organize and entruck your patrol.
“Patrol No. 2:—
This platoon (less Patrol No. 1). Entruck as follows:
In the leading truck (pointing), Sergeant, Leader 2d Squad, truck commander and second-in-command of the patrol, stand in truck body just behind the cab.
“You six riflemen will also ride in that truck. No. 1 you are second-in-command of the truck. Ride with the driver and observe to the front. No. 2 observe to the right; No. 3 to the left; No. 4 to the rear. No. 4 watch me for sig- nals. Nos. 5 and 6 are the connecting files. Entruck.
“In the second truck (pointing), the remainder of the 2d Squad and 1% auto-rifle squad. Corporal, assistant squad leader, you are second-in-command of the truck. Sit with the driver and observe to the front. No. 7 observe to the right; No. 8 to the left; No. 9 to the rear; Number 10 you are a connecting file.
MOTORIZED DETACHMENT 117
“Corporal, assistant auto-rifle squad leader, have your men observe for hostile aircraft and be prepared to fire if we are attacked.
“T will command the patrol and ride in the truck body behind the cab. Entruck!
“In the third truck, Sergeant, Platoon Guide and the 3d Squad.
“Sergeant, Platoon Guide, truck commander, ride in the body behind the cab. Detail observers and connecting files. The motorcycle messenger has been directed to keep in contact with you.
“Sergeant, squad leader, second-in-command of the truck, ride in the cab with the driver. Watch me for signals. Messenger No. 2, ride in the side car. Keep in contact with that truck (pointing to 3d truck). You must be able to get away if the patrol is ambushed. This patrol will be the advance guard of the detachment when it leaves the motor column. It will move out on my order.
“It is now 6:10 AM. Set your watches.
“Any questions?”
FIGURE 27.
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Location of road block over Heriot Creek.
MOTORIZED DETACHMENT 119
SITUATION, CONTINUED
11. a. At 7:10 AM Colonel 3d Infantry is marching at the head of the main body which has just reached the junction of Lumpkin and Marne Roads. Major Motorized Detachment, with his command and administrative group consisting of Lieutenant S-2, the sergeant major, the staff sergeant intelligence section, and a radio operator with a radio SCR 195 of the 3d Battalion are following the Col- onel’s car. They are all riding in a command and recon- naissance truck and are being followed by a motorcycle messenger. At this time a motorcycle messenger from the division reconnaissance troop delivered a message to Col- onel 3d Infantry who immediately moved to the side of the road, beckoning Major Motorized Detachment to join him.
b. The body of the message was as follows: “Encoun- tered no enemy troops west of Heriot Creek. At 6:45 AM was stopped by a defended road block over Heriot Creek (see sketch). I am leaving a motorcycle patrol to main- tain contact and will proceed on mission.” It was accom- panied by a sketch (See Figure 27).
c. Colonel 3d Infantry read the message and studied the sketch which accompanied it. He handed both to Major Motorized Detachment and said: “Read this message.” After the message had been read it was checked against the sketch. The Colonel then continued. “Your detach- ment will move forward at once, overcome the resistance reported by the reconnaissance troop and clear the way for the advance of the regiment. When the road block has been reduced, take position on Ford Hill (See Figure 26) and, when passed through by the advance guard, assemble, entruck, and follow the foot elements of the main body.”
d. Members of the detachment commander’s group heard the order and are familiar with the contents of the mes- sage and the sketch.
THIRD REQUIREMENT
12. Orders as actually issued by Major Motorized Detach- ment. (Time allowance—5 minutes)
THE MAILING LIST
DISCUSSION
13. In this situation, Major Motorized Detachment must act with the utmost celerity. He must provide a covering force to precede him when he goes forward in advance of the detachment to make a rapid reconnaissance and be ready to issue orders for the employment of the detach- ment when it arrives. He should use the radio to send back the prearranged code messages and initiate the prompt forward movement of the detachment. The motorcycle messenger is available to meet the detachment, and lead it forward. S-2 should be charged with conducting the detachment to a suitable point near the detrucking area.
A SOLUTION OF THE THIRD REQUIREMENT
14. Oral orders as actually issued by Major Motorized Detachment:
“Radio operator, send the code messages “Taxi” and “Two Pair’ to the motorized detachment.
“Motorcycle messenger, meet the detachment and bring them to this point. Send Patrol No. 1 and the communica- tion detachment forward at increased speed.
“Lieutenant S-2, guide the detachment to road junction 407 (pointing out location of this road junction on the map). I’ll post a guide there to conduct it to a detrucking area. I am leaving as soon as my covering patrol and com- munication detachment arrive to contact the motorcycle patrol and make a personal reconnaissance. You and Cap- tains Companies M and B join me at this point (indicating point marked Y on the sketch) as soon as the detachment reaches the detrucking area.
“Any questions?”
MOTORIZED DETACHMENT 121
SITUATION, CONTINUED
15. Major Motorized Detachment, preceded by the motor- cycle messenger from the division reconnaissance troop and Patrol No. 1, and followed by the communication detachment and a motorcycle messenger, halts under cover of the woods about 300 yards northeast of road junction 407. (See Figure 28.) He had made a visual reconnaissance of the terrain along the route of march, and noted positions for antitank and antiaircraft weapons. He selects an area for detrucking, issues instructions to the sergeant major pertaining thereto and goes to point Y, where a member of the division reconnaissance patrol points out the enemy, verifying the information shown on the sketch. Major Motorized Detachment makes notes and is ready to issue his attack order to Captains Companies B and M upon their arrival.
FOURTH REQUIREMENT
16. Study the map (Figure 28) and then give so much of your plan for the attack by the motorized detachment as will answer the following questions:
a. What area(s) did you select for detrucking?
b. What arrangements did you make to assure prompt movement of your vehicles into the area(s) without a halt?
c. What is your plan for the employment of Company B?
d. What is your plan for the employment of Company M to include provision for—
(1) Antiaircraft defense.
(2) Antimechanized defense.
(3) Caliber .30 machine gun support of the attack by Company B.
(4) 8l-mm mortar support of the attack by Company B?
e. What is your plan for coordinating the attack to include time of attack and the line of departure?
M.L
THE MAILING LIST
DISCUSSION 17. a. Major Motorized Detachment has little time for a detailed reconnaissance. He must quickly observe the terrain along the route and close to the objective. He must
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PHILLIPS HILL
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FIGURE 28.—Terrain in vicinity of road block.
select an area for detrucking as far forward as possible. This area should possess cover and concealment.
b. Having selected an area, he should leave a responsible non-commissioned officer with a motorcycle to guide the detachment into the area.
MOTORIZED DETACHMENT 125
c. Major Motorized Detachment has only one striking force under his command, namely Company B. His plan of attack must be based on the information he receives from the division reconnaissance patrol and such _ recon- naissance as he is able to make prior to the arrival of the detachment. He will have only a few minutes to plan his attack before Captains Companies B and M join him at point Y. There will be little time for reconnaissance by these company commanders. Major Motorized Detachment decides to assumes full responsibility for the success of his plan and to direct how the elements of Company B are to be employed. This method is suitable for this situation because—
(1) Major Motorized Detachment has only one striking force;
(2) He has more time for reconnaissance and planning than Captain Company B;
(3) He is able personally to control the entire action;
(4) The successful action of Company B will enable the detachment to accomplish its mission;
(5) An attack launched through the normal chain of command, following reconnaissance by Major Motorized Detachment, Captains Companies B and M and their pla- toon leaders, would consume valuable time in a situation where speed is a vital factor.
Company B should be given an objective some distance northeast of the road block. The capture of this objective will permit the removal of the road block and the repair of the crossing over Heriot Creek by the engineers.
In making his plans Major Motorized Detachment con- siders that a frontal attack can be launched more promptly than any other kind. There is no assurance, however, that it will make the desired progress. The enemy is prepared for an attack and may hold tenaciously to his position. An envelopment of either flank will require more time, but it would probably be decisive. The woods afford excellent cover for the approach of an enveloping force. An attack against the hostile right flank will probably clear the Marne
124 THE MAILING LIST Road north of the crossing and permit the detachment to advance without further combat.
An envelopment of the hostile left flank may permit the enemy to withdraw north on the Marne Road and take up a second delaying position. The envelopment of both flanks should also be decisive, but it is doubtful that the available rifle strength of the detachment warrants it.
One rifle platoon reinforced should make a direct attack and pin the enemy to the ground.
Another rifle platoon reinforced, could well be used as the enveloping force. The advance of the enveloping force cannot be seen from point Y. It is therefore considered advisable to attach supporting weapons to this platoon.
The 1st Platoon is already split into two patrols. It should be used to furnish flank protection and provide a small reserve. The reserve should be prepared to support either of the other platoons or to take any other action prescribed by the detachment commander.
d. (1) Although there has been no definite air threat, Major Motorized Detachment knows that a hostile obser- vation plane observed the bivouac of the 3d Infantry early this morning. He should take the necessary defensive measures to secure continued concealment and dispersion of his vehicles. Provisions should also be made to fire on hostile aircraft which might attack the detachment. Some .30 caliber machine guns should be located at a suitable point to fire at hostile aircraft. Auto-rifles should be pre- pared to fire in close defense of the assembly area.
(2) The most probable avenues of approach for hostile mechanized vehicles lie to the east and south. Less favor- able, but possible approaches, lie to the north and west. Caliber .50 machine guns should cover these approaches. These guns should be placed on high ground to cover ap- proaches from the south and east. Alternate positions should be selected and gun crews should be prepared to move the guns so as to bring effective fire on any target which appears within range.
MOTORIZED DETACHMENT 125
(3) The attack of Company B should receive the maxi- mum fire support from the automatic weapons of the motorized detachment. At least one platoon of caliber .30 machine guns should support the attack by firing on that part of the hostile position which can be seen. A suitable position would be in the area north and west of point Y. A reconnaissance should be initiated to locate a favorable position for the remaining caliber .30 machine guns. If such a position can be found on the right flank between point Y and Heriot Creek enfilade fire can be placed on the hostile position.
(4) The 81-mm mortar platoon should be emplaced so as to bring fire on that part of the hostile position which can be seen. The fire should be controlled from point Y and lifted when either attacking platoon becomes endangered.
e. The attack must be coordinated to ensure support- ing fire for the attack. In this situation it is not practi- cable to determine the number of minutes that will be required for the emplacement of the supporting weap- ons of Company M and for the 2d Platoon to cross the line of departure. Major Motorized Detachment wants to start the attack at the earliest possible moment. He can best accomplish this by directing that each element report when it is ready to attack, and by directing that the attack get under way when the 8l-mm mortar platoon opens fire. He will give the order to the 8l-mm mortar platoon to open fire when he knows that preparations for the attack are complete.
(Time allowance—15 minutes)
FIGURE 29.—Plan of attack.
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SWENEY HILL/@e@@
MOTORIZED DETACHMENT 127
A SOLUTION OF THE FOURTH REQUIREMENT
18. So much of the plan for the attack by the motorized detachment as is called for by answers to the following questions (For map references see Figure 29.) :
a. What area(s) did you select for detrucking?
The wooded draw east of the Marne Road and just south of point Y was selected for detrucking.
b. What arrangements did you make to move your vehicles into the area without a halt?
The battalion sergeant major and a motorcycle with side car was left at the junction of the Marne Road and the unimproved road leading into the detrucking area to guide the column into the area.
c. What is your plan for the employment of Company B?
(1) To direct Captain Company B to attack, capture the hostile position east of the road block, and seize the high ground 400 yards northeast thereof.
(2) To have the attack launched upon prescribed signal.
(3) To direct Captain Company B to employ one pla- toon to attack astride the Marne Road, to use a _ platoon reinforced with light machine guns and a 60-mm mortar to envelop the enemy’s right (northwest) flank, and to release the 1st Platoon to my control.
(4) To attach one radio, SCR 195 (‘walkie-talkie’) to Company B for use by the enveloping platoon.
(5) To use one-half of a rifle squad from the Ist Pla- toon to protect the right flank from a position near point X and one-half of a rifle squad 1st Platoon to protect the rear from a position near point W.
(6) To assemble the remainder of the 1st Platoon in support about 100 yards south of point Y.
d. What is your plan for the employment of Company M to include provision for:
(1) Antiaircraft defense?
To place one section of caliber .30 machine guns on the high ground to protect the assembly area from _ hostile aircraft.
128 THE MAILING LIST
(2) Antimechanized defense?
To have two caliber .50 machine guns from positions at points V and §S protect the detachment from mechanized attacks from the south and southeast, and to have two caliber .50 machine guns, from positions at point W and the road junction about 400 yards west thereof, protect the detachment from mechanized attack from the north and west.
(3) Caliber .30 machine gun support of the attack by Company B?
To employ one platoon of caliber .30 machine guns from positions north and west of point Y to fire on the hostile position east of the bridge over Heriot Creek, and to direct reconnaissance of the area northeast of point Y for a posi- tion from which a section of caliber .30 machine guns can bring enfilade fire on the hostile position.
(4) 8l1-mm mortar support of the attack?
To have the 8l-mm mortar platoon, from a_ position about 300 yards south of point Y, support the attack by fire on the hostile position east of Heriot Creek, paying special attention to located enemy machine guns.
e. Coordination of the attack to include time of attack and line of departure?
To start the attack as soon as the platoon of Company B which is to attack astride the Marne road and the sup- porting weapons (one caliber .30 machine gun platoon and the 8l-mm mortar platoon of Company M) can get into position. I will instruct all concerned that upon the open- ing of fire by the 8i-mm mortar platoon, the main attack will start. The line of departure for the platoon attacking astride the Marne road will be through the ridge at point i SITUATION, CONTINUED
19. a. Major Motorized Detachment issued a brief oral order to carry out the plan outlined in paragraph 18.
b. Lieutenants 2d Platoon, 3d Platoon, and Weapons Platoon have just joined Captain Company B at point Y.
MOTORIZED DETACHMENT 129
FIFTH REQUIREMENT
20. As Captain Company B, issue your orders for the attack to your assembled platoon leaders. (Time allowance—10 minutes)
DISCUSSION
21. Captain Company B issues a brief oral order to his platoon leaders. He has little time for reconnaissance; the attack must get under way as soon as practicable. Major Motorized Detachment has prescribed the attack by Com- pany B in detail. Captain Company B and his platoon leaders are responsible, however, for its execution. Lieu- tenants 2d, 3d, and Weapons Platoons are given sufficient information of the enemy and of the plan of the detach- ment commander to enable them to act intelligently. Defi- nite initial and final objectives are given to the 2d and 3d Platoons, and each platoon is given a direction of attack. Captain Company B knows that the action of the envelop- ing platoon cannot be supported by the automatic weapons of Company M, that it will be forced to fight through woods where its progress cannot be seen and that the success of the action depends largely upon the platoon’s ability to crush the enemy’s right flank. Hence, it should be furnished supporting weapons. A radio (SCR 195 “walkie-talkie’’) should be attached to this platoon to facilitate communica- tion between the platoon leader and the detachment com- mand post. One 60-mm mortar was attached to the Pla- toon making the frontal attack to assist the platoon in con- tinuing forward after the hostile position has been cap- tured. One 60-mm mortar was put in position, initially, near point Y to fire on the hostile position when ordered. If the 8l-mm mortars go into action promptly, it may not be necessary to use this 60-mm mortar. It is placed in position, however, and can support the attack if required.
130 THE MAILING LIST
A SOLUTION OF THE FIFTH REQUIREMENT
22. Captain Company B, at Point Y, issued the following oral order for the attack to Lieutenants 2d Platoon, 3d Platoon, and Weapons Platoon:
“Enemy machine guns and riflemen are there (pointing to enemy position). Detachment attacks without delay, envelops enemy right (north) flank and seizes the high ground 400 yards northeast of that road block (pointing). Company M will support the attack from this vicinity. The signal for the attack will be the opening of fire by the 8l-mm mortar platoon. Line of departure, ridge line through this point. Lieutenant 2d Platoon, attack astride the Marne Road (pointing it out), capture the hostile posi- tion east of the road block, and then seize the high ground 400 yards northeast of the road block. One 60-mm mortar is attached to your platoon. Notify me as soon as your pla- toon is in position, ready to cross the line of departure.
“Lieutenant 3d Platoon, the light machine-gun section, a radio SCR 195, and one 60-mm mortar are attached to your platoon. Move at once via that dry stream bed about 200 yards north of the Marne Road (pointing), attack the right flank of the enemy position (pointing), and seize the road bend about 150 yards north of that road block (point- ing), then push on and seize the high ground astride the Marne Road about 300 yards farther to the north. Upon arrival there establish contact with the 2d Platoon on your right.
“Lieutenant Weapons Platoon, attach the light machine- gun section and one of your mortars to the 3d Platoon, and one mortar to the 2d Platoon. Put one mortar in position in this vicinity prepared to fire on the hostile position at my command.
“Messages to me here. Any questions? Move fast.”
MOTORIZED DETACHMENT 151
SUMMARY
23. A motorized detachment on a combat mission should be so organized as to assure quick, effective action against hostile resistance to clear the way for the main body. The means to accomplish its mission, therefore, must be pro- vided. The tactical employment of the detachment, when hostile resistance is encountered, should be characterized by speed and aggressiveness combining frontal and flank- ing action with maximum fire support.
CHAPTER 6
Signal Communication— Regiment in Attack
(AN INFANTRY SCHOOL TEACHING)
In teaching some of the principles employed in signal communication while preparing for an attack and in the attack, this chapter particularly emphasizes the selection of command posts and axes of signal communication, and communication with attached units. It also describes briefly all radio sets now authorized for the infantry regiment.
PRIOR ACTIONS OF RED AND BLUE FORCES
The Blue Ist Division, with the lst Squadron Ist Cavalry, and the 101st Observation Squadron attached, has the mission of seizing the crossings over Conewago Creek (approximately 20 miles northeast of Littlestown). The division reconnaissance troop is operating with the cavalry. (See Figure 30.)
Early on the morning of 10 April the 1st Squadron 1st Cavalry, preceding the division, encountered Red cavalry along the general line: Littlestown (63-39)—RJ 543 (54- 40) and drove it to the north. The cavalry encountered strong covering detachments, consisting of infantry rifle and machine-gun units, in the vicinity of Ashgrove School (61-40) and Germantown (57-42).
The division, marching north, drove in the covering detachments and developed the enemy positions during the early afternoon. By 4:00 PM the lst Squadron Ist Cavalry (less 15 Troop A) had been relieved by elements of the 2d and 3d Infantry Regiments and was protecting
133
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GRANITE HILL }
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u Regt _ Intermediate
( “J: 1a Objective ( 7 = \ & SoNNEAUVILLE by 4 =,
J a , J aay / Oe , a ¢ =i a Gi oS | of X - ~ Pty po © f . roe f — ate i / ty “Ti saat * —_—_ | | |(-) 1 / / ff \ err eens pepe / 3(-) | a, { Ny \ +f 9 ‘ | er) hy \ Hy : f 2 3 7 } bee. el / ) i“ | / = a y —_ | ie ( 7 SCHOOL VA \ pe 2, ~> \ 3 ( ) ( ~+ \ + 740% A) / - 7 a LITTLESTOWN Ox \ i Mf \ he, : . ‘ pg J] | A, Mice \ i t U —————<_ : i | _ }
FIGURE 30.—Situation Map, 1st Infantry.
SIGNAL COMMUNICATION 135
the left flank of the division (See Figure 30). It was opposed by Red cavalry. One-half Troop A Ist Cavalry was protecting the right flank of the division. The division reconnaissance troop was operating towards both flanks in an effort to determine the contour of the hostile flank posi- tions. The 2d and 3d Infantry Regiments, each employing two battalions, had advanced to the positions indicated. The lst Infantry had been placed in division reserve and was in an assembly area as indicated on the situation map.
Enemy observation aviation was active. The division command post had been established in the western outskirts of Littlestown.
ACTIVITIES IN THE 1ST INFANTRY ASSEMBLY AREA
The ist Infantry had occupied its assembly area during the morning. The regiment’s movement forward was ac- complished by marching and motor. Units moved forward in small groups and on different roads.
During the afternoon the lst Infantry remained in its assembly area. Units were dispersed and concealed in the small patches of woods. Communication within the assembly area was by foot messengers. The small size of the as- sembly area made the use of electrical means of communica- tion unnecessary. The SCR-195 and 131 sets could have been used without danger of the enemy discovering the location of the assembly area, but in this situation their use was unnecessary. Tables of organization for the infan- try regiment effective October 1, 1940 allots one SCR-245 radio set. The use of this set in the assembly area might have disclosed its location to the enemy. It was camouflaged and available to provide emergency communication between the regiment and the division command post. As all mes- sages sent by the SCR-171, between regimental headquarters and division, would have had to be encoded and decoded it was quicker to use motor messengers. All normal traffic was handled by these messengers. During the day the regimental commander and staff, including the communication officer,
136 THE MAILING LIST
had been making a detailed map study of the terrain north, northwest, and west of Two Taverns, as the location of the assembly area indicated the employment of the Ist Infantry in that general locality.
At 4:15 PM, the Communication Officer 1st Infantry is advised as follows:
S-3: “I know that you are fully oriented as to the terrain. Take a look at this map (See Figure 30). The latest available information has been entered showing our own and the hostile situation. Considerable intrenching has been noted southwest of Bonneauville.
“We attack at 5:30 AM tomorrow, as shown on the map. Get what information you need from the map. Submit your recommendations for paragraph 5 of the attack order at CR 546-D (54-42) at 5:15 PM, today. We select our own command post site and axis of signal communication and report them to division.
“The SCR-245 will remain attached to the regiment.
“Are there any questions?”
Communication Officer: “Yes, sir. Will there be any units attached to us for the attack?”
S-3: “Yes. You do need to know that, don’t you?”
Communication Officer. “Yes, because I will be re- sponsible for the supervision and coordination of the com- munication system of the lst Infantry and any attached units.”
S-3: “Okay. Company A, Ist Engineers will be attached, the Ist Field Artillery Battalion will be in direct support.”
Communication Officer: “When will the regiment com- plete its movement to the attack location?”
S-3: “Details of that move have not been completed. We will remain in this area as long as possible and expect to reach our attack positions so that all units will be in posi- tion thirty minutes prior to the time of attack.”
Communication Officer: “Have you decided as to the hour you want the new command post to open, and when will the wire line from division arrive at the new command post?”
SIGNAL COMMUNICATION 137
S-3: “I will advise you later when to open the attack command post. When you get this information get in touch with the division signal officer with reference to the wire line. There will be no motor reconnaissance north of the line: CR 549-O (56-42)—CR 546-D (54-42) during the hours of daylight. Small reconnaissance parties may move north of this line on foot. Reconnaissance away from this assembly area will be limited to single vehicles and small groups of individuals. Are there any other questions?”
Communication Officer: “Yes, sir. Will there be any restrictions on the use of radio during the night march?”
S-3: “I will get a decision on that point from the Com- manding Officer and let you know.”
Communication Officer: “Who is going to provide security for my reconnaissance parties?”
S-3: “You don’t need any security detachments. The cavalry screen will provide you with security.”
Communication Officer: “That cavalry screen looks pretty thin to me. I want a few riflemen to furnish protection for the four communication parties. I would like four rifle- men to furnish security for my party, and each battalion communication party should have the same. I suggest that these riflemen be sent to the small woods west of CR 546-D prior to 5:00 PM. We will use them after the regimental order is issued.”
S-3: “I agree with you, and I will make the necessary arrangements.”
THE
MAILING
LIST
FIRST REQUIREMENT
1. The actions of the Communication Officer lst Infantry from the time he receives the above instructions from S-3 until the regimental communication system is installed for the attack.
2. Prepare a sketch showing your recommendations for paragraph 5 of the regimental attack order relative to:
a. Initial command posts.
b. Axes of signal communication.
c. Where you would expect to find the command posts of the following units:
(1) Ist Field Artillery Battalion. (2) Company A Ist Engineers.
SIGNAL COMMUNICATION 139
9
3. a. Using the proper symbols prepare a consolidated circuit diagram of the 1st Infantry as of 5:30 AM, 11 April. Include in this diagram the wire lines constructed by the artillery for command and liaison functions with units of the 1st Infantry.
b. Using the proper symbols, draw a schematic diagram showing the complete infantry-artillery radio communica- tion system.
4. State the actions of S-1 in connection with the estab- lishment of the command post for the attack.
5. List the agencies of communication which would be available for communication between the 1st Infantry and the 3d Battalion (regimental reserve).
NOTE.—Darkness begins at 7:07 PM.
140 THE MAILING LIST
A SOLUTION OF FIRST REQUIREMENT
1. During the period between the time he receives in- structions from S-3 until the regimental communication system is installed Captain Communication Officer 1st In- tantry—
a. Arranges with S-3 to ensure that battalion communica- tion officers will be present when the regimental order is issued.
b. Goes to the communication platoon and briefly explains the situation. Studies his operation map. Prepares recom- mendations for axes of signal communication and location of command post sites for a map study.
c. Taking two noncommissioned officers from the wire section, goes to CR 546-D (54-42) and submits recommenda- tions for paragraph 5 of the attack order.
d. Takes notes on the regimental attack order as it is issued orally by the colonel. This order restricts the use of radio by the 1st Infantry until the attack is launched, directs that the command posts for the attack be opened at 4:00 AM, and orders that the regiment move forward from its present assembly area at 1:00 AM.
e. Arranges with the battalion communication officers to have guides posted at their initial command posts for the attack, and provides for the technical coordination of the regimental plan of communication.
f. Obtains from S-2 the location of the regimental OP for the attack.
g. Arranges with S-3 for the installation of wire systems prior to the arrival of the regiment in the attack positions. All wire to be installed by 3:45 AM. Each battalion to furnish security for its communication parties and a rifle squad to furnish security for the regimental command post. Checks with S-3 to see that division is notified as to the location of the regimental command post and to request that the division wire line arrive at 3:45 AM.
SIGNAL COMMUNICATION 141
h. Accompanied by S-1l, goes on a reconnaissance to select the regimental command post site on the ground, and decide on its interior arrangement.
i. Accompanied by the two noncommissioned officers from the wire section, makes a reconnaissance of the area to determine the location of the battalion command post sites and suitable wire routes.
j. Returns to the platoon and explains the situation as known.
k. Moves with the wire section to the forward area and supervises construction of the wire system.
2. The sketch showing the recommendations of Captain Communication Officer for paragraph 5 of the regimental attack order (See Figure 31.).
a NN
TWO TAVERNS
354 FIGURE 31.—Initial command posts and axes of signal communications.
353
SIGNAL COMMUNICATION 143
3. a. See Figure 32. Consolidated Circuit Diagram.
2 1 DON A wHite 2 1 —, L — ARTY t LN sec | 1 DON ene : | Ai t = — —O 1 1 , k DON 5 RED 1 1 ~ O OO pery = a — LN sec | DEXTER
FIGURE 32.—Consolidated Circuit Diagram.
b.
THE MAILING
LIST
See Figure 33. Infantry-Artillery Radio System
Pee %. 9 Phy
| \ | \ \ | \ \ | \ | | \ | \ i \ , l Sy Buy M } To \ 1 AIR - | SERVICE S30 INF | \ Vv 1 1
TO SUPERIOR UNIT INDICATES INFANTRY RADIO SYSTEM
LEGEND: — — — — INDICATES FIELD ARTILLERY RADIO SYSTEM
FIGURE
33.—Infantry-Artillery Radio System.
SIGNAL COMMUNICATION 145
4. The actions of S-1 in connection with the establish- ment of the command post for the attack:
a. S-1, accompanied by the communication officer, goes to the command post site for the regiment and selects the exact location on the ground.
b. Indicates the exact interior arrangements for the com- manding officer and staff.
5. The following agencies of communication would be available for communication between the 1st Infantry and the 3d Battalion (regimental reserve) :
a. Personal contact of commanders or their representa- tives.
b. Radio sets SCR-131 and SCR-195 (voice).
c. Motor messenger.
d. Dismounted messenger.
DISCUSSION
In this situation, since the 1st Cavalry Squadron is cover- ing the approach of the Ist Infantry to the line of departure, the command posts of the leading battalions can be located well forward without danger of being too near the enemy when the attacks jumps off at daylight. The command post of the Ist Infantry was located near the bridge at (53-44) because the bridge is on the main road leading into the 1st Infantry sector, and excellent cover and concealment are available nearby. The command posts of the leading battalions were located near the centers of the battalion zones and on the natural forward routes of the troops.
The axes of signal communication for the leading bat- talions should follow in general the stream lines in the bat- talion sectors and extend as far forward as the intermediate objective of the regiment. Plans cannot be made at this time for extending the axes beyond hill 571-a because the tactical plan for continuing the attack after the capture of that hill is not definitely known. The axis of signal communication for the regiment should, in general, follow the axis of the 2d Battalion, which is making the main effort.
THE
MAILING LIST
SITUATION, CONTINUED
At 8:00 AM, 11 April, the regiment is disposed as follows:
The Ist Battalion has advanced to the general line shown on Figure 34. It is making little progress and is receiving heavy fire from O. McMaster (56-47), the southern slopes of hill 571-a, and the draw leading to J. Spangler (55-48). Company C, in battalion reserve, where employment is sub- ject to “regimental order’’, is located as shown on Figure 34.
The 2d Battalion’s advance has been stopped along a general line north of the road running from CR 566-D (53- 48) to RJ 479 (54-47) (See Figure 34).
The 3d Battalion is in regimental reserve in the woods 700 yards northeast of RJ 425 (53-45)—See Figure 34.
Colonel 1st Infantry has just received a message from the division commander directing that the lst Infantry’s ob- jective be taken without delay, and announced his decision: “To resume the attack without delay against hill 571l-a (54- 48) and, continuing the advance, to seize Granite Hill (village) (56-52).” (See Figure 30.) Major S-3 submitted various plans for the continuation of the attack. These were considered by the commanding officer, and the plan as indicated on Figure 34 was adopted. The command posts of the 1st Infantry and its two leading battalions are now located as shown on Figure 34.
SECOND REQUIREMENT
1. Prepare so much of your plan for regimental com- munication as pertains to:
a. Radio—both SCR-131 and SCR-195 sets.
b. Wire c. Axes of signal communication.
d. Command posts.
2. State what means of communication will be available, during the attack, between the Ist Infantry and the fol- lowing units:
a. 1st Squadron 1st Cavalry, reinforced.
b. 1st Division.
c. Company A Ist Engineers.
d. 1st Field Artillery Battalion.
—747 4
745
en
FIGURE 34.—Operation map for continuing the attack.
148 THE MAILING LIST
A SOLUTION OF THE SECOND REQUIREMENT
1. The following is the plan for regimental communica- tion in so far as it pertains to:
a. Radio. To utilize radio communication between the regimental command post and those of all three battalions by the SCR-131 radio set. This channel of communication is already in operation. To allot one regimental voice radio set (SCR-195) in addition to the two organizational sets to the 3d Battalion for communication with regiment.
b. Wire. To utilize wire lines between all three battalions. Wire lines have already been established between the two leading battalions and the regimental command post. To issue additional wire to the 3d Battalion and have the bat- talion construct its own wire line from the regimental com- | mand post (located near the 3d Battalion reserve area) for the renewal of the attack.
c. Axes of signal communication. To order no changes in the original axes of signal communication for the regiment and the Ist and 2d Battalions. To permit the battalion com- manders to change their command post sites for the re- sumption of the attack if they deem it advisable. To have the 3d Battalion select its own axis of signal communication and report it to regiment.
d. Command posts: Ist Infantry: See location shown on Figure 34. ist Battalion: To be reported if changed. 2d Battalion: To be reported if changed. 3d Battalion: To be reported.
2. The following means of communication will be avail- able between the Ist Infantry and—
a. Ist Squadron 1st Cavalry, reinforced. Radio, motor messenger, mounted messenger (airplane if made available).
b. 1st Division. Radio, telephone, telegraph, motor mes- senger (airplane if made available).
c. Company A Ist Engineers. Motor and dismounted messenger. Personnel contact with commander or his representative.
SIGNAL COMMUNICATION 149
d. 1st Field Artillery Battalion. Telephone, motor mes- senger, dismounted messenger, personal contact with the commander or his representative.
It is desirable to have wire communication between the regimental command post and its leading battalions and any other of its battalions operating at a considerable distance from the regimental command post. This is generally practicable. The main attack should be favored in the selection of axes of signal communication and the allotment of the regimental voice radio sets. Wire lines were installed between the regimental command post and the 3d Battalion. When a reserve battalion attacks, it should be provided with wire communication with its regiment. The regiment car- ries 12 miles of wire and can readily spare extra wire to the 3d Battalion. Under the attack plan the 3d Battalion, in moving to its attack position, begins its movement from the vicinity of the regimental command post and can lay the wire line to its attack command post.
All battalion commanders should be permitted consider- able latitude in selecting their command posts and axes of signal communication in such a situation.
The 3d Battalion should be directed to select and report its axis of signal communication and the location of its com- mand post.
In considering the plan of communication for continuing the attack as shown on Figure 34, the SCR-131 radio set should be used for communication between the regiment and each of the three battalions. This net would be kept established, but it would be operated only when and if tele- phone and telegraph communication becomes ineffective. One regimental voice radio set was allotted to the 3d Bat- talion for purpose of communication during its movement, and to supplement other agencies of communication. This battalion should be furnished every available means of communication because it is making a movement at a considerable distance from the regimental command post. In general, the main attack should be favored with all available communication facilities.
150 THE MAILING LIST
In order to present a complete picture of all infantry radio equipment there follows a brief description of their general characteristics, capabilities and notes on the tactical uses of the SCR-195.
RADIO SETS
Radio equipment supplied to the Infantry Regiment (Rifle) has the following general characteristics:
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INFANTRY SETS
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) Weight Frequ- Range Channel No. of Type of Set type in ency in separ - chan- antenna pounds Range Miles ations nels SCR-131 76.5 4360- 5, CW 20 Ke 21 Loop 3960 SCR-171 179.0 2640- 15, CW 20 Ke 21 60-foot 3040 single