_ TOP SECRET trase 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R064300060016-7 12 February 1965 25X1 Copy No. Gi 7 2% SPECIAL REPORT CHINESE COMMUNISTS BRACE FOR POSSIBLE SPREAD OF INDOCHINA WAR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF FP RhCE -OF -C UR R-E NT TIN eel hae se NCE - 25X1 exis fd) BCRET Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R00130006 a ae Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060016-7 ° Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060016-7 25X1 a e . Approved FoPélease 2005/04/22 : CIA-R hand - TOP SECRET 12 February 1965 CHINESE COMMUNISTS BRACE FOR POSSIBLE SPREAD OF INDOCHINA WAR The steady build-up of Chinese Communist mili- tary strength in South China since mid-1964 strongly suggests that Peiping is preparing against the pos- sibility that an expansion of the Indochina war may lead to direct Chinese involvement. Taken as a whole, Peiping's efforts to improve its capabili- ties appear defensive. There are no indications that the Chinese leaders intend to initiate new military action in Southeast Asia at this time, but it seems clear from their actions that they are de- termined to continue their encouragement and sup- port for Communist insurgency. The Chinese prepara- tions probably reflect concern that continued suc- cesses in South Vietnam will increase the danger of repeated and heavy US blows against North Vietnam (the DRV) or Communist China. This appears to be the sense of Foreign Minister Chen Yi's recent re- parks[ iat tlie Wee wate ing we or e Communists but there was a possi- bility of US "fireworks" before final victory. Peiping certainly hopes to avoid a direct confrontation with US forces, and the steps it has taken are probably calculated in part to back up threatening propaganda aimed at deterring the US from actions which would bring it face to face with Communist China. The Chinese are probably committed to respond in some fashion if there is an all-out US attack on the DRV, however, and would be unwill- ing to "stand idly by" in such a situation. Pei- ping's official statement of 9 February reaffirmed earlier promises to assist North Vietnam and as- serted that the Chinese were "well prepared in this respect." Planning for joint action designed to counter ossible US moves probably began in earnest in late June and early July 1964, Evidence of Chi- nese military preparations began to increase from that time on and the pace picked up after the Ton- kin Gulf crisis in August 1964. Chinese actions include mprovement of air defenses and nava. orces in sou China, what may be a sub- stantial enlargement of the armed forces, a militia build-up, and civil defensé preparations. TOP SEQGRET Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060016-7 25XK1 Joint planning for closer Chinese cooperation in defense of the DRV apparently began well over a year ago, probably as part of a long-range strategy involving a gradual build-up of Peiping's strength in South China to be ready for hostili should the need arise. MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN COMMUNIST CHINA By : AUG Tonkin Gulf crisis; First 1964 regiment of MIGs transferred to No Tetnam; jet fighter is base activated at Nanning; new radar and air defense support a personnel moved to Sino-Vietnamese border BS ae & SEP — Summer military conscription drive in full swing; 1964 hew nava' a Tshed on Nor shore oF Tonkin Gull, 1964 sided over by Mao Tse-tung; this was concerned with the militia buildup; construction began on Ningming airfleld; Peitun airfield being improved. i NOV Cae Ssumao airfield being im- 1964 proved; air raid drills on Hainan Island. DEC Second major conscription drive of 1964 under way; second 1964 _regiment_of MIGs transferred to North Vietnam; _continuin es JAN — Terms of service for military personnel extended by one year; 1965 indications that the Chinese may be assuming responsibility nit for atr defense of North Vietnam. sual m ary activity was noted in South China during or immedi- ately after this: period. Planning for measures to cope with possible US military moves took on a sudden urgency in the spring of 1964. Begin- ning in early May the US had made it clear to the Communist leaders in Peiping and Hanoi: that the deteriorating situation in Laos and South Vietnam was a matter of vital and growing concern in Washington. The core of the US message was a warning that the Indochina war might be enlarged if the Communists did not ease their heavy pressure in Southeast Asia. US threats of possible ac- tion against the DRV apparently aroused sharp concern in the Communist camp, and triggered a special con- inese central committee held in conjunction with extraordinary military re- Approved For Release 7005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060016-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 . 1 e -- STN. 001300060016-7 D 25X11 over by Mao Tse-tung himself and attended by large numbers of top military and party offi- ' cials. | 25X1 i 25x11 Alarmed by US talk of carrying the war north, Hanoi may have de- manded new assurances of Chinese military assistance in the event i of an attack--backed up by defi- . nite plans for action in such an eventuality. The Vietnamese probably also asked for a more forthright public statement of Peiping's intentions--aimed at Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060016-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For ne deterring the US from enlarging the conflict. This was forth- coming on 7 July in a formal statement by Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi putting the US on notice that any attack on North Vietnam carried grave risk of countermoves by Communist China. Evidence of Peiping's de- termination to help defend the DRV, and indications of the ex- tent to which Chinese moves in support of Hanoi had been pre- pared in advance began to ap- pear following the Tonkin Gulf crisis in August. Official state- ments from Washington made it clear that this was a one-time reaction to a specific provoca- tion, not the first phase of a major escalation. The incident demonstrated, however, that un- der some circumstances the US was willing to intervene directly by mounting limited attacks against the DRV. The Air and Naval Build-up Peiping's response to the employment of US air power against targets in the DRV was a blast of belligerent propaganda and a series of moves to strength- en air defenses in North Vietnam and South China. The speed of the reaction suggests that well- prepared contingency plans were being put into effect. The Chi- nese moved a regiment of jet fighters into North Vietnan's Phuc Yen Airfield in August and a second regiment in December. Fighter strength in South China has been more than doubled. jet fighters have been moved into the area since August, 25x11 raising the total deployed there This build-up has in- “95X14 ¢luded some MIG-19 (Farmer) and a few MIG-21 (Fishbed) jet fight- ers. Their transfer was accom- panied by a substantial increase in radar installations and anti- aircraft artillery. Since October, an airfield suitable for use by tactical jet fighters has been under construc- tion at Ningming, ten miles north of the Vietnamese border. This probably will be service- i able by this spring. 25X1 25X1 small airfield near the Laos border at Ssumao, There are in- dications that the 4,700-~foot unpaved runway at this field is being improved. Another airfield, near the Burma border at Peitun, which can already accommodate jet fighters, is also being im- proved. There are increasing indi- eations that the Chinese may in- tend to use their growing air 25X1 strength in the area to defend 25X41 North Vietnam, as well as South 25X11 Approved For Release 2605/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060016-7 25X41 « ~ for North Vietnam undér some circumstances. Peiping's South China Fleet has increased its capability in the Tonkin Gulf since August. small nava ac y was estab- lished in the Peihai area on the north shore of the Tonkin Gulf. Although the South Sea Fleet has no major naval vessels, it has numerous patrol. craft and motor torpedo boats which could con- stitute a limited threat to US naval operations in the Tonkin Gulf. Expansion of the Army There are some indications that the Chinese Communists have decided to expand their al- ready large armed forces. Two large-scale conscription drives and a recent extension of mili- tary tours of duty may have had the net effect of expanding these forces from about 2.5 million to more than 3 million. The first conscription drive took place from July to This appeared at the e merely a repetition of the annual summer conscrip- tions of the previous three years. From 1955 to 1959, the army had recruited and demobi- lized during the winter to coin- cide with the farming cycle, as most inductees were from rural areas. Because peasant recruits had fewer skills and had become less reliable during the disaster years of 1959-60, recruiting shifted largely to an urban base in 1961. While no solid figures on the summer recruitment tar- get for 1964 have been made ould indicate a total goal of about 700,000, nationa. which would be in Line with normal annual quotas. 25X1 hationwide conscription drive was under way. Many of the re- ecruits were being drawn from areas that presumably had already supplied their annual quota in the summer. This is the first time that a major winter drive has been noted since 1959 and the first time that two heavy drives are known to have taken place in one calendar year. Al- though figures for either con- seription or demobilization are lacking, the total number of re- eruits over the past year would seem to have been greater than the normal annual quota. On 19 January, Peiping de- creed a one-year extension of the terms of service for the army, air force, and navy to four, five, and six years, re- spectively, This order presum- ably halts the demobilization which has been going on concur~ rently with the second conscrip- tion drive. The net effect of retaining most of those who would normally be demobilized at this time and the two sub- scription drives last year would be to increase the size of the armed forces by a substantial 5 Approved For Release 2065/04/22 : CIA-RI = 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/ number. Another effect of th mandatory extension of tours, of special importance to height-— ened military preparedness, is that the army will be able to retain its best-—trained troops for an additional year. At the same time, the proportion of raw recruits in the service at any one time will be reduced, In fact, the proportion should be significantly lower this year, because the militia, from which the army draws most recruits, has greatly stepped up its pre- induction basic infantry train- ing. Militia Build-up At the same time that the regular military forces appar- ently have been quietly expanded, a major build-up of the civilian TOP Approved For Relea TOP SEGRET | | People's Militia has been taking place under the full glare of propaganda. From a claimed peak of 230 million during the Great Leap Forward, the militia collapsed and was all but dis- banded in 1960, and militia ac- tivity remained limited even through early 1964. With the general hardening of the regime's policies in June, however, re- eruiting and training of mili- tiamen was suddenly stepped up. By now, according to tenuous indications, the militia may have regained a strength on the order of 20-30 million. Current training covers most basic mili- tary skills, including the use of live ammunition on a large scale for the first time in four years. Peiping intends to use the militia partly as a new tool for controlling domestic dissidence, particularly in conjunction with the intensifying "socialist ed- ucation" campaign. Peiping has also played up the militia's potential as a defen-~ sive reserve which can release regular troops for duty else- where. Despite the regime's hopes, however, it is question- able whether a trustworthy mili- tia force can be organized on a large scale, Civil Defense Preparations For the first time in sev- eral years, indications of civil defense preparations in South China have begun to appear. On Nevertheless, 25X1 Hainan Island 25X41 air raid trenches were being dug 25X1 | and air raid drills conducted. 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060016-7 25x1 « y “ Approved FolRelease 2005/04/ CIA-R TOP SECRET|] There is evidence a oca government units on the South China border with Laos and Viet- nam have been preparing contin- gency war evacuation plans. The Immediate Future Taken as a whole, the Chi- nese Communists' effort to strengthen their armed forces in general, and particularly to improve their air and naval ca- pability in the region near the Sino-Vietnamese border, appears defensive. Peiping seems to be preparing to ward off blows . which it fears may fall, rather than getting ready to launch a massive offensive thrust de- signed to finish off the war quickly. At the same time, Pei- ping hopes that its actions backing up its bellicose propa- ganda will serve to deter the US from any escalation of the war. The Chinese appear confi- dent that the months ahead will bring new successes in the strug- gle by the Viet Cong to wrest control over the countryside in South Vietnam from the govern~ ment in Saigon and eventually to establish a neutralist regime which would insist on a US with- drawal from the area, Peliping is probably equally well pleased by the situation in Laos, where Communist forces have been able to maintain a dominant position despite the additional air sup- port provided for the armies of Souvanna Phouma. The [L__——drdd optimism 2BRX1 about developments in Southeast Asia shown by Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi is in part psychological warfare, but it 25X11 probably reflects the general lines of Peiping's estimate eoncerning the trend of events. 25X11 As for Laos ; esuee woatt be withdrawn 25X11 after the game was played out in South Vietnam and the Lao- tians would be forced to reach agreement among themselves, Peiping's propaganda paints the US situation in Southeast Asia as increasingly desperate. Although some of the Chinese leaders doubtless realize that this picture of a swelling tide - of Communist victory is over- drawn, they are probably to some extent pemused by their own in- vention. Chou En-lai’s intem- perate sneers at the feebleness of "imperialism" 25X14 Suggest such a mood of con- fidence. The Chinese premier scoffed at defensive military preparations by the UK against Indonesia and declared that al- though the US "paper tiger is baring it fangs and showing its claws," the Chinese people regard 7 TOP SECRET|___ | Approved For Release 2008/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060016-7 it as "quite miserable and ludi- crous," Despite this bold talk, Peiping's preparations for de- fense indicate continued respect for US power directly applied in the field. The Chinese may well despise the US "strategi- cally," heavily discounting the possibility of an all-out at- tack against China, but are get- ting ready to cope with stepped up "tactical" thrusts against the DRV. Their emphasis on air defense and the build-up of 35X1 naval capability indicates the i kind of Limited US action they regard as most Likely. The re- cent moves to increase the over- all strength of their ground forces during the next six months or so are probably insurances against an all-out US attack which the Chinese accept as pos- sible but do not think is very Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060016-7 o Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060016-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300060016-7