DEPARTMENT OF STATE 7322282 TRP SENS .-CHINA wv | | oso = ACTION ? November 24, 1973 / To: The Secretary . Washington, D.C, 20520 TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY From: S/PC - Winston Lord BA - Art Hummel Ww SUBJECT: Ongoing Actions from Your China Trip The following is a listing of the undertakings and intentions you expressed to the Chinese and the actions being taken to fullfil them: (1) The Normalization Process. You said that we would study Mao's and Chou's remarks and the new Chinese sentence in the communique -- "The Chinese side reiterated that the normalization of relations between China and the United States can be realized only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China" -- with a view toward making tentative suggestions on how the normalization process might develop in this context. You satd that we would get back to the Chinese within a month. Action: We will submit ideas to you in the near future. (2) U.S. Military Presence on Taiwan. You indicated unilaterally our intention to reduce our military presence during 1974 to essentially logistics and communications by withdrawing the two F-4 squadrons (one the first half of the year, and one the second half), removing nuclear weapons, and halting U-2 flaghts. Action:. Without knowing of any target deadline, DOD has already put itself in a position to implement removal of the first F-4 squadron in early 1974, after you give the go-ahead. The removal of nuclear weapons and halting of U-2 flights are a matter of timing and consultation. We will submit a possible scenario on all of these actions. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY | — ns cert so ee ee eee — os = ——————— TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS — : EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY ‘°°. 2 (3) Korea and the United Nations. In addition to the current General Assembly action which is being imple- mented, youssaid that we would be prepared to discuss with the Chinese the question of the United Nations Command over the coming year and make a major effort to reach agreement before the: next General Assembly. ‘Action: We will soon submit a detailed scenario for use in New York after the General Assembly is over, so that the United Nations Command and other issues can be handled in Security Council context. (4) ‘Letter to Lee Kuan-yew. You promised to send a letter to kee Kuan-yew on the question of dual citizenship for overseas Chinese. “Action: We will submit a proposed draft to you (5) Marine Guards in Peking. The Chinese indicated that they are no longer requesting any specific changes in the Marine Guard situation. “Action: Although we are not required by the PRC to take any particular action, we need to consider (a) more closely controlling the activities of the Marines in Peking, and (b) rotating some or all of the present Marine contingent. A telegram to David Bruce asking his views is attached for your clearance (at Tab A). We eee Z ALAL ; wt ti fitr og Other TH —___——_ aa Chon, ply | (6) Private Claims/Blocked Assets. You told the PRC in Peking that you would arrange a thorough reexamina- tion of the US positions on which we failed to reach agree- ment during your visit. You said that our side would shortly (within two weeks) propose the final and most forthcoming positions that can be devised. Approve Action: A small working group has already worked out new, and more palatable, positions. We expect formal interagency approval (including that of the NSC staff) early next week, after which your approval will be sought. We are also preparing for your clearance to Ambassador Bruce an instruction authorizing him to discuss the subject with the Chinese in hopes of resolving all the remaining problems. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS Durdtire, ie EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY ) red UA fp 1 TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY | _ 3 (7). Exchange Program. In the counterpart talks, we gave agreement to a list of 20 exchange projects (10 in each direction) that the Chinese listed for us. These are nearly all the result of prior discussion between the PRC and the US Government, as well as private US organizations. Our side made some additional suggestions (including an ice show to go to Peking) that the Chinese agreed to consider. Action: We have informed the National Committee on US-China Relations and the Committee on Scholarly Communications regarding the exchanges of interest to them which were agreed in Peking. There will be a meeting on Monday, November 26, with representatives of the two committees for a further discussion of these exchanges. Dick Solomon is sending you a memorandum through NSC channels regarding the Governors' and the Congressional delegations. (8) Press Representation. The PRC agreed that it would be possible to have American press representation in Peking on a permanent basis. However, they posed the prob- lem that they see of having dual PRC and ROC representatives both attending press conferences and other occasions in Washington. Although they did not say so specifically, it seemed obvious that solution to the Washington problem is a pre-condition to US press representation in Peking. You said you would look into this and see if some means could be worked out so that the Washington end of the problem can be handled without confrontation between PRC and ROC person- nel. ; Action: We are consulting with George Vest to see if any solution is possible. The prospects do not look good. (9) Indian Ocean Presence. You indicated our intentigns to expand our presence in the Indian Ocean. Action: You will want to keep this generally brforea in mind, in particular in your discussions with Cae echt i, Secretary Schlesinger. re da | L ge, : . F ae r ‘ as Yi (gel ws (10) ‘Naval Port in Pakistan. You indicated that we “Fe Y ; were considering the possibility of a naval port in Pakistan, fr and Chou subsequently indicated Chinese approval of this me concept. This obviously raises a host of considerations, including technical, Congressional, and our diplomacy with / regard to South Asian subcontinent. é f 7 . TOP SECRET(SENSITIVE/NODIS heh-ruchf Seal a = OP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS . : ‘Action: Do you want this topic pursued or studied in any way? Yes, do the following: — Nothing need be done at A j A: this time | ert ah fl) Bo oo: (11) | MFN for the PRC. You affirmed our intention generally to keep the question (in effect public debate on) MFN for the PRC separate from MFN for the Soviet Union. The current legislation folds all MFN treatment together, of course, but would appear to be compatible with the PRC position. We also indicated to the Chinese that we would not highlight the MFN issue until they had told us they wished to press ahead with it. In any event, we first have the claims/asset problem to resolve. “Action: Beyond moving on. the related claims/ asset issue, no further action now seems required, except generally to keep in mind the Chinese wish that we not get them embroiled with the Soviet angle. (12) Major Economic/Credit Deals with the Soviet Union. You indicated unilaterally that we did not foresee any early agreement to major projects of this kind with Moscow. Action: If any such projects begin to materialize in the near future, we will want to inform the Chinese. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS