UNCLASSIFIED EXO ‘ COUBEDENZTLIAL (entire text) ~ prosik a NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS RELEASED IN FULL IMPLICATIONS OF A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN SINO~SOVIET RELATIONS ‘ PAGES MISSIN G BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH 1 ASSESSTIENT AND RESERROH Summary If China and the USSR manage to move their detente process forward over the next two years, both countries would gain leverage with the US. There is little likelihood that any new strategic alignments would result, however, or even that the two countries could solve the regional problems of Kampuchea, Afghanistan, or the huge troop concen-— trations along their borders. ‘But by extending - - bilateral cooperation over a broad range and adopt- ing. some cosmetic measures of detente, the two countries could achieve a widespread perception that major realignments were possible, leading a. -humber of affected countries to want to reinsure against such an eventuality. , wee Provided American responses were based on» appreciation of underlying power relationships as well as more transient developments, however, the ~ adverse impact would not be great. China might use . its improved ties with Moscow to raise the price of strategic cooperation with the US aimed at the USSR, but the interest in an American counter to Moscow's military might would still be there. The iP Soviets would gain some confidence from a reduced sense of encirclement and a demonstrable policy success, but relations with the US would remain Moscow's central foreign policy concern. kekkekkik Setting Initiatives by Beijing and Moscow have given. considerable momentum over the past year to improved Sino-Soviet relations. Several develop- ments, including pressing domestic problems in both countries, increasing friction‘in their relations CONFIDENTIAL Declassify: OADR (Baraz, R.) URRAY D. ZINOMAN : Report 522-AR 1982 DATE/CASE ID: 30 JABERD03 199300538 Se December 23 Es UNCLASSIFIED t ae | UNCLASSIFIED -3- - dno! Mao's leftist domestic policies and Moscow's claim to primacy in the "socialist community." Beijing will continue to move toward what Moscow regards as Leninist orthodoxy in internal affairs and Will be generally accepted as a member of the socialist community. But China will not join such major Soviet-led institutions as CEMA and the Warsaw Pact and will continue to behave as a nonaligned country, championing the cause of the Third World, thus sustaining friction. Nevertheless, Soviet and Chinese positions on Third . World issues will move closer together. Kampuchea and Afghanistan. Progress will be difficult, and each side will continue to support its proteges while it advises caution and compromise. In Southeast Asia, the Soviets may. scale back their support for Vietnam while they continue to encourage Vietnamese acceptance of a coalition government of all forces in . Kampuchea. In exchange, the Chinese may.agree to negotiations i with Hanoi aimed at improving relations and reducing troop levels #3 along their border. On Afghanistan, Moscow might enlist Beijing ‘Ss .. .: help in persuading Pakistan to ‘restrict: outside’ aid to the insur~ ty+. | gents, in exchange for* lowering -troop | levels. as. the guerrilla : opposition diminishes. .. = ta. ci Economic Relations. “Sino-Soviet trade will increase at 4 dramatic percentage rates (perhaps approaching. $1 billion dollars compared with an. annual average of $500 million in the late 1970s), but it will not be significant in absolute terms for either coun- eo try. More important for international perceptions, Beijing will cae oe give even higher: priority to the modernization of existing plant and equipment, much of which was designed and equipped by the - - USSR. Western imports will play an important role in this upgrad- - -ing but it may also involve a considerable commitment to future |. trade with the USSR and Eastern-Europe. Moscow will offer techni- cal and material cooperation. Although Beijing will be cautious about accepting Soviet "assistance," the: exchange of planning and technical teams will be brisk. Impact The major effect of such improved ‘Sino-Soviet relations will be on perceptions; the military postures, trade patterns, trea- ties, and other commitments of the two countries will be essen- tially unchanged. The effect will be no less real for being intangible. Global Effects. Although China will continue to set its course independently of Moscow, the disunity of the communist camp will be less evident. The Soviet fear of encirclement will be somewhat diminished. Western morale will be correspondingly Lowered. CONFIDENTIAB/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS | UNCLASSIFIED | | | = ae UNCLASSIFIED So Bie ‘ probably will encourage a reevaluation of foreign policies by most countries on the South Asian subcontinent. India's relations with its smaller neighbors--Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan--would almost certainly improve, as might New Delhi's much stickier relations with Pakistan. A general detente in the region would reduce the influence of both superpowers. Insofar as it reduced Indian dependence on the USSR, it would favor the US. But it could also incline the Pakistanis toward an accommodation with the Soviets on Afghanistan. Much will depend on Soviet moves in Afghanistan and the level of US military supply to Pakistan. Moscow's closest Bast European allies will welcome increased party, trade, and cultural ties with a communist state whose independence from Moscow is undeniable. Beijing's. support for ‘ei independent communist regimes, however, will not. extend to “sé@ndorsément of freedom to reject communism. Theré- Gould. be an adverse. impact on European views of US reliability if’ the Sino- * Soviet*“rapprochement were seen ‘as a consequence ‘of aAmérican : ineptness_ “in~ its relations with China,. hee op. Sa east oh ae ~s t . 7 Prepared by Frank Crump X28657 Approved by Robert H. Baraz x29194 CONPIDENTIAD/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS UNCLASSIFIED a eee ee OI EE ee |